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

GIVEN BY

W. Morton Prince

THE CREED OF DEUTSCHTUM

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THE NATURE OF MIND AND HUMAN AUTOMATISM

THE DISSOCIATION OF A PERSONALITY

THE UNCONSCIOUS

THE CREED OF DEUTSCHTUM

AND OTHER WAR ESSAYS, INCLUDING
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE KAISER
WITH A FOREWORD BY MARQUIS OKUMA
(LATE PRIME MINISTER OF JAPAN)

BY

MORTON PRINCE

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Dr. Morton Prince.
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CONTENTS

CHAPTER		PAGE
I.	THE CREED OF DEUTSCHTUM . . .	9
II.	PRUSSIAN MILITARISM AND A LASTING PEACE	67
	THE DEMAND FOR THE SUPPRESSION OF PRUSSIAN MILITARISM	69
	WHAT IS PRUSSIAN MILITARISM? . . .	74
	PRUSSIAN MILITARISM IN PRACTICE . .	78
	PEACE BY NEGOTIATION IMPOSSIBLE AT THIS TIME	95
	A CONFLICT BETWEEN TWO PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT	96
III.	THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE KAISER .	103
	FOREWORD BY MARQUIS OKUMA . . .	107
	INTRODUCTION BY PROFESSOR SHIOSAWA .	111
	THE KAISER'S ANTIPATHY	117
	THE KAISER'S PREROGATIVES	131
	THE KAISER'S DIVINE RIGHT DELUSION .	134
	THE GERMAN AUTOCRACY AND THE ARMY	142
	THE KAISER'S SENTIMENTS	145
	THE KAISER'S SELF-REGARDING SENTIMENTS	150
	AIMS OF THE GERMAN DEMOCRACY . . .	157
	THE REAL CAUSE OF THE KAISER'S ANTIPATHY	166
	THE KAISER'S ANTIPATHY AN OBSESSION AND A DEFENSE REACTION	169
	THE MORAL	172

CHAPTER PAGE

IV. THE AMERICAN VERSUS THE GERMAN VIEWPOINT 175

FRENCH AND GERMAN LESSONS AT THE FRONT 175

Songs the Germans Sing 177

An American Viewpoint 178

Scores Were Shot Down 181

Shot to Defend Sister 182

Attitude of German Officers . . . 187

Why Was Louvain Burned? . . . 188

General von Boehn's View 190

Richard Harding Davis' Views . . 192

Awful Price Belgians Paid 193

Other Pictures Drawn 195

The German Ideal of Government . 199

THE GERMAN POLICY OF TERRORISM . . 201

Proclamations Threaten 203

The Evidence of German Soldiers' Diaries 206

The American Way by Contrast . . 208

War as Taught by the German War Book 210

The Policy of Destroying Merchantmen 212

The Prostitution of Intellectual Honesty 214

V. THE AMERICAN CONSCIENCE, 1914–15 219

VI. THE DISINTEGRATION OF AN IDEAL . 235

THE IDEAL 235

THE CONTRAST 252

CHAPTER PAGE

VII. THE WAR—A TEST OF THE GERMAN THEORY OF MILITARISM 265

VIII. A WORLD CONSCIOUSNESS AND FUTURE PEACE 285

THE INDIVIDUAL CONSCIOUSNESS . . . 285

Personality as Evolved by the Creative Force of the Experiences of Life . 288

The Subconscious as the Dynamic Source of Conduct 291

THE COLLECTIVE CONSCIOUSNESS . . . 293

Types of Collective Consciousness . 294

The Development of a Collective Consciousness 294

A Common Meaning to Ideals Essential to a Collective Consciousness . . 297

The Social Consciousness as the Regulator of Society 303

A World Consciousness 308

THE CREED OF DEUTSCHTUM

AN ADDRESS DELIVERED BEFORE THE PHILADELPHIA MEDICAL SOCIETY, OCTOBER 19, 1917.

THE CREED OF DEUTSCHTUM

I

THE thoughts upon this great war and the impressions that I have brought back from two visits to the battle front, have not had so much to do with the material aspects of the struggle—interesting as these are—as with the conflicting ideals for which the war is being fought on each side. Let me premise by saying that every visitor to England and France and to the western battle front has returned impressed by the gigantic scale on which this war is being waged and by the huge military and industrial organizations by means of which it is carried on. Indeed war is now a quasi business, organized on a colossal scale, employing millions of workers as well as soldiers and embracing nearly every sphere of human activity.

Leaving aside the mobilization of the factories, the mines, the railroads and shipping, the food supplies and hundreds of industries of all sorts, the spectacle at the front of the vast numbers of transport lorries, the hospitals with their million of

beds, the commissariat supplying millions of men, the air service with its thousands of flying machines, the extraordinarily developed intelligence service with its balloons and lookout posts besides its special aeroplanes and personnel; the telegraph and telephone service, the engineer service building and caring for the railroads and motor roads and pipe lines for water—the spectacle of all this and much besides staggers the imagination.

All these material aspects of the war are absorbingly instructive, but to my mind the most impressive thing, of which one soon becomes aware, is not material. It is the spirit of France and England. It is the national consciousness of the two nations. It is the unity of thought and common ideal which permeates the collective consciousness of the peoples. This ideal is the driving force which impels them to go on, and on, and on, and make no peace until the common ideal has achieved its end.

You have noticed that every squeal for peace has come out of Germany. Every day we hear a new squeal. But we hear not a sound from England or from France. There one is conscious only of a grim determination to go on until the final object is achieved. That object is something over and beyond the restoration of territory, and even beyond restitution for wanton destruction; and beyond indemnities.

Belgium must be restored: Yes.

Serbia—Yes.

Northern France—Yes.

Alsace-Lorraine—Yes, if possible.

The liberation of all the countries now overrun—Yes.

All this as a matter of course. But all this, or most of it, they could have had long before this if they had been content with going back to the *status quo ante.*

These objects omit the one supreme and final aim that will satisfy the aspirations of the national consciousness of England and France. This aim is a lasting peace, and therefore the attainment of that end which will guarantee a lasting peace. This end has been named by Lloyd George and Asquith and Bonar Law and Balfour and all the leading statesmen of the Allies as the destruction of Prussian militarism.

"Prussian militarism" is a convenient, short political expression, easily understood and useful as a political slogan. But it is far from being accurate. It is far from representing the meaning of the real thing which has menaced the peace and liberty of the world for over forty years. Prussian militarism is only one manifestation of that thing, only the means which that thing employs to accomplish its purposes.

The real thing is a mystic ideal of the German people called Das Deutschtum.†

I think that if we would understand France—if we would understand what France fears, and what

† Sometimes translated "Germanism."

England fears; what gives those countries the fortitude to go on and refuse to make peace until their supreme object is attained, we must grasp the full meaning of this Thing.

I have asked many responsible people in France why they are unwilling to make peace, and their answer has always been the same. It is the menace of *Das Deutschtum;* not formulated in that term it is true, but in the facts that it stands for. It is thoroughly realized that so long as this menace persists there can be no lasting peace.

We have heard a great deal of Prussian militarism, and of the military oligarchy and of the Junker class, and they alone have been held responsible for this war. But we have heard little in the sphere of practical politics of Deutschtum (or "Germanism") as a creed, as a mystic paranoid ideal which has permeated the consciousness of a whole nation, and we have heard little of one article of that creed, the so-called Mission of the German people. Few Americans, probably, have grasped what the Germans mean by Deutschtum.

I do not mean that much has not been written on the subject. On the contrary, the English and French war literature contains numerous brilliant essays and books exhaustively dealing with the subject; and there is a complete literature in German which has been the source from which most of our information has been derived. But in political and war speeches and the responsible statements of government officials little reference has been made to

these dominating ideals of the German people which are the real underlying force behind Prussian militarism. As they are the dominating ideals of the national consciousness of Germany, so it is the dominating ideal of the national consciousness of England and of France to destroy them.

We must keep in mind that Deutschtum represents the common ideals not only of the ruling classes, of the University professors, historians, scientists, philosophers, of all the intellectuals, but of the people at large. And it is the force—a very specific and impelling force—which has urged the German people and nation onward in their mad drive for world dominion, and for this purpose to make use of Prussian militarism.

II

It is impossible to define Deutschtum in a phrase. The word is untranslatable excepting perhaps by *"Germandom,"* which is inadequate. *Das Deutschtum* is the national consciousness of Germany so far as it pertains to conceptions of the state, of its power and will, of the character and destiny of the German race, and to the aspirations and political creeds of the people. It also involves an ideal of duty and obligations owed to the state by every citizen of the Empire. Hence it has been called "a state of mind." It is a system of ideals of the social and political consciousness of the people

as well as of the ruling classes. It comes well nigh to being a social insanity.

Deutschtum or Germandom, then, is a totality of ideas and sentiments, a system of mental, moral and political ideas organized about two closely connected central ideas, that of the state and that of the German people as a super-race, superior to all others.

In this system there have become evolved and organized a number of sentiments (including national policies) which have been postulated as ideals of this national consciousness. The driving force of these ideals has made the German nation what it is and given it the will to impose its dominion over the rest of the world and use whatever methods it saw fit regardless of the opinions of the rest of mankind. And out of these postulates there has developed a creed—a creed of Deutschtum. One may say that Deutschtum as a whole is the political creed of the German people, which like the Apostolic and other religious creeds embraces a series of postulates. But each postulate dogmatically expresses or is based upon the lust and the self-glorification of the German people.

Through these self-centred ideals Germany has, like a paranoiac, interpreted other nations, other peoples, and its own relations and obligations to them, whether in the domain of national rights and morals, or international law and treaties.

If one would seek the origin and evolution of Deutschtum we must go back a century or more to

the times of Frederick the Great and the immediately post-Napoleonic period. For all students of Germany are agreed that the root principles and philosophy of Deutschtum date back to the philosophers Hegel and Kant and Fichte, whose teachings have impregnated German thought—not only that of the so-called intellectuals, but of captains of industry, statesmen and even military writers.

But it is enough for us to take German thought as of the present day just as we find it. And as finally evolved all are equally agreed that German ideals, political, moral and military, as manifested by this war, are due to the force of the teachings, in the first place, of the political historian Treitschke and the unbalanced philosopher Nietzsche; ‡ and in the second place to the writings and preachings of a perfect swarm of university professors and other intellectuals who, as propagandists, have deluged the German people with their elaborations and secondary rationalizations of their masters' teachings. A philosophy runs through all this mass of thought, and it is a fact, that needs to be considered, that in no country has philosophy so permeated and determined the thought of the people, other than the professional philosophers, and the national consciousness as in Germany. That seems incredible to us practical Americans.

It will also seem incredible to many who do not know Germany that the scholastic classes—university professors and professional teachers generally,

‡ He finally became insane.

should have such an influence in shaping German thought and the views and policies of government. But it must be remembered that the German system of education is organized to that end. In the first place, the higher schools and universities are not only under the control of the state, but, as Professor Dewey,* of Columbia, well says, are a part of state life, and the state takes a hand in the selection of the teachers in subjects that have a direct bearing upon political policies.

In the second place the professors, being appointees of the state, are paid henchmen just as much as are the appointees of Tammany in New York. They and their subordinates have got to shout for the state and its apotheosis, as much as any political appointee, or off goes his head, or, at least, off goes any chance for preferment if he hopes to be a professor. And in the third place, one of the chief functions, from the State's point of view, of the universities is the preparation of men to become future state officials, members of the bureaucracy. We must not forget that the legislative body plays little part in the German government; it is hardly included in the State as such. The State is the Administration, responsible to the Kaiser alone; and this bureaucracy practically derives its membership from the universities. University teaching, therefore, shapes the thought of the Administration, the Kaiser, the State. Its philosophy has become inbred in the state ideals and the national consciousness.

* German Philosophy and Politics.

American and English professors have some modesty in inflicting their views on the world and do not consider it one of their functions to instruct the public on political questions. Indeed the public would not lend a very serious ear to their views, with the exception of those of a few distinguished representatives who can be counted almost on the fingers of the two hands. But in Germany the case is quite different. There the professors and their tribe have no such modesty. Indeed it is one of their functions to lecture the public as well as their students, and the public not only listens but looks to them for instruction. The professors are the educators of Germany. And this is true not only of the university men but of the so-called Intellectuals generally. The consequence has been that during the last twenty or thirty years a host of such men have produced a perfect deluge of books and pamphlets and articles on the various phases of Deutschtum. They have preached and hammered into the ears of the German people the doctrines of "Pan-Germanism,"—"morality of war," and "world dominion" and "power," and "the sanctity of the state" and the "chosen people" and the "Divine mission of Germany" and all that sort of thing. Since 1897 this has been particularly resonant, because in that year this preaching and hammering was organized into a propaganda which has been going on ever since. Two organizations were formed: one directed by the professors with a publication called *Der Kampf um das Deutschtum* (*The struggle for Germandom*); the

other, called the *Pan-Germanic League,* with a publication of that name, directed by a noisy group of men who inflamed public opinion by meetings, pamphlets, and articles. This latter became the Pan-Germanic party.

Among various other Pan-German organizations the *Deutsches Bund* was formed in 1894 with two important newspapers, the *Deutsche Tageszeitung* and the *Deutsche Zeitung* as organs. Prince von Bülow, former Chancellor of the Empire, who dates the arrival of Germany as a world power from 1897, has given much credit to the Pan-German League for its success in "stimulating" and "keeping alive" the sentiments taught in the schools and universities. All taught the various doctrines of Deutschtum until they became ingrained in the national consciousness of Germany, and the people became puffed up with self-glorification and came to believe they were the "chosen people" and had a mission to extend German ideas, German kultur, German dominion over the face of the earth; and many indeed to believe that they were called upon by God to regenerate the world. The result has been a most interesting sociological and psychological phenomenon—a quasi social insanity—a systematized herd delusion affecting a whole people. And the Delusion has become the national consciousness of Germany.

Unfortunately the rest of the world did not take all this as seriously as should have been done. But since the war began attention has been directed to

the study of these German teachings and the doctrines of Deutschtum. They have been collected by English and French writers and quoted extensively in many books and pamphlets.†

After the first shock which the unsophisticated receives they make dreary reading, for they are but reiteration and reiteration of the same ideas differing only in the degree of emotion and extrava-

† The following are sufficient: *Collection de Documents sur le Pangermanisme;* publié sous le direction de Mr. Charles Andler. (Les Origines du Pangermanisme, 1800 à 1888; Le Pangermanisme Continental sous Guillaume II, de 1888 à 1914.)

Gems (?) of German Thought; Compiled by William Archer. Doubleday, Page & Co., 1917. (This collection contains 501 Gems, arranged by subjects. As the author says, it could easily have been made 1001 Gems.)

German Ideals in 1917 and in 1914; by André Chevrillon. (The author discusses briefly the ideals with quotations from and references to a large number of German writers.)

Out of Their Own Mouths [compiled by Munroe Smith]. D. Appleton, 1917. (A large collection of "utterances" arranged in accordance with the vocations of the writers—"German Rulers, Statesmen, Savants, Publicists, Dramatists, Poets, Businessmen, Party Leaders and Soldiers.

Jugés par eux-mêmes; Paris. Berger-Levrault, 1916.

Das annexionistische Deutschland; "A collection of documents published or circulated since August 4, 1914, in Germany"; by S. Grumbach; Payor & Co., Lausanne, 1917. (Professor Munroe Smith gives a resumé of these in a review in The Political Science Quarterly for September, 1917.)

The Kaiser; edited by Asa Don Dickenson, 1914 (contains numerous classic quotations from the Kaiser's utterances).

The Kaiser's Speeches; Translated and edited by Wolf von Schierbrand, &c. Harper & Brothers, 1903.

My Ideas and Ideals. Kaiser Wilhelm II. Boston, John W. Luce & Co. 1914. (A collection of gems from the Kaiser's utterances.)

The War Lord; by J. M. Kennedy: Duffield & Co. 1914 (Another collection of the same).

The German Emperor as Shown in His Public Utterances; by Christian Gault. Charles Scribner's Sons. 1915.

grance of delusion. They are, however, instructive and every American should read them. In no other way can one obtain an insight into German thought and understand Germany. They are the teachings of professors, and scientists, and publicists, and industrial magnates and ministers of the Gospel, and military writers, and philosophers, and historians, and public men, and ethnologists, and travelers, and journalists, and poets, and what not. No wonder the German people believe in *Das Deutschtum!* Under such constant hammering the thickest skull would be penetrated at last.

A journalist has thus sarcastically but accurately summed up this propaganda for *Das Deutschtum:*

> For a generation before the war modern Germany travestied Bismarck's calculated violence while incapable of his wisdom. Every sedentary professor, puffed up with swipes and imitation, imagined himself to be a son of iron and a potential man of blood. More and more the speech and writing of the whole nation became heavy with passionate words and menacing metaphor. Swords, mailed fists, and hammers jangled in this clanking vocabulary, but, on the whole, the hammers had it. The poet's word that one must be 'either hammer or anvil' was repeated like a creed. Wagner, the race-worshipping historians, the two kinds of Pan-Germans, idealist and materialist, and a theatrical Kaiser in a helmet, made mythology a worse agent of delirium than alcohol.

III

I have no intention of covering again this dreary, if shocking, ground of German Ideals"; I want only to restate one or two of their postulates which

are fundamental and from which as premises are derived the most dangerous delusion in the Creed of Deutschtum—dangerous for the future peace of the world. These postulates are the I, IV and IX articles of the creed which itself may be formulated without doing violence to the claims of the Germans themselves as follows:

Ten Articles of the Creed of Deutschtum

I. I believe in the apotheosis of the State, personified as the supreme Will and idealized as Power, above morality, treaties and international law; and I believe a State when without physical Power ceases to be a State and becomes a community without rights.

II. I believe in militarism as the Pillar of the State and the means by which the Will and Power of the State shall overcome all resistance and rule over all other wills and extend the sovereignty of Germany and Germanism.

III. I believe that war is sacred and moral; and that frightfulness is a justified method by which militarism may effect the aims of Germany when resisted.

IV. I believe the German race to be a biologically super-race and the Salt of the Earth, the Chosen of God.

V. I believe there are no inherent, inalienable and natural rights of mankind which the State is obliged to respect and which are reserved to the people as in democracies.

VI. I believe it to be the duty of every individual to subordinate his will to the will of the State, which is above the will of private and public opinion and not responsible to the latter.

And I believe that every German is a citizen-soldier obligated to work and fight in his own

sphere of activity, not for his own private interests but for German greatness and to propagate the German idea throughout the world; to the end that Germany may in every way—politically, economically, industrially, intellectually and militarily dominate all other races and peoples.

VII. I believe that Germany has a mission to extend her territories and power at the expense of less meritorious and inferior people—as all other people are.

VIII. I believe the German State collaborates with God, and in the subjugation of weaker people is carrying out the Will of God.

IX. I believe the State and the German people have a mission to extend German kultur and German ideas throughout the people of the earth and thus regenerate the world.

X. I believe the Western ideas of Democracy, Liberty and Liberalism—the "declarations of Rights" of the great Western nations (particularly the American Declaration of 1774 and the French Declaration of 1789), the American doctrine of "inherent and inalienable rights" reserved to the people and which no government can take away —are antiquated, effete and harmful; I believe the present war is a conflict between German ideals and Western Democratic ideals; and the new Gospel of the autocratic German State is to supersede the liberal gospel of liberty and government by the people of the Western Democracies.

Some of these articles are secondary "rationalizings" from the fundamental ideals. I have in mind here only to amplify the conception of the State (I), the idea of the Germans being a superrace (IV), and particularly the Mission of the German people (IX).

Article I. The German Conception of the State

The conception of the State as Power, and having a lot of other metaphysical attributes, has been repeated over and over again in parrot fashion so many times that it has become a mystic article of faith. Its very mysticism lends to it force and ease of proselytizing, as is the case with a religious dogma, which this metaphysical notion of State has very nearly become. The phrase formulated by Treitschke "The State is Power" has become a shibboleth. The idea dates back to Lasson, who wrote in 1868, and perhaps it is of earlier date for all I know. But Treitschke furnished this formula, which tickles the ear. It is made up of words which severally have meaning, but when incorporated in a phrase have no meaning at all. One might as well say that "a civic community is a funded debt" or, "a university is an autocratic will." Yet the formula has intoxicated Germany into a blind worship of Power and the creation of militarism as the pillar on which that power shall rest; it has deluded them into elevating might above everything else in the world and inculcating the mystic belief that in this worship of Power is the allegiance owed to the State.

Then, amongst its other attributes, the State is an entity, a mystic personality; it is the Absolute; the sovereign in everything—morals, will, and everything else. Some extremists would even endow it with Divinity, "The State is God on earth,"

as Prof. Dewey of Columbia sums up the doctrine of Hegel who said, "The march of God in history is the cause of the existence of States." Indeed "history is the movement, the march of God on earth through time" (Dewey). Hence, as argued by a German, to surrender any territory which Germany has conquered in the present war would be sacrilegious. In this political philosophy Germany is conceived, as Professor Durkeim has phrased it, as the highest terrestrial incarnation of divine power.

These attributes are of practical importance because, for instance, from the dogmas of the sovereignty of the will and in morals are derived the axioms that the State can break treaties and international law when it wills, and that in war as well as in peace, the State is above the laws of morality and humanity, which only apply to individuals. The sovereignty of the will of the State necessarily extends to public opinion. This kind of a state, conceived of as a mystic personal entity, is not, as in democracies, the expression of public opinion but something apart from and above it. It may or may not, as it pleases, take into consideration the will of the people, or classes of the people. Indeed there can scarcely be a will of the people, for absolute obedience to the will of the State is the highest duty of the citizens. There is perfect freedom of opinion, but the duty of all is to obey. This has a different significance from the obligation, in democracies, of every citizen to obey the

State. For in Democracies if the "State" adopts methods, or policies, or morals, or behavior disapproved by the majority, out goes the "State," i. e., the administration, bag and baggage. Society governs.

The Kaiser once said, "There is no law but my law; there is no will but my will," and the world outside Germany first gasped at the audacity, and then smiled at what it thought personal, swashbuckling, autocratic arrogance. But in reality it was only this German conception of the State, for the Kaiser symbolized the State in his person. And, similarly, his saying, "Considering myself as the instrument of the Lord, and without heeding the views and opinions of the day, I go my way," was only another way of asserting, in accordance with Articles I, V and VI of the Creed, that the will of the State was superior to that of society.

This dogma that the State is power justifies the invasion and rape of Belgium, because, of course as logically follows, a State is a State only just so far as it has power. "A so-called small state is not a state at all, but only a tolerated community which absurdly pretends to be a State." . . . "The lesser states have rights only in so far as they possess a power of resistance that must be taken into account." (Lasson.)

One ideal which has been of wonderful assistance to the German Empire, both in its internal development and in its policy of dominating other peoples, has logically resulted from this mystic con-

ception of the State and the duty of obedience to the will of the State. But it has had a most malign influence upon the welfare of other peoples. It is the ideal that every German, on the one hand, should subordinate his private interests and rights to the interests of the State, and, on the other, that as a citizen soldier, he is obligated to work and fight in his own sphere of activity to further the ideals and policies and aggressions of the Fatherland—the ideals of *Das Deutschtum*.

This ideal has been taught and fostered by the State in the school and university until it has become ingrained in the personality of every German. It has been the motivating force underlying the German propaganda in America and elsewhere, and gives the real insidious meaning to the notorious Delbrück law which claims a continuing allegiance to the Fatherland of every German naturalized in a foreign country. Mr. Kuno Francke, who until very recently was Professor at Harvard University, has borne testimony to this devotion of every German to the national conception of State and the obligations that it entails. I shall have occasion to quote him as a witness in several connections, as he is one of the most conservative of Americans of German birth and education and one who has won the respect of the community because of his refusal, out of a sense of duty to his adopted country, to join at the outset of the war the intriguing group of German propagandists in this country of which Münsterberg and Dernberg were leaders.

Professor Francke, however, has appealed, somewhat naïvely, I think, for American approbation of German ideals without an apparent thought that those ideals which he lavishly extols can only shock the American conscience. However that may be, his testimony, as that of one who knows his Germany, is of value. In regard to the solidarity of German sentiment regarding the State and duties of citizens he has said:

> No doubt there never was a conception of the state among any people from which this moral and disciplinary view was entirely absent. But not since Plato's time has this view anywhere been a national force as truly vital and all embracing as it has come to be in modern Prussia and Germany. It has imbued the whole German people, as no other people is imbued, with the spirit of national service and national achievement. The modern German mind instinctively refuses to accept any of the thousand and one private activities that constitute the daily life of a people as something really private and isolated. The farmer and the miner, the factory hand and the sailor, the business man and the preacher, the scholar and the artist—they are all soldiers, soldiers for German greatness and progress; and their spheres of activity, far apart as they may seem from each other, are in reality on one and the same level, the level of the fight for making Germany in every way, politically, economically, intellectually, and morally—a self-supporting, self-relying, conspicuously healthy and conspicuously productive national organism.*

Professor Francke, it is true, has adroitly narrowed the conception of the State to "preëminently

* "The War—A Test of the German Theory of the State" (The Problems and Lessons of the War: Clark University Addresses: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1916).

a moral agency superior to society," "its principal mission" being "to raise the individuals that make up society to a higher level of public consciousness and energy." But the German "conception of the state" is too well known to be concealed by this camouflage. The solidarity of sentiment and mobilization of the people is the point.

Article IV. The Germans a Super-Race

The inrooted belief that the German race is a super-race is a cardinal article of the Deutschtum creed. To justify this belief appeal has been made to a mythical biological race-type (to which it is claimed Germans alone belong); to heredity and anthropology, to history and legend, supported by the achievements of the much vaunted German kultur. The race-type has been claimed to be characterized by blue eyes and blond hair and complexion; and historians and "race-biologists" have tried to show that when men of genius have appeared in other nations they were blonds and had blue eyes and therefore were descendants of the German race.

Anthropologists and other scientists and so-called "race-biologists" like Houston Chamberlain, have not hesitated, as no greater biologist than Professor Jacques Loeb† of the Rockefeller Institute has, amongst others, pointed out, to misrepresent scientific principles of heredity and evolution and put forward a pseudo-science by which they have ap-

† Biology and War; *Science*, Jan. 26, 1917.

pealed to the vanity, and captivated the self-esteem of the people. Running through Pan-Germanic literature one finds this idea of a super-race constantly and frankly stated, or connoted, or assumed.

The following well known quotations from the utterances of important people from the Kaiser down are illustrative. They could be multiplied a thousand fold *ad nauseam.*

We are the salt of the earth.

We are the chosen people.

Many are called but few are chosen.

We are of all the peoples, the most noble, the most pure, destined before others to work for the highest development of humanity.

Deutschland is above everything, above everything in the world.

We are indubitably the most martial nation in the world. . . .

We are the most gifted of nations in all the domains of science and art. We are the best colonists, the best sailors and even the best traders.

Germany is so far above and beyond all the other nations that all the rest of the earth, be they who they may, should feel themselves well cared for when they are allowed to fight with the dogs for the crumbs that fall from her table.

The Teutons are the aristocracy of Humanity.

Whosoever has the characteristics of the Teuton race is superior . . . the cultural value of a nation is measured by the quantity of Teutonism it contains.

Immoral, of course, is a policy of power if it is employed, as amongst our enemies, to supplant the higher German culture and morality by the much lower English, French, or Russian culture (or lack of culture).

The Teutons are the aristocracy of humanity; the Latins, on the contrary, belong to the degenerate mob.

The German people is always right, because it is the German people and numbers 87 million souls.

I want first to make it clear in what sense we may say, without extravagance or the least trace of self-exaltation: Germany is chosen, for her own good and that of other nations, to undertake their guidance. Providence has placed the appointed people, at the appointed moment, ready for the appointed task.

Here in America even Prof. Francke has sung the same swan song:

No unprejudiced observer of contemporary European affairs can get away from the fact that Germany during the last fifty years has excelled all other countries in eagerness and momentum of private initiative. The German schoolboy is more eager to learn, the German university student is more firmly set upon independent research, the German workman has a higher level of average intelligence, the German farmer is more scientific in the cultivation of his soil, the German manufacturer is more ready to introduce new methods of production, the German business man is more active in finding new outlets for his goods, the German city administrator is more keenly alive to civic improvements, the German army and navy officer is more fully abreast with every new experiment or device of military tactics, all Germans are keyed up to a more intense, a more swiftly pulsating manner of life than is the case in any one of the nations with which Germany is now at war. All this intensity of private initiative, I believe, is largely due to the impelling force exerted upon the individual by the exalted views instinctively held by all Germans regarding the mission and the functions of the state.‡

‡ *Loc. cit.*

Article IX. The Holy Mission of the German People

This belief in race and kultur superiority would be harmless and could be laughed at if it had not led to calamitous consequences. From this belief as one premise, and the mystic conception of the State embodied in and taught by *Das Deutschtum* as another, Germany has justified and stimulated her lust for power and territory by the conclusion that it is the mission of a superior race to extend itself at the expense of inferior races over the rest of the world. And, therefore, the German people have this mission on this earth: to extend Deutschtum over all other peoples, European, American and Asiatic, to regenerate the world for the benefit of humanity. It is the same idea that the white races have, or have had as to their duties towards uncivilized races—"the white man's burden." This is the principal theme to which I wish to speak.

However grotesque the idea may appear, or however much of a moral insanity it may be regarded, it is real—a real, vital, impelling force and must be taken seriously. It is, indeed, the great sociological obsessing delusion with which, to state it conservatively, the dominant classes of Germany have become affected. It has become a national ideal.

It is not always easy in analysing a psychological obsession to determine the basic causal root ideas from which the obsession has sprung. As a rule, every obsession has its roots in several antecedent

ideas which coöperate in the final mental state, and around which others become systematized through processes of rationalizing. Students of Germandom, or "Germanism," therefore, differ somewhat in their conclusions on this point. But my view would be that the main psychological roots of this obsession are to be found in the two premises I have mentioned. But systematized with them in the delusional belief and as coöperative ideas, reached by the process of rationalization are the doctrines of so-called Prussian militarism, the sanctity of war and the justification of frightfulness as necessary methods.

In the light of this German state of mind with all its obsessing ideas, and in the light of German world-wide activities and propagandism, the idea *"Deutschland über Alles,"* so widely popularized in song and speech, acquires a deeper and wider meaning than military and economic sovereignty, or political sovereignty over Mittel-Europa and other territories belonging to other people. It means in addition that the German State is above all other states, above international law, above morality, above civil society, above all private rights, above public opinion; and its will is above the will of all individuals (singly or collectively) whose duty is to obey. And it means that German ideas, German Kultur, and everything that the German idea stands for—world-power, world-markets, world-kultur (*"Weltmacht, Weltmarkt, Weltkultur"*)—is to be extended throughout the world. As Prince

von Bülow said, "Germany above everything, everything in the world." In this Deutschtum is summed up.

This idea of a world mission is a very old one, and has agitated German thought for a century at least. At the commencement of the last century the philosopher Fichte taught that "the Germans, of all the modern nations, had received in special measure into their safekeeping the seeds of human perfection," and that it had been entrusted to them to take the leading part in their development in the great confederation of a new humanity. "Since then," as Lavisse and Andler remark, "that magnificent and mystic declaration of haughty pride has been repeated a hundred times."* These authors go on to point out that Heinrich Heine in his time had announced that "Not only Alsace and Lorraine, but the whole of France and Europe, and the world itself will find salvation and become ours. Yes, the whole world shall be German. I have often dreamed of that mission of the universal domination of Germany when I was walking in my reveries under the evergreen pines of my fatherland."

A few quotations from more recent writers—which I take from various collections and other writings—will suffice to present the point of view:

He who does not believe in the Divine mission of Germany had better hang himself, and rather to-day than to-morrow.—H. S. Chamberlain.

* German Theory and Practice of War.

We are indeed entrusted here on earth with a doubly sacred mission: not only to protect Kultur . . . against the narrow-hearted huckster-spirit of a thoroughly corrupted and inwardly rotten commercialism (*Jobbertum*), but also to impart Kultur in its most august purity, nobility and glory to the whole of humanity, and thereby contribute not a little to its salvation. *Ein Deutscher: Was uns der Krieg bringen muss.*

Germany is the future of humanity—Pastor W. Lehmann.

God defend the noble cause of Deutschtum. There is no other hope for the future of humanity.—H. S. Chamberlain, 1914.

We must vanquish, because the downfall of Germanism would mean the downfall of humanity.—Pastor K. König.

The German people must rise as a master-folk above the inferior peoples of the colonies.—*Grossdeutschland und Mitteleuropa um das Jahr 1950, von einem Alldeutschen, 1895.*

A great mission, scarcely comprehensible to other nations, is unquestionably reserved for the whole German character (*Anlage*) [which is defined as] the spirit of pure humanity [and the mission as] the ennoblement of the world.—Richard Wagner.

We hope that a great mission will be allotted to us Germans . . . and this German mission is: to look after the world (*zu sorgen für die Welt*). Is it arrogance to write such a phrase? Is it vanity in the disguise of a moral idea? No, no, and again no.—Pastor G. Traube, 1914.

It is my firm belief that the country to which God gave Luther, Goethe, Bach, Wagner, Moltke, Bismarck and William I. has still a great mission before it, to work for the welfare of humanity. God has put us to a hard probation . . . that we may the better serve as His instrument for the saving of mankind; for we were on the point of becoming untrue to our old-estab-

lished nature (*Wesen*). He who has imposed upon us this ordeal will also help us out of it.—Extract from letter of an important personage, but unnamed, to H. S. Chamberlain.

God has in Luther practically chosen the German people, and that can never be altered, for is it not written in Romans XI, 29, "For the gifts and calling of God are without repentance."—Dr. Preuss.

We have entered into the war with hearts high and pure, permeated with the aspirations of our national future. That future we will fill with the blossoms of our culture; it is assured to us by the desire that inspires and unites all Germans to raise the world to full nobleness and perfection.—Historian Lamprecht.

Papacy and Empire are both Teutonic organizations for domination, meant to subjugate the world. The Teutonic race is called to circle the earth with its rule, to exploit the treasures of nature and of human labor power, and to make the passive races servient elements in its cultural development.—Ludwig Woltmann.

The poet Wolfskehl declares:

To-day the question is that of the life or death of European culture. Your accomplices sin against the Holy Ghost of Europe. We make this war for all the humanity of Europe. This war comes from God. The divine element in humanity is at stake.

Professor Mahling announced:

The hour of the world-mission of the German people had struck. . . . Do we desire to be the hammer which God wields?

And thus we might go on quoting tediously and almost indefinitely from German writers upholding the mission of Germany in one or other of its aspects.

And so there has developed this most dangerous

of the ideals of *Das Deutschtum* which postulates the Mission (sometimes called "divine" and "holy") of Germany to expand and regenerate the world according to German ideas for the benefit of humanity. It is not difficult to understand that some extremists, holding that the State itself is divine, or derives its power from God, or is the instrument of God, or collaborator with God, believe that this mission is a Holy Mission; and that the "chosen people" are called "to live and expand at the expense of other less meritorious people." In other words, as one American writer, Arthur Bullard, phrases it, the Germans believe they have been called of God to regenerate the world. Hence "Deutschtum is a crusade"—a political religion.

How widely the notion of a holy authority for this mission obtains there is no means of knowing. But considering the mystic elevation of the state, the almost universality of the belief that every German is obligated to work for the power and dominion of the state; that his highest duty is his duty to the state, subordinating all private rights and interests to that end, that the spread of Germanism would be for the glory and power and advantage of the state and the greatest good of humanity, the spiritual force of this mission is almost as great under the authority of the State as if it were universally felt to be one ordained by God as many really do insist.

The notion of collaboration with God crops out in nearly every speech, order or proclamation the

Kaiser makes, and takes on a fuller meaning when the national ideal of a mission is kept in mind. When we also bear in mind that the regeneration of the world, which the mission of Deutschtum would bring about, intends the supplanting of the ideals of the Eastern and the Western world with the German ideals of the elevation of the state above all moral laws and international law, of the deification of Force, the deification of War as holy, the sacred duty of violating treaties, the obligation to use Frightfulness, and so on, we realize the danger to lasting peace from this ideal of Deutschtum which is the inspiring force of the German nation.

IV

Notwithstanding all the extensive literature of Deutschtum, the thoughtful reader will ask himself to what extent its ideals have permeated the masses as well as the classes of the German people. It is very easy to overwork a fact as well as an idea, and the tendency is to overstatement in political argument. The very fact that it was thought necessary in Germany to organize such extensive campaigns and to harangue the German people about German and Pan-German ideals suggests at least an original general apathy or ignorance and need of a propaganda. How far has this been overcome?

We never know until after the votes are counted

what the opinion of the people is. Now the point I have in mind is how far does the great silent thought of the people share these ideals which have been so noisily taught by the classes? Suppose that a questionnaire on the creed of Germandom were circulated throughout the whole people of Germany, how would the masses answer the questions? Probably no one inside or outside Germany really knows. But it is probable that as in all countries they would follow their leaders when it came to action. We know that the Kaiser, the government and the controlled press, the Junkers and the commercial and industrial groups represented by six of the most important industrial and agricultural associations, the intellectuals, the military and naval castes, the captains of industries, the conservative and liberal political parties and many other class groups are devotees to the creed of *Das Deutschtum* either as a whole or in one or more of its articles of faith. According to the concrete issues to the front at any time one ideal naturally dominates the thought of the day to the exclusion of others. Just at present the war has necessarily forced into the focus of interest the Pan-Germanic idea of extension of territory by annexation of the conquered countries. * Opinion on this issue is

* For an important account and discussion of German opinion on this point see "German Land Hunger" by Professor Munroe Smith in the Political Science Quarterly for September 1917. This article is a review of "Das annexionistische Deutschland" (A collection of documents published or circulated in Germany since Aug. 4, 1914) by S. Grumbach, Payot & Co., Lausanne, 1917.

necessarily more or less governed or modified from time to time by the requirements of practical politics and the changing war situations. It would appear, however, from the evidence in hand, that the dominant opinion of the classes looks upon the present hour as the golden opportunity to grasp the fruits of military victory and thus at last bring to fruition this particular long-cherished aspiration of *Das Deutschtum* by annexing Belgium, northern France, the Baltic provinces, Poland and large slices of Russia. On the other hand, the Social Democrats have consistently, since 1914, repudiated "annexations," but as Munroe Smith† shows us, "the majority group did not reject territorial guarantees and securities," evidently infected by the patriotic hysteria of the war fever.

The Social-Democrats

To *Das Deutschtum* as a whole the members of this large political group have been classed as "dissenters," if not heretics. Indeed it is difficult to see how this democratic party—for such it really is—can have reconciled some of these articles of faith with their own party platforms. Indeed it has been opposed to the doctrine of war, a large military establishment and colonial expansion. In its last party platform of 1912 the social-democrats definitely recorded themselves on these points. Then, too, the long and bitter struggle which they carried

† loc. cit.

on for years against the Government, since the time of Bismarck, can only be interpreted as a repudiation of that conception of the State which has been so systematically taught by the schools and universities. On the other hand, concrete issues in which they have opposed the State have related mostly to internal reforms, such as the ballot, and have not touched the philosophy of Pan-Germanism. But it is also true that the doctrine of a Super-Germanic, blue-eyed, and blond-race has infected the proletarian socialists as well as the other classes. The members of this group are human and Germans as well as social-democrats, and the doctrines of the superiority of the German race and its mission to regenerate the world are not incompatible with their platform, and have touched the soft spots of egotism and vanity in their personalities. It is expecting too much of human nature that they should not have accepted the teachings of renowned students and historians and "race-biologists" who have dinned into their ears their superiority over all other races and the great benefit that will come to humanity by the "peaceful penetration" of the world by German kultur. And so they have shut their eyes to the methods of intrigue, and deceit, and espionage, by which peaceful penetration was being brought about. The "mission" of Germany activated largely by the super-race delusion received from them little if any resistance. It is only to the militaristic methods of regenerating the world that they have taken exception.

That the majority of the social-democrats have largely supported the government *after* war was declared proves nothing.

We are allowed to know so little of what has been going on inside Germany since war was begun that no one outside probably can speak from direct knowledge. But there are a few known facts and certain general principles that can be offered without danger of being wrong.

In the first place, we know that all Germans have been made to believe—probably because they wanted to believe—that Germany was attacked, and the social-democrats always said they would defend the Fatherland if attacked. As Francke who knows his Fatherland has testified:

> They [the *masses* as well as the intellectuals] believe that Germany has been the victim of a world-wide coalition to rob her of the legitimate fruits of her unremitting toil for national organization and to crush the spirit of national solidarity that has led to German ascendency in nearly every field of higher activity. Whatever may be one's views as to the historical basis for this belief, there can be no doubt that it is this belief more than anything else which is giving Germany in this war an extraordinary heroic strength. . . . Over and over again she has been blocked in these enterprises by the ill will of her more grasping rivals, and it is hard to resist the conclusions that the present war was entered upon by her enemies with the hope of shutting her out once for all from the great stakes of colonial expansion.‡

Nothing was more naïve than the expectation that social-democrats would be disloyal to their

‡ loc. cit.

country after war was declared. They were opposed to the declaration of war and disavowed all responsibility therefor. But the Fatherland being engaged in war it became another matter.

In the second place, it is a common, everyday observation that nearly every person, once in a fight, forgets the cause and the principles at issue and goes in to win.

Thirdly, social-democrats are patriots and the great mass of patriots in any country are, like all bred-in-the-bone Americans, for their country, "right or wrong."

Fourthly, it is a well-known psychological fact that persons who have broken away, later in life, from the early and deeply inculcated sentiments and principles of youth and accepted new points of view on intellectual grounds, afterwards in times of stress, like war, or misfortune, or danger, tend to revert to those earlier ingrained sentiments in which feeling is strongly incorporated. And they also revert to the influence of the primitive instincts which had been brought under control by the social education. Striking examples of this principle we have seen amongst the hyphenated (German) Americans in this country.

We can safely say, then, in spite of their attitude during the war, that most of the ideals of *Das Deutschtum* were not shared on the whole by the social-democrats before the war. And there is good reason to believe that when the time comes for peace, this large group of Germans will be found

to support the demand of the rest of the world for the suppression of Prussian militarism and Prussian autocracy. With the subsidence of the excitement of war the principles of democracy will once again become dominant in their thoughts.

As to the mass of the rest of the German "people,"* we have to guide us the information brought out of Germany by foreign diplomats and correspondents of the press and the testimony of neutrals who have resided or travelled in Germany after the outbreak of war, and we have the utterances of so-called representative men and of the press, the parliamentary debates of party representatives and a vast mass of writings. Through all this there runs a concordance of testimony showing few discordant notes amongst the Germans themselves. Undoubtedly these notes would be more strident and more numerous if it were not for the official censorship. But, also undoubtedly, the intolerant social censorship of the majority public opinion is quite as powerful in suppressing individual revolt as the official censorship. That is true in all communities. And in Germany, as elsewhere, there must be a large number of the ignorant and the uneducated, the "boobs," who are too unintelligent to have any opinions at all on national ideals and therefore on the philosophy and the ideals of *Das Deutschtum*. These can be left out of ac-

* I put aside the Pan-Germanists, Junkers and other groups whose sentiments are well known to be those of *Das Deutschtum*.

count. It is only the dominants that count. But of the dominant intelligent classes, aside from the military caste, whether men of business affairs engaged in manufactures, and commerce, and finance, and industry, or of the professions, or agriculture, or other vocations, the evidence goes to show, as many have pointed out, the vast majority have accepted and become inoculated with the teachings of the universities and higher schools and of the "intellectuals." They have become permeated with the ideals of the Creed of Deutschtum until these have become habits of thought and second nature. Of course one ideal is more controlling in one mind and one in another. We have only to look about us in this country and note the sentiments of Germans and so-called German-Americans, born and educated in Germany but now living in our midst. Nearly all these, almost without exception, even moderate men like Professor Francke who wish to be loyal to American ideals were, before we entered the war, dominated by German thought, German ideals, and admiration for German kultur. These men, under the reactionary impulses awakened by the war, reverted, as was natural, to the inculcated teaching of their youth.

But the "state of mind" of Germans in the United States is only in part to be ascribed to reversion. In large part it was due to systematic organized propaganda, begun and carried on for years before the war. (Article VI of Creed.) It was carried on by a German language press and

by German societies of different kinds, possibly by some unconscious of its deeper purpose. This purpose was to spread and inculcate the ideas of *Das Deutschtum* in America as has been done in South America and other countries. Indeed, accounts have been written by German-Americans recording the progress of the "German idea" in the United States.†

This invasion has been a part of the "peaceful penetration" which the German government and nation have persistently carried on in nearly all countries in quest of world dominion. The German "idea" is so utterly hostile to American ideals that its penetration into America can only be regarded as a menace to our institutions. And the German societies engaged, consciously or unconsciously, in spreading *Das Deutschtum* in the United States must be viewed as dangerous elements.

The upshot of these two forces—reversion and propagandism—is that the state of mind of Germans in the United States fairly reflects that of their countrymen in the Fatherland. If we want to understand the dominant state of mind of Germans at home we have only to examine that of those here in America.

The situation has been, then, fairly summed up by Professor Francke when he said, in December,

† Notably *Das Deutschtum in den Vereinigten Staaten* by Julius Goebel, professor in the University of Chicago: and *Das Deutschtum der Vereinigten Staaten,* by Professor Karl Knortz, Superintendent of Schools at Evansville, Indiana (1898).

1915, although possibly without realizing how it would sound to American ears:

With the exception of a few Socialist theorizers, not a German has lifted his voice during the last twelvemonth but to declare that this war is the decisive test of German nationality, of everything for which Germans have lived and died in the past. American observers have frequently expressed surprise that the intellectual and spiritual leaders of the Germany of to-day, scientists like Haeckel and Ostwald, philosophers like Eucken and Wundt, philologists like Wilmanowitz and Diels, historians like Eduard Meyer and Erich Marcks, economists like Schmoller and Wagner, theologians like Harnack and Troeltzsch, musicians like Humperdinck and Strauss, poets like Dehmel and Gerhardt Hauptmann—are all of one mind in this crisis, and that in their individual or collective utterances they lay much more stress upon conviction than argument. The reason, I think, is that these men, and with them the masses of the German people, feel that the German cause in this war *needs* no logical defense, that it is impossible to think that the most orderly, industrious, intelligent, law-abiding, sober and spiritually minded of nations should suddenly become insane, and from sheer madness of passion and lust of conquest have plunged into a war of aggression against the majority of the world's military powers, in other words into what to all outward appearances would seem certain self-destruction.‡

V

It is safe, then, to say that the policies, methods and utterances of the statesmen and public men of Germany, however shocking they have been to our ears, have in no way misrepresented the sen-

‡ loc. cit.

timents of the German people as a whole.

When the Kaiser in a speech in 1905 declared "We are the salt of the earth," all the world outside of Germany smiled and thought to itself, it is only one of the Kaiser's exuberant boastings and vainglorious phrases. But he had not coined the phrase although he made it famous. It was only a trite, banal exclamation which had been repeated hundreds of times by others and belonged to the thought of *Das Deutschtum.* It was as commonplace to German ears as it would be to Americans, if the President had said, "the American flag is the most glorious of flags"; or, "America is 'the home of the brave and the land of the free.' "

And likewise, when the Kaiser said, in 1907, at Münster:

> Let all the old and new subjects of this Empire, the citizens, the peasants, the working men, unite in one and the same sentiment of love and fidelity towards the Fatherland, and the German people will be the block of granite, upon which our *Lord God will be able to raise and perfect the civilization of the world;* it is then that the saying of the poet will be made good: "The world some day will owe its salvation to Germanism."

When he said this he was only repeating the idea of the collaboration of God and Germany which he had learned in the universities and which had permeated German thought as well as his own.

When the German Chancellor, von Bethmann-Hollweg, in the stormy interview with the English Ambassador on August 4, 1914, characterized

the treaty guaranteeing the neutrality of Belgium as only a "scrap of paper," he said nothing shocking or even new to the German mind. He did not even coin this phrase which dates back to Frederick William IV; he only made it historic. Likewise in 1901 an anonymous writer in an important publication had used the same expression: "What about treaties? In time of war the articles of all treaties of neutrality are carried away by wind like so many *scraps of paper.*" * Although von Bethmann-Hollweg's exclamation was uttered in a moment of anger, which temporarily disrupted his diplomatic self-control, it gave away not only the real underlying belief of the man, but one of the ideals of German statesmanship long and widely inculcated as one of the ideals of *Das Deutschtum.* The doctrine had been current for years and years in Germany. And similarly with the claim of the right to invade a neutral state under the "law of necessity." The demands of statescraft required that such principles as, "The German state does not consider itself bound by treaties when it is for her interest to break them," and, "Small states from lack of power are not states at all and therefore have no rights and may be invaded," should not be disclosed, but should be repressed in diplomatic intercourse. Under the force of the angry emotion of the moment, the lid was lifted and the repressed ideal burst out to the surface. For the instant, the mask was removed; the diplomatic ve-

* German Ideals in 1917 and in 1914 by André Chevrillon.

neer, that only imitated the morality of civilization, cracked. This is the true significance of the disclosure which has shocked the conscience of the world. The doctrine has been preached and hammered into the consciousness of the German people until it has become one of the cardinal articles of the Creed of Deutschtum.

When von Bülow, the former Chancellor, said: "The King must be at the head of Prussia; Prussia at the head of Germany; and Germany at the head of the universe"; and, "Germany above everything, everything in the world," he was only giving expression to the current thought of the German people, and not merely to that of the military and Junker class, or of the autocracy of which he was the official representative.

When General von Moltke wrote in 1880: "Perpetual peace is a dream, and it is not even a beautiful dream. War is part of the eternal order *instituted by God,*" he not only made it easy for the conscience of any statesman who scrupled to declare war, but showed that the army had become infected by the sophisticated teachings of the university professors and their ilk, as Bernhardi became later. And he simply was repeating one of the Articles of the Creed of Deutschtum.

When the German Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, von Jagow, a few months before the war, said that "the small states will no longer be able to enjoy the independence hitherto *permitted* to them; they are destined to disappear, or to grav-

itate into the orbit of the great Powers," he simply upheld the doctrine of Deutschtum that Belgium and Holland and Serbia and other small states are not states at all, in the true sense of the word, with rights which great states are bound to respect. Though the policy of the invasion of Belgium and Serbia was that of the government, the force behind it was the German people.

We have all laughed at the bombastic painting which the Kaiser had made of himself as a Roman Emperor mounted on a prancing charger and we thought of him, perhaps, as a silly fool. But there could be nothing ridiculous in it to a German who has been taught to believe that there have been only three great periods in history, *Hellenism, Romanism,* and *Germanism,* and that Germanism is the only and direct successor of Romanism,* and William II. the direct successor of the Roman Emperors. The symbolism of the painting represents one of the theories of *Deutschtum* and not only the megalomania of William II.

And so I might run on indefinitely with the utterances and acts of German statesmen and public men. All this explains the solidarity of the German people behind the Kaiser in the war.

* *German Theory and Practice of War:* Lavisse & Andler, 1915. This idea is summed up in the inscription, quoted by these authors, displayed on a restored Roman camp "Trajano, imperatori Romanorum, Wilhelmus II imperator Germanorum."

VI

The failure of the statesmen of the Entente to understand *Deutschtum* unquestionably caused them to fail to realize the aims of Germany in beginning and pursuing the war; and this failure led to mistakes of strategy on their part.

If the British Foreign Minister, then Sir Edward Grey, had understood that the so-called "punishment" of Serbia, in July, 1914, for alleged political offenses was only an ostensible motive put out to blind the world, and that the real aim was the long-planned and cherished ideal of Pan-Germanism to extend its empire through the Balkans, he would have also realized that not soft, diplomatic appeals but only the mobilization of the British fleet, as in 1911, at the time of the Agadir incident, would make Berlin "stop, look and listen." If he had appreciated that the Serbian incident was only the long awaited opportunity and excuse which Pan-Germanism sought, he would have seen that only the vigorous diplomatic methods of Charles Francis Adams in 1863 and Grover Cleveland in 1895 and Theodore Roosevelt in 1902 might have checked Germany's aggression.

If, later in 1915, the Entente had fully understood the mighty, pent-up urge of that ideal of *Das Deutschtum* which for twenty years has been acquiring momentum within the consciousness of the nation, they would have realized that the hour had

struck when it would make an effort to burst its bonds, drive by the Iron Gates on the Danube through Serbia and on to Constantinople, and there fulfil its ambition. It would have been clear to them that this drive was bound to come as soon as we Americans had cleaned the country from typhus fever.* And they would have sent General Serrail's army to Belgrade in 1915 when the heroic Serbian army stood faithfully, alone, "the guardian of the Gate."† Instead they wasted at Gallipoli a splendid army that might have barred the passage of the Danube, saved Serbia, held Greece passive, and isolated Bulgaria, preventing her from joining the Central Powers. But they did not understand *Deutschtum*. Too late they sent General Serrail to Saloniki, and Germany has gained this, her goal of empire, of which she has dreamed for twenty years, since the Kaiser's visit in 1898 to Palestine where he proclaimed himself the "protector of all the Mussulmans."

And so with Roumania. An understanding of *Deutschtum* would have induced the Entente, unless prepared to give adequate military support, to discourage Roumania, long coveted by Pan-Germanism, from entering the war, instead of encouraging her to do so, weak as she was. Oppor-

* This drive was predicted to me in England in the summer of 1915, by an Englishman who had just returned from Serbia. He claimed that the importance of sending forces to Belgrade had been urged by Serbia on the Entente.

† "She is the guardian of the Gate and faithfully has she stood to her trust." (Lloyd George.)

tunity knocked at the door of Berlin. Well might *Das Deutschtum* answer, "The Lord has delivered into our hands the lamb for which we have lusted. Our chance has come at last." What else could the Entente have expected but a mighty German drive—for oil wells, wheat, and extension of empire? For what else did Germany originate this war? "The sole object of the war," the Kaiser announced in a General Order to his troops in 1915, "was to enforce the triumph of that Great Germany which was to dominate all Europe." And so the German Empire for the present extends from the Baltic to the Dardanelles and on into Asia Minor. And all because the Entente failed to grasp the need to plug the hole through which the central powers poured their armies into Serbia and weakly let down the bars of the neutral gate that kept them out of coveted Roumania.

M. Chéradame, through his brilliant writings, based on studies of Germany, pursued through twenty years and more, has opened the eyes of America to the systematically laid plans of Germany, consistently held to and developed for twenty years, to weld together under German rule and hegemony a "Mittel-Europa," and extend the German Empire from the North Sea to Bagdad and the Persian Gulf. The Pan-Germanic propaganda should have rendered unnecessary such expositions. But we went our way and would not listen to warnings of students of Germany. M. Chéradame has done us great service not only in setting in the

clear light of day these German designs and imperial policies, pursued unremittingly since 1898, the time of the Kaiser's visit to Damascus and the then Minister of Foreign Affairs, von Bülow, but in getting our attention and making us listen. It has now become perfectly clear, as light has been thrown from many sources on German activities, that the attack on Serbia in 1914 (originally planned for 1913) was intended to be the preliminary and necessary step to accomplish the final conquest of "Mittel-Europa" and beyond—the "Drang nach Osten." Serbia was the block wedged in between Austria-Hungary, on the North, and Bulgaria and Turkey on the South, and had to be eliminated.

This ambition of a German Mittel-Europa and beyond—Hamburg to Bagdad—is the concrete application of the doctrine of Article VII of the "Creed," the mission of Germany to extend her territories at the expense of less meritorious peoples. Further the Balkans and Asia Minor are only the southeastern extension of Mittel-Europa. The full plan included the countries to the north —Holland and Belgium.

But let us not lose sight of the fact, in focussing our attention on the territorial hegemony of Germany, that the extension of territories in Europe by force is only one particular expression of "Deutschland ueber Alles." It is the result of only one of the doctrines of the Creed. And the driving force that provides the national will to accomplish

the purpose by military power is *Das Deutschtum.* If all the states concerned chose voluntarily, by their free will and accord (an inconceivable proposition) to form a single confederation, the rest of the world could not righteously interfere. For it would be to control the right of free peoples to work out their destinies in their own way. The greatest danger to the freedom of the world—for which democracy is contending—is that great national Delusion which conceives the mission of the German State and the German people to be to regenerate the rest of the world, conceived as inferior peoples, by the domination of German ideas and German kultur, and German power.

It is *Das Deutschtum* that has inspired Germany and given force to such policies. Without its insane delusions they could not live one minute. *Das Deutschtum* has made possible the militaristic government, and given moral support to the military oligarchy and the Junker caste. Prussian militarism is only a tool—the "hammer."‡ Other tools have been peaceful commercial penetration of the nations and systematic propaganda, open and secret. These, as we now know, have been most effective German measures.

It was in the event that other nations would re-

‡ "In the coming century Germany must be the hammer or the anvil"—Speech of von Bülow, December 11, 1897. This is a favorite figure of speech with the Germans. Professor Mahling, Privy Councillor of the consistory, in an address asked, "Do we desire to be the hammer which God wields?"

fuse to be peacefully regenerated and to accept the Divine Mission of *Das Deutschtum* that it became necessary to have ready as a threat the most powerful armies and navies in the world; and then when the crisis came to resort to the hammer—military force and Prussian militarism.

It is easy, too, to see that under the claim to be the chosen of God to do His divine Will, Frightfulness, invented and taught by their great military authority Clausewitz and later systematized by the German war-staff, is easily justified to themselves by the people as it was in the middle ages when employed in religious crusades against heretics.

VII

That the German people seriously believe, or rather have made themselves believe, that they believe in the Divine Mission of themselves, just as the Kaiser has made himself believe in his divine right to rule, must not be ignored if we are to understand the forces that we are up against in this war and are to make sure of a lasting peace. But that this call, whether divine or from an exalted State, to regenerate the world is the real motive which has impelled the German nation to extend its dominion to World Empire, no tyro in psychology will believe for one moment.

It is too grotesque. It is accompanied by too

great ardor and emotion. And the purpose coincides too closely with the material interest of Germany. Suppose it was against Germany's interest, does any one believe that Germany would listen to the call of God? Some political writers have swallowed this ostensible motive, hook, bait and line. Granted it is the motive the Germans have given to themselves. Psychology, as well as practical politics, teaches us that we must look deeper below the surface for the real motive.

The real motive is nothing but pure greed; the desire for material and political power and expansion, for self-aggrandizement at the expense of others—world empire in a material sense.

"Was wir brauchen wir nehmen"†—what we want we take—has been the inner concealed thought of the Germans.

But this sordid motive of self-aggrandizement must be made acceptable and be justified to themselves. So, by the well known process of sophistical rationalizing, it is transformed and made palatable to a chosen people as a Divine Mission. Psychologically, that's easy enough.

Nevertheless, as a phenomenon of social psychology, bordering on psychiatry, the fact of a whole nation being inspired and impelled by a mystic ideal is of great interest and well worthy of study.

But more important to-day is the recognition of the fact that *Das Deutschtum* is the force behind

† See pages 78, 79.

Prussian militarism, behind Prussian frightfulness, behind German ideas of State, Power, Empire, behind the lust for extension of territories and every act of Germany responsible for this war and the way it has been carried on.

How superficial, then, is the view that this war is not directed against the German people but only against the German ruling classes.

It may be expedient as a matter of political tactics to separate the people from the Government in the responsibility for this war, but the real responsibility lies with those who have cultivated the ideals of which the Government is only the exponent. And now, when the war is a fact, that the great majority of the German people stand solidly behind their Kaiser as their champion in the war, no student of Germany has doubted. Nevertheless, history has shown that the collectively held ideas of a people are capable of undergoing revolutionary transformation. The government is fighting for its own existence, for the perpetuation of its own power, and nothing like self-abdication can be expected of it. But it is within the bounds of possibility that under the influence of a tactfully conducted propaganda the masses of the people may be made to see that, on the one hand, they were misled into believing that Germany was attacked from a desire to dismember the Empire, and, on the other, that with the object lesson before them of British, French, Italian and American efficiency, their faith in the divine mission of a blond super-

race has been nothing but a social delusion. With the scales fallen from their eyes they might, quite possibly, as peoples have done before, make a scapegoat of the Government and its professorial and political "machine." It would be an evolution and not a revolution.

Das Deutschtum then is a state of mind of the German people. Unless either the power of Germany to wage war be totally destroyed, or unless this state of mind is destroyed and the German people are awakened out of the delusional state into which they have argued themselves, unless they are made to face the truth, to see the truth in all its horrible nakedness, there can be no lasting peace. The German menace will persist. This every one in France sees and understands. There are no illusions, no misunderstandings, no attempt to hide from the facts, in spite of a passionate longing for peace, to escape the misery of war, to save the remnants of their devastated land, to save further sacrifice of the sons of France. The man in the street knows the truth. The poilu in the trenches knows the truth. The workman in the factory, the peasant in the fields, the women of France—all know the truth.

The same is true of the people of England. They, one and all, understand, as the people of America are only just dimly beginning to understand, the German state of mind. What use, if a lasting peace is to be achieved, only to liberate

Belgium and France and Serbia and all the other countries now within the German war map; and even Alsace and Lorraine? What use, if a lasting peace is to be achieved, to destroy even the Prussian autocracy, unless the power to wage war or the delusional state of mind, the German national consciousness, *Das Deutschtum,* be destroyed—be cured and regenerated? What use to make peace now if some day the war is to be fought all over again?

Such, according to my experience, is the one pervading thought shared by substantially all the people of France and England. All are united in the belief that to make a peace that shall not be a lasting peace is only to shirk the responsibility, to transmit to the next generation the task only half finished. It would mean that all the sacrifices they have made would be in vain.

And so the people of France and the people of Great Britain are ready to go on, and on, and on, making untold sacrifices that their children and their children's children may not have to endure, as the present generation has had to endure, this agony and bloody sweat.

And so out of this deep, silent conviction, and this grim determination, there has arisen a spirit of self-sacrifice. By this their fortitude is sustained. This is one of the great lessons of this war. One splendid manifestation of this spirit is the way the women of France and Great Britain have come forward and taken the places of the

men in the fields and in the workshops. Like the men they have responded to the call of country. One sees them by the thousands and tens of thousands; sowing the fields and tilling the harvest; at the lathe and forge and furnace; making and filling the shells, and doing nearly every sort of work in every sphere where work is required of somebody.

It is a wonderful lesson, that of self-sacrifice. We, too, are learning it but we have much to learn.

I know no more beautiful expression of this spirit than that which I saw in France. It was in a large military cemetery at Chalons-sur-Marne. This cemetery was dedicated by their comrades to the soldiers of the IV army fallen in that sector in the great Champagne drive of July-August, 1915. As we entered the enclosure, stretched before us were endless rows of graves, row on row, each grave reverently and beautifully planted with flowers and surmounted by a black cross of generous proportions marked with a white disc inscribed with the name of a dead soldier of France. Private and officer lay side by side without distinction. The aspect and atmosphere of the place were so impressive of reverence and love that instinctively each of us bared his head and spoke in subdued tones. Then we read on a monument—a simple shaft erected to the memory of the dead, these words:

"A nos Morts.
Le mort n'est rien. Vive la tombe
quand le pays en sort vivant.
En avant!" ‡

Das Deutschtum during long years of preparation planned for the dominion of the world by Germany. It deliberately planned for a world war if necessary to carry out its ambitions of lust. For this purpose it fostered and encouraged an arrogant, monstrous, military caste and autocracy. It created a colossal army ready to strike at a moment's notice to enforce its will. It had been building a navy for a score of years not for defense but to secure conquests in every part of the globe and wrest the colonies of other nations from their allegiance. It brought on this war against an unsuspecting world. It has caused untold misery, desolation, the destruction of venerated monuments of art and religion, the massacres of hundreds of thousands of innocent people and atrocities hitherto inconceivable; it has caused the killing and maiming of millions of men; the wasting of the accumulated wealth of the world and of the productive activities of generations to come. It has forced the people of the United States, as well as

‡ To our Dead.
Death is nothing. Hurrah for the
tomb when from it springs forth a living nation.
Forward!

On another face of the monument is inscribed:

"Gloire à notre France éternelle
Gloire à ceux qui sont morts pour elle."

others, to give over the peaceful pursuits of happiness and social welfare and sacrifice the lives and well-being of its youth in a dreadful war. It has forced them to pile up billions of debt and mortgage their future earnings that would have been used to make their land better to live in and their homes prosperous and happy.

All this misery and much more has it done. And for this the Creed of *Das Deutschtum* must be destroyed, renounced forever for the salvation and freedom of mankind.

And so supported by the spirit of self-sacrifice, we Americans, too, must go on and on until the conflict between the ideals of Germany and the ideals of the West is settled for all time.

"The 'Battle Hymn of the Republic' must be still our hymn:

"In the beauties of the lilies Christ was born across the sea,
With a glory in his bosom that transfigures you and me:
As he died to make men holy, let us die to make men free,
While God is marching on."

We must go on using all our man power, and all our resources, the economic blockade and the social boycott, until the Germans have awakened out of the temporary obsessions by which they have been afflicted for years and years. We must go on, ready, like the people of the British Empire and the people of France, for every sacrifice, until the Germans are prepared to face themselves and the ugliness of the doctrines they call ideals. We

must go on until the people of Germany themselves, no longer blinded, realize that *Das Deutschtum* is only the delusion of a social insanity and with clear vision take the reins of government into their own hands. We must go on until they are prepared to make atonement and reparation for the past and by accepting the ideals of western democracies give guarantees of a lasting peace. Victory will come, but it will be the victory of Democracy which, though now using the sword, only seeks the freedom of the world.

PRUSSIAN MILITARISM AND A LASTING PEACE

AN ADDRESS DELIVERED BEFORE THE WORCESTER CHURCHMEN'S CLUB, WORCESTER, FEBRUARY 7, 1917.

PRUSSIAN MILITARISM AND A LASTING PEACE

WHEN you did me the honor of making me your guest this evening you invited me to speak on the subject of the war which is now in every one's mind and heart.

Indeed, the time has come when the American people are called upon to think long and seriously and deeply upon the principles involved in this war. For these principles vitally concern American interests, and we are now likely at any moment to be called upon to take part in this war. If we are drawn in no one can foresee what lies before us, how far we shall go, where or what the end shall be.

Nor can we foresee what will be the final effect upon our own institutions, what changes in our own policies and system will result.

During the course of several weeks we were kept in a tense condition of suspense while possible terms of peace were discussed by the belligerents and our Government and it was mooted whether peace could be secured without victory or only with victory. And now the dramatic events of the past week have forced us to take a stand in defense of American rights. The President had to face

squarely a position in which there was no alternative. Only one course was open to him—to keep his plighted word. That course he took.† And I believe every true American, no matter how severe a critic of the Administration he has been hitherto, will stand up and support him in the step he has taken and in any measures he may take in defense of American honor and American rights

But this action of the President, these latest dramatic events, to which I have referred, have tended to push into the background of the mind the general principles underlying the war, and to bring out into the focus of attention of the American mind only a particular concrete application of these principles—viz: the denial of freedom of the seas by ruthless submarine warfare.

It has been difficult to make the people of certain sections of this country, particularly the West, understand and still more to interest them in the principles involved in this war. But now that concrete American rights are avowedly to be attacked‡ they have become aroused and have rallied with gratifying unanimity in defiance of the "mad-man of Europe."

Yet the denial to Americans by Germany of freedom of the seas is not solely a war measure dictated by the military exigencies of the moment but a concrete application, as I shall contend, of prin-

† Breaking off diplomatic relations with Germany.

‡ German declaration of ruthless submarine warfare beginning February 1, 1917.

ciples of Government which are utterly hostile to American principles—to the American theory of Government. These principles are those of Prussian Militarism and to these I would like to speak.

Prussian Militarism as an issue is fundamental to terms of peace; it is fundamental to the objects of the Allies; it vitally affects American interests; it vitally concerns a lasting peace.

I want to treat the subject from an American point of view, for it concerns American ideals, American principles and American interests. As Daniel Webster said in 1823 when protesting in the cause of Greece against Turkish frightfulness and the Allied Powers of Europe of his time:

> Let this be then, and as far as I am concerned I hope it will be, purely an American discussion; but let it embrace, nevertheless, everything that fairly concerns America. Let it comprehend not merely her present advantage but her permanent interest, her elevated character as one of the free States of the world, and her duty toward those great principals which have hitherto maintained the relative independence of nations, and which have, more especially, made her what she is.

And so from this same standpoint I want to ask if it is true, as the President once said, "America is not concerned with the causes and objects of this war."

The Demand for the Suppression of Prussian Militarism

Let me prelude what I have to say by calling your attention to the fact that the Entente Powers,

in both their notes in answer to the Central Powers and to Mr. Wilson, insisted upon the destruction of Prussian militarism as fundamental to all the other objects they have in mind and to terms of peace.

This object has been well known to the world for a long time. From almost the beginning of the war it has been accentuated again and again by England, France, Russia and Italy, until it rings out as the slogan of the war. This condition of peace, they have also said, alone can furnish an effectual guarantee for a lasting peace which they must have. And therefore, unless this end be accomplished and Prussian militarism be destroyed, there is no use in making peace now or at any other time for the war would have to be fought sooner or later all over again. The demand for a lasting peace and the demand for the destruction of Prussian militarism go hand in hand. We cannot have the one without the other.

This view of the Allies has been repeatedly expressed through their responsible chiefs. It is not mere rhetoric; it is a state of mind that must be taken into consideration in estimating the possibility of peace without victory—peace by negotiation.

"We shall never sheathe the sword," said Mr. Asquith, in his historic Guildhall speech, "which we have not lightly drawn, until the military domination of Prussia be wholly and finally destroyed."

Mr. Bonar Law, Government leader in the House of Commons, defined the peace terms of the

Allies as "restitution, reparation and guaranties against repetition," and Mr. Lloyd George amplified this epigrammatic definition as, "complete restitution, full reparation and effectual guaranties."

What constitutes effectual guaranties he set forth when he said:

> The Allies entered into this war to defend Europe against the aggression of Prussian military domination, and they must insist that the end is a most complete and effective guarantee against the *possibility of that caste* ever again disturbing the peace of Europe.

It is an "honorable and lasting peace" that is wanted.

Likewise the Russian Duma lead off in answer to the German overtures for peace with the declaration:

> It [the Duma] considers that a lasting peace will be possible only after a decisive victory over the military power of the enemy and after definite renunciation by Germany of the aspirations which render her responsible for the world war and for the horrors by which it has been accompanied.

The official reply of the ten Entente Allies to the proposal of the Central Powers for a peace conference runs:

> Once again the Allies declare that no peace is possible . . . so long as they have not brought about a settlement calculated to end, once and for all, forces which have constituted a perpetual menace to the nations, and to afford the only effective guarantee for the future security of the world.

Likewise Bonar Law explained the attitude of

the British Government. He said in the House of Commons:

What are we fighting for? Not territory, not greater strength as a nation. We are fighting for two things—for peace now and for security for peace in time to come. Let the House remember what happened in this war—outrages in Belgium, outrages by sea and land, massacres in Armenia which Germany could have stopped by a word—then realize this: The war will have been fought in vain—utterly in vain, unless we can make sure that it shall never again be in the power of any State to do what Germany has done.

The Central Powers, it will be remembered, wanted to fix up a peace first through a Conference and later, after present peace had been agreed upon, to enter into arrangements to preserve future peace.

The great work of preventing future wars, they said, can be begun only after the end of the present struggle of the nations. (Reply to President Wilson's peace note to all the belligerent and neutral Powers, Dec. 18, 1916.)

And to this Lloyd Gorge replied:

What guarantee is there that these terrors will not be repeated in the future? That, if we enter into a treaty of peace, we shall put an end to Prussian militarism?

In the same strain the Russian Duma announced that it

considers that a premature peace would not only be a brief period of calm, but would also involve the danger of another bloody war and a renewal of the deplorable sacrifices by the people.

The elimination of Prussian militarism, then,

has taken on the character of an ultimatum and a paramount issue.

Thus, aside from all other considerations and terms and issues, there arose a deadlock. The Entente held that the destruction of Prussian militarism was the only guarantee of lasting peace and that this must be assured *now* as one of the terms of present peace. The Central Powers took the position that international arrangements for future peace should be enterd into only after present peace is agreed upon by negotiation; and the arrangements which have been informally suggested by them studiously avoid including the ending of Prussian militarism, or any hint of an admission that there is such a thing, much less that it would be surrendered as a guarantee of future peace.

In this situation neutrals are bound to ask themselves whether Prussian militarism is such a menacing thing to the future peace of the world that the demand for its abolition in the terms for present peace cannot be compromised; or whether it is a matter of such indifference that it can be left to future international arrangements. In the latter case they must ask themselves if it is likely that Germany, after this war is ended by negotiation and danger of defeat averted, would accept this demand of the Allies as one of the later arrangements to guarantee future peace. In other words, does it matter much one way or the other so long as the present conflict is settled? Or is the present war an outburst of a long slumbering irreconcilable

and irrepressible conflict of principles, of ideals, that cannot be permanently settled save by military conquest—by peace *with* victory on one side or the other.

Remember that Germany proposes that the Allies postpone their paramount object until after the war and trust to Germany's satisfying their claim later.

What Is Prussian Militarism?

What manner of thing, then, is "Prussian Militarism" that the continuation of this terrible war can be justified until it is destroyed? Everything hangs on the meaning of this abstract term.

Most people confuse militarism with large armies and navies and even with "preparedness" or with frightful methods of warfare. But a little consideration will show that in principle it has nothing to do with the size of a nation's army or navy and much less with preparedness. A nation might maintain an enormous army and yet this would not be militarism. And a nation might have a small army and yet be a militaristic nation.

What, then, is Prussian militarism?

It is only necessary to turn to German publicists, military writers, the speeches of the Kaiser and the German press, to learn the German theory of government and the part the army plays in it, and then by correlating these with the avowed policies and actual practice during many years of Prussia and the Imperial Government, both in internal and for-

eign affairs, to extract the meaning of the Prussian system. From all these sources the world has been able to obtain an understanding of it which it is safe to say the Entente Powers have in mind when they say it must be "wholly and finally destroyed."

Now, according to this conception, the fundamental principle of Prussian militarism is that the stability, power and will of the nation rest not on public opinion and the will of the people but on armed force; and therefore that it is to such armed force that the Imperial Government looks not only to maintain itself within the empire but—more important to other nations—to enforce its will and its policies upon other nations without the empire.

More concretely, Prussian militarism in its external relations may be defined as the idea of extending the nation's trade and system of government and policies by force. And in its official military code governing methods of warfare the laws of humanity have no place under the exigency of "necessity."

Militarism thus becomes something much more than a system of defense against encroachments from within and without—it is a mode of, and organization for attack in the enforcement of progressive policies, of national "evolution" (to use von Bethmann Hollweg's phrase), and of the will of the State, whatever direction these may take. It has even been the boast, not only of the German emperor but of a host of German publicists, that by the potential power of its army (not, be it noted,

by respect for the rights of other nations), Germany has maintained peace itself between the great Powers of Europe during the past twenty-five years.

Prussian militarism depends, of course, for its efficiency, upon the theory, which Germany has applied in practice, that, if all the available forces of a nation—economic, industrial, man-power, etc.—are organized into a military system and that system is developed to its very highest efficiency in every one of its multiplicity of parts; and if it be placed under the autocratic control of a government not responsible to the people, or public opinion, or parliament, it will be so powerful as to be irresistible against any combination of powers likely within human foresight to be brought against it: and that therefore no State or likely combination of States will dare to attack it, on the one hand, and, on the other, it can enforce its will on the world. This theory, it may be said in passing, has been shown to be fallacious by the present war.

But this is not the whole, nor perhaps the worst part of the Prussian system. The worst has been the *collective state of mind* and certain specific *ideals* instilled in the greater part of the German people as a national consciousness. These include the worship of military prowess and power, and self-subjection to an exalted military caste; and they include national desires and a national will—a will to bring national desires to fulfilment by force; to take what the State wants by force; to ex-

tend its policies, whether of trade or empire, by force; to gain "a place in the sun" by force; to brook no opposition under threat of the sword; to disregard international law and treaties and violate neutral and weaker nations. Therefore arbitration, conciliation, respect for treaties and the natural inherent rights of other peoples are not recognized by militarism, as they were not recognized when Germany in answer to Sir Edward Grey refused to entertain them to avert this war.

It is obvious, then, Prussian militarism has nothing to do with the size of armies excepting so far as a relatively superior army may be a necessary piece of machinery for enforcing its arbitrary will.

The United States might maintain a very small army and yet adopt militarism as a policy in dealing with weaker nations, like Mexico and some South American republics. Or it might maintain a huge army of say 4,000,000 men and yet not espouse militarism. Japan might adopt a policy of militarism against China but not against great Powers.

And the same is true of a great navy. England with her mighty navy holds the supremacy of the sea, but militarism under the name of "navalism" plays no part in her democratic theory of government based on public opinion. To speak seriously of British navalism as synonymous with militarism is to fall into the confusion of mistaking the size of armaments with the military theory of government.

Prussian Militarism in Practice

Now it may be fairly asked, has in practice Prussian militarism really sought to enforce its theoretic ideals on the world in such a way that the Allies are reasonably justified in demanding—sine qua non—that it be destroyed as security for future lasting peace? Or is it only an unsubstantial fear, or political accusation, and this war only an exceptional application? Is it true that "Prussia," as Lloyd George has charged,

> since she got into the hands of that caste [the military caste] has been a bad neighbor—arrogant, threatening, bullying, shifting boundaries at her will, taking one fair field after another from weaker neighbors and adding them to her own dominions, ostentatiously piling up weapons of offense, ready on a moment's notice to be used.

Or is what Bethmann-Holweg said true?

> As against this aggressive character of the Entente, he asserted, the Triple Alliance had always found itself in a defensive position. No honorable critic can deny that. Not in the shadow of Prussian militarism did the world live before the war, but in the shadow of the policy of isolation which was to keep Germany down.

Let us see what the actual practices of Germany have been within the memory of the present generation.

In 1864 Prussia wanted the Duchies of Schleswig-Holstein and Lauenburg and so, with true Bismarckian duplicity, she picked a quarrel with Denmark, sent an ultimatum which, because Parlia-

ment was not in session, she knew it was physically impossible under the constitution to satisfy within the 48 hours allowed, and, with Austria as a tool, took these provinces by force of arms. And Bismarck, as one historian remarks, regarded it "as the diplomatic masterpiece of his career." "Was wir brauchen, wir nehmen"—"what we want we take"—as a Prussian diplomat once indiscreetly boasted. The spoils for the time being were divided with her co-conspirator, Austria, giving to that Empire Holstein as her share. But Prussia wanted more. She wanted all the spoils, and wanted also for herself the headship of the German Confederation and therefore to get rid of her rival Austria.

So, in 1866, Prussia deliberately brought about a war with Austria, and by force of arms the Prussian octopus grabbed Holstein as well as Schleswig and Lauenburg, annexed Hanover and several Duchies, excluded Austria from Germany and made herself the head of the new North German Confederation with its King as the President and Commander-in-Chief of all the armies, as he is now the Emperor and supreme war-lord of the Imperial Federation. "Was wir brauchen, wir nehmen."

But Prussia wanted still more. She wanted to strengthen her power by bringing into the Confederation which she ruled the South German States. This could only be done by a war which would entangle these states with which an offensive and defensive military alliance had been made.

So in 1870, by falsifying a telegram, a quarrel was deliberately forced upon France and by force of arms Alsace and Lorraine were taken, and the South German States fell into the Prussian net—the Confederation, which now became the German Imperial Federation with the Prussian King as Emperor instead of President. "Was wir brauchen, wir nehmen."

In 1879 Germany wanted to mobilize the militaristic forces of the central empires into one great machine by forming an offensive as well as a defensive alliance with Austria—thus holding the threat of the Prussianized German machine over the rest of Continental Europe to enforce the Prussian Will. It is safe to say that without this alliance the present war would have been impossible. As a reaction to it—a counter-force—this alliance directly created the Dual Entente of France and Russia.

In 1883 the dual alliance of Germany and Austria became the triple Alliance, Italy joining for *defensive* purposes only, and England, France and Russia were later compelled to answer it by the Triple Entente.

In 1897 Germany wanted a colony in China; so she simply took Kiao-chau by threat of war, claiming it as an indemnity for—what?, just the murder of two missionaries. That was the Prussian Will.

In 1898 the Kaiser wanted the Philippines, as is generally believed. At any rate he sent the German Admiral Diedrich to Manila Bay to inter-

fere with Dewey in the blockade and attempted to form a *European coalition against the United States* to intervene in our war with Spain. In consequence of Diedrich's interference we were brought to the brink of war with Germany. War was prevented not by notes but by Dewey's threat to fire upon the German fleet and by Captain Chichester of the English navy ranging his vessel alongside of Dewey. The European coalition against the United States was blocked by England which refused to join.

Germany's ambition was revealed by the Kaiser's remark: "If I had had a larger fleet I would have taken Uncle Sam by the scruff of the neck." *

In 1902 he thought he had another chance to take "Uncle Sam by the scruff of the neck" and test the Monroe Doctrine. But this time Roosevelt thwarted the Prussian Will. To collect some money claims against Venezuela, Germany, having sent war vessels to that country, threatened to bombard Venezuelan ports and occupy the territory in defiance of our Monroe Doctrine. President Roosevelt sent for the German Ambassador at Washington and told him that unless Germany withdrew her fleet in ten days he would send Dewey with the American fleet to protect Venezuela against German encroachments. At the end of a week Germany had made no reply. President Roosevelt then said in substance to the Ambassador: "I said ten days: I now make it nine." In

* Cf. *The Psychology of the Kaiser,* p. 153.

thirty-six hours the Kaiser withdrew his fleet.† The German Will to Conquer came in contact with the American will to Defend and the German Will succumbed. And it is well for all Americans to remember that there was no war.

In 1905 Germany entered into a diplomatic controversy with France demanding an interest in Morocco, which really did not concern her excepting on the doctrine "Was wir brauchen, wir nehmen." A conference known as the Algeciras conference was held. Germany's argument was, yield what we want or—war! That meant a general European war, just such a war as we have to-day. France yielded to save the world from a catastrophy like the present one but was left humiliated with the resignation of her Minister for Foreign Affairs, Delcassé, demanded by Germany.

In 1907 at the Hague conference the United States, England and France pledged themselves in discussion to the principle of disarmament, but Germany let it be known that she would leave the conference if the question of disarmament was pressed. And the German military machine remained intact to threaten the world.

The next year, in 1908, Germany, disregarding the treaty of Berlin of 1878 and the treaty of London of 1871, boldly threatened war if Russia did not back down and assent to the annexation of Bosnia and Hertzogovina by Austria. Russia, to avoid

† *Life of John Hay* (Vol. II, appendix, 2nd Edition), by W. R. Thayer.

a European conflagration, as France had done in 1905, backed down but announced, "never again!"

Three years later, in 1911, the Morocco question was raised again with France, and Germany to enforce her wants by threat of war—which again meant a general European war,—sent the warship *Panther* to Agadir. But this time England came to the support of France and mobilized her fleet. The German warship *Panther* was withdrawn, but Germany never recovered from the humiliation to her pride of having to put her mailed fist in her pocket and sheathe her shining sword in its scabbard.

In 1913 Germany made a secret proposal to the Prime Minister of Italy, Giolitti, to join her with Austria to make the same attack as she did in 1914 and partition Serbia between the three countries. Italy, to her credit, refused.

In 1914 Germany secretly again entered into a conspiracy with Austria to attack little Serbia, reduce her to a condition of vassalage, and extend the German hegemony of "Mittel-Europa" through the Balkans to Constantinople. Militarism refused arbitration, it refused conciliation, it refused a conference and it refused peace. Her will alone must be accepted. The European war resulted. The violation of Belgium I need not refer to.

These are some of the more blatant examples of Prussian methods of domination and extending her empire and leadership by military force. For this

purpose, as every one knows, the most powerful military organization the world has ever seen, perfect in every detail, was built up.

But an army was not enough to enforce the ideals of militarism.

Not satisfied with her Continental aspirations, an ambition for colonial possessions and to become a World Power was fomented by the Pan-Germans with the Kaiser as their agent and became one of the ideals of the German national consciousness. But it was too late to acquire colonies peacefully as the lands of the world, justly or unjustly, had already been absorbed. It was necessary therefore to take them by force from Great Britain, or France, or other nations. So in 1897 a naval program was entered upon, the ulterior design being to wrest a "place in the sun" from more fortunate and forehanded nations, particularly Great Britain. And since that date Germany has endeavored to outbuild Great Britain, hoping some day—awaiting "The Day" when she would take what she wanted from the British Empire. "The ocean teaches us," said the Kaiser, "that on its waves and on its most distant shores no great decision can any longer take place without Germany and without the German Emperor."

The unremitting pursuance of such policies by Bismarck and his successors has been made easy by, first, the autocratic constitution and character of the Prussian and the Imperial systems of government bordering on absolutism; and second, by the

creation of a national consciousness, a political religion, brought into being through the systematic organized education of the dominant castes and classes of Germany. Under the first the Imperial system is substantially a continuation of the Prussian system before the Federalization of the German States in 1871; the Imperial Federation is dominated by Prussia; the Government is an autocracy with the power in the hands of the Kaiser; the Chancellor, appointed by the Kaiser, is responsible to him alone and not to the Reichstag, or even to the Bundesrath; the Kaiser may be, and, practically, William II. is, his own Chancellor and determines the policies of the Empire; the German Reichstag, aside from voting supplies, is little more than a debating body; the army, not public opinion, is, to use the words of the Kaiser, "the pillar of the Empire"; the government in practice is the Kaiser and those responsible to him, not the Parliament; the representatives of the people have little or nothing to say in formulating the policies of the Empire and, if they had, it would not make much practical difference because, owing to the inequitable distribution of seats in Parliament without relation to the present distribution of the population, the voters are deprived of just proportionate representation.

By this system, obviously, power is almost wholly in the hands of the administration, while the legislative bodies are of little account beyond what comes from the power of criticism and agitation.

Democracy has no place in the German system.

By the second circumstance I have just referred to—the systematic education of the people—that collective state of mind I mentioned some time back, has been created in the dominant classes. This has become the imponderable force behind militarism. Indeed it may be said that Prussian militarism is only the expression of this imponderable, the machinery it employs to fulfil its will. This imponderable has become, through a widespread propaganda, fostered by the Government, a system of ideals of the classes known as *Das Deutschtum* and embodied in the policies formulated by the doctrines of Pan-Germanism. It is customary to lay all the blame for Prussian militarism upon the Kaiser, the ruling classes and the so-called military autocracy. But it is difficult to say how far these castes have independently determined German policies and how far they themselves are only puppets and dupes of their own propagandism. That the Kaiser is responsible for the creation of a military caste by which he has surrounded himself, there would seem to be no manner of doubt. And it now seems equally clear that this creation of his hands—often likened to the Frankenstein of story—in the time of the world-crisis rose up and overpowered him. But beyond and, I think we can with accuracy say, above the military caste is that great imponderable urge of the dominating consciousness of the Germanic people—*Das Deutschtum:* A Will to dominate all other peoples, to extend the German idea

—*Weltmacht, Weltmarkt, Weltkultur*—throughout the world. A state of mind, originating with the philosophers and then taught by the professors and intellectuals, under the tutelage or direction of the State, the Kaiser himself, his ministers and the members of the bureaucracy became first its pupils and its victims and then, inspired by its obsessing delusions, its exponents and administrators. The military caste, created for the purpose, became the willing instrument of execution. But before the world upon the German State alone, in complete possession of all the functions of government, of administration, of direction of policies and power to execute, rests the full responsibility for all its actions. Yet in this analysis we see what have been in the words of the Allies "the forces which have constituted a perpetual menace to the nations."

I have rehearsed all these well-known German activities since 1864, the fundamental principles and forces of the German system of government and its methods of carrying into effect its policies, because there is always danger when using an abstract term of getting away from the underlying things for which it stands, and, in this case, the ugly things for which Prussian militarism stands. Prussian militarism stands for a theory of government, an attitude of mind, political ideals, and very definite, concrete political and military forces and methods of using them.

The world has been shocked by the sinking of the *Lusitania,* of the *Sussex* and a large number of other merchant ships without warning; by the bombardment from the air and sea of open towns; by the violation of Belgium and Serbia; by the massacre of their inhabitants and of the Armenians; by atrocities unspeakable and innumerable; by the wanton destruction of monuments of art, religion and civilization; by the pillage of the inhabitants and forced levying of fines on communities; by the deportation of the civil population for purposes of forced labor; by the judicial murder of Miss Cavell and Captain Fryatt; by the general methods of frightfulness; by the adoption of the principle of "military necessity," and many other acts repugnant to and destructive of accepted principles of civilization. But these, however wrong and shocking to our sensibilities, are only *particular applications* of the Prussian system of government and its principles of militarism. So long as that system, in which the rights of small states, international law and the laws of humanity have no place, is tolerated by the world there is no logical reason to revolt against its application.

So long as the world recognizes Germany as one of the family of civilized nations, holds diplomatic and social intercourse with her, trades with her, lends to her, makes treaties with her, admits her to fellowship in the humane society of mankind knowing her to be what she is, the world cannot in reason object to her barbarism. If we accept the system

why object to its application?

In view, then, of all these considerations, the meaning of the Allies to every one, who does not shut his eyes to facts, is perfectly clear when they say, in their answer to the Central Powers, "No peace is possible . . . so long as they [the Allies] have not brought about a settlement calculated to end once and for all forces which have constituted a perpetual menace to the nations." And must not every "honorable critic," to whom Bethmann-Hollweg has appealed, say that Lloyd George told the truth when he answered, "Prussia since she got into the hands of that caste [the military caste] has been a bad neighbor—arrogant, threatening, bullying, shifting boundaries at her will, taking one fair field after another from weaker neighbors and adding them to her own dominions, ostentatiously piling up weapons of offense, ready on a moment's notice to be used."

There also can be little doubt left in the mind as to what the Allies mean by "Guaranties for a *lasting* peace," when they demand "a settlement calculated . . . to afford the only effective guarantee for the future security of the world."

To guarantee lasting peace, as well as bring present peace, as has been stated over and over again by responsible ministers of the Allied governments, by their press, by publicists and by open expressions of public opinion, Prussian militarism and all that it stands for must go.

Well, that is all very fine, but what guarantees then can be given for the elimination of Prussian militarism? Neither in answer to Germany or to Mr. Wilson have the Allies consented to enter into details and state what they demand for its accomplishment. We are left, therefore, to surmise and to our own judgment.

So far as Prussian militarism is a state of mind and so far as it is a system of ideals and aspirations and will, these being elements of a national consciousness, and therefore psychological, it must be admitted that they cannot be directly destroyed by military force. Indirectly, however, such a result might ensue from a victorious outcome of the war for the Allies. It may well come about that with the object lesson of defeat before them a new light will come to German statesmen, the military caste and the deluded victims of the propaganda for "Deutschland über Alles." It is quite within the bounds of possibility that, without giving up their pride of race and Kultur but realizing at last whither Prussian militarism has led them—that instead of a "place in the sun" they have been led into the dark shadow of a world hostility, their colonies gone, their future mortgaged by billions of debt, millions of their sons killed or maimed for life, morally boycotted by nearly all the people they expected to conquer or whose rights they flaunted —they will see that their ideals are incapable of realization by force of arms and that militarism doesn't pay. And in such a situation the will to

power may well give way to will to peace.

However that may be, so far as Prussian militarism is a system of government which has created, instigated and put its ideals into effect through the autocratic will of a limited caste making use of a huge military organization, it can be destroyed by destroying the political power of that caste and disarming the organization at its disposal.

It is incredible, therefore, that if the Allies achieve military victory—obtain "Peace with Victory"—and have the power to impose their will by force, they will not, as their first step, insist upon the elimination of the House of Hohenzollern. Righteousness, justice, the judgment of "the supreme court of civilization," the public opinion of the civilized world call aloud for it. That the German Kaiser, the bully of Europe, who for twenty-eight years, ever since he came to the throne has been the responsible promoter of the war spirit and Prussian aggression, the creator and patron of the Prussian military caste and militarism, who has used his great power to incite ideas of world dominion and ruthlessness amongst his people—civilians and soldiers, who has throttled the aspirations of German Democracy, should be permitted to continue in his career would be a world calamity.

If in the event of victory the Allies shall use their military force to rid the world of the power for evil of the House of Hohenzollern they would be supported by the gratitude of the world.

A New England Puritan divine once delivered

himself of this prayer in the Old South Meeting House of Boston, "Oh, Lord, it is not for us to advise; but if a storm should come, and should destroy the enemy's fleet, Thine would be the glory and we should be satisfied." * And so we along with the rest of the neutral world may say to the Entente Allies, "It is not for us to advise, but if in your power and military victory you should rid the world of the House of Hohenzollern and its military caste, thine would be the glory and we should be satisfied."

That this is one of the purposes of the Allies and that it is one of those "details" which they have very respectfully said to our Government "will not be made known," one does not need to be very deep seeing to guess. Probably another of those details included in their laudable object is to see to it that there shall be brought about a limitation of the prerogatives of the future Kaiser so that he would be reduced to a position in the government similar to that of the King of England and the sovereigns of other parliamentarily governed states; that is, a true democratic government, with a ministry responsible to parliament and the people.

It would seem to be useless, when expecting a guaranty of lasting peace, to change only the per-

* It may interest the curious to know that this was a historical episode commemorated by Longfellow in his "Ballad of the French Fleet—October, 1746." It so happened that a storm did come and did destroy the enemy's fleet; and the good people of Boston were satisfied, believing it to be a Divine intervention in response to their worthy's prayer.

sonnel of a government and leave unmolested the autocratic system of which any particular ruler is the exponent. It is the system that is the menace to the world. Only in the democratization of the imperial system does the future hold out a hope of a will to peace.

To the objection that to impose by force a form of government upon the German people is to interfere in the internal affairs of a people and violates one of the very principles for which the Allies are contending—the right of each people to govern themselves and work out their own destinies in their own way—the answer is obvious. Such measures as I have imagined need not be brought to fulfilment by direct forceful imposition. In the event of military victory the Allies owe to those who have died and those who have suffered in the cause of Liberty that they shall not have died and suffered in vain; and they owe to the generations that are to come that they shall not have to undergo the terrible sacrifices which this generation has experienced. They may rightly, therefore, insist that they will make no terms until the German people themselves come to the council chamber of peace with a form of government which shall in itself offer the same guaranty for the future that the democracy of the world offers to them. The guaranties must be mutual and equal on both sides, and they are not mutual and equal when on the one side the terms are guaranteed by a democracy based on and seeking the "natural and inherent rights of

mankind," and on the other by a Prussian autocracy recognizing no such rights, nor international law, the sanctity of treaties and the laws of humanity, but only Absolute Power and Will to conquest. No terms of peace agreed upon between Powers with such different ideals can be lasting. The Entente Allies may well insist, they owe it as an obligation to the dead and to the living, to the great cause of civilization to insist, that there shall be no peace until Germany can enter the council chamber and say, "We have put our house in order, we have reconstructed our government and are prepared to be admitted to the democracy of the world." America, although at the moment still a neutral in war but, having broken off diplomatic relations with Germany, not a neutral in spirit, can not only sympathize with but is interested in this insistence.

In principle this was the stand taken by the North after the defeat of the armies of the South in our civil war. As a guaranty of the maintenance of the principles for which the war was fought voluntary "reconstruction" of State constitutions was required for admission to the family of states united on terms of equality.

In a world of democracy we may not impose upon our neighbor how he shall order his own house, but we may say to him we will not enter his home nor shall he enter ours, we will boycott him, isolate and ostracize him until he chains up his bulldog, gives us the same guaranties for safe conduct that we give to him.

Peace by Negotiation Impossible at This Time

When, then, you come to ask what do the Allies mean when they demand that Germany shall give assurances for future peace, when they declare they will not make peace "so long as they have not brought about a settlement calculated to end once and for all forces which have constituted a perpetual menace to the nations and to afford the only effective guarantee for the future security of the world," we can only think along the lines the present situation imposes upon us. We must, however, remember that the Allies cannot be asked in the present uncertain stage of the war to define concretely and explicitly the exact character and details of the "settlement" they broadly outline. Tactical considerations forbid, before victory is actually achieved, and it would be foolish to cross the bridges before they are reached. But if such "assurances" as I have imagined be required, is it conceivable that, at a conference to negotiate peace around a table, the House of Hohenzollern and the Prussian military caste will agree to eliminate themselves? Or, if this demand be waived, that they would or could surrender their ideals and will and state of mind and policies of militarism, much less their military organization?

Here seems to be an insuperable difficulty to peace without victory—to peace by negotiation. In the midst of negotiation there emerges the irreconcilable conflict of ideals—the ideals of Prussian

autocracy and Prussian militarism manifesting themselves through the Will to dominate the world by force, on the one hand, and the ideals of democracy with respect for the rights and privileges and independence of all nations, great and small, on the other. One of these must give way, or else all nations must continue to live armed against one another as in the past. For the democratic ideals to give way means the regression of democracy and the return to that order of things out of which civilization has been progressively but slowly emerging during the past one hundred years. For the Prussian ideals to give way means the self-elimination of the ruling classes in Germany and subordinating themselves to the will of a reconstructed German people. It would seem then that the settlement of this conflict can only come by the arbitrament of the sword, if it is to come at all out of this war.

A Conflict Between Two Principles of Government

It is well for us to face the fact, for all neutrals to face the fact, that in this great European war we have a conflict between two principles of government, between two civilizations: One founded upon the principle of the inherent and natural rights of mankind; the other founded on the principle of militarism.

According to the one, all men possess natural

and inherent rights which no government and no majorities can take away; it maintains, besides, that the rights and privileges of all nations and all peoples shall be respected by all others; that all nations and all peoples shall be allowed peacefully to work out their destinies in their own way so long as they do not infringe upon the rights of others; that they shall not be dominated and menaced by the aggressive covetousness of another nation determined to impose its arbitrary will by military force.

According to the other, the will of the state is the supreme will and the state that has the will and the power has the right to take what it wants by force and to use any methods which it deems necessity requires.

This war is undoubtedly the culmination of an irrepressible conflict of ideals that has been brewing for years.

So long as these two ideals, behind which were mighty forces, persisted, those forces sooner or later were bound to clash in war. We can see now that the Serbian question was only the occasion that brought them into conflict. Lincoln said that this American government could not "endure permanently half slave and half free. . . . It will become all one thing or all the other." Likewise I do not believe that the nations of the world can endure permanently half militaristic and half peaceful. They will become all one thing or all the other. If one or more hold to the principles of militarism, the war has shown that all the others must create

and maintain mighty military establishments to enforce their rights. Limitation of armaments and a league to enforce arbitration and conciliation before a declaration of war (for that is what the proposed "League to Enforce Peace" really is) can modify the evil of militarism but cannot cure it.

Is America, then, "not concerned with the causes and objects of the war" as has been said? On the contrary, America cannot, I believe, look with indifference on the outcome of this war, as to which ideal shall triumph. If the Prussian ideal shall survive, we shall of course have to maintain great armaments in our own defense. But that is only a material interest. What concerns us greatly more are the moral principles involved—the possible triumph of principles utterly hostile and abhorrent to our system of government and the principles upon which it is founded.

The fundamental principle underlying this conflict of ideals is one of right and wrong. The real issue is a moral one. And I do not believe that this government or our people can be indifferent to that issue. I do not believe that when it is thoroughly understood our people will be indifferent.

I am not referring to the methods of carrying on the war pursued by Germany and her allies—methods which have broken the international laws of nations and the moral laws of humanity. These are, I repeat, but particular applications of the Prussian system of government and therefore of a militarism which does not accept the laws of hu-

manity.

From the American point of view that *system* is morally wrong because it violates the natural and inherent rights of mankind. And therefore this government and the American people cannot be indifferent as to how this war is settled, whether Prussian militarism is left free or whether it is destroyed. If it be left free the conflict of ideals and principles will still remain to threaten civilization. Lincoln's great antagonist, Douglas, said that he did not "care whether slavery be voted up or voted down" so long as the political conflict over the extension of slavery into the territories was settled. But Lincoln refused to follow Douglas and accept a policy as a settlement which was not based upon the principle that slavery was wrong. For he held that we could not justifiably withhold the legal right of the South to extend their system excepting on the ground that it was wrong. So now, I believe, that we cannot logically oppose the applications of the Prussian system, when they affect only the lives and property and material rights of *other* nations, excepting on the ground that the Prussian system is morally wrong. Our Government, therefore, cannot be indifferent to the terms on which peace is made. To paraphrase the words of Lincoln: we want and must have a national policy as to Prussian militarism which deals with it as being a wrong. Whoever would prevent militarism becoming international and perpetual yields all when he yields to a policy which treats it either as being

right or as being a matter of indifference.

The people of the Allied Nations have set themselves the noble task of destroying Prussian militarism. So long as they are willing to make the awful sacrifices necessary to this end, we, who, so long as we are neutral, are not called upon to make any but insignificant sacrifices of a material nature, should see to it that we do not hamper them in their noble purpose; and, if we shall be drawn into the war and become one of the allies, should lend all our resources and all our power towards the accomplishment of that task. We would not be human if we did not shrink from the spectacle of the appalling loss of human life that this purpose entails, but we should not forget the admonition of a celebrated humane and manly divine, James Martineau:

> The reverence for human life is carried to an immoral idolatry when it is held more sacred than justice and right, and when the spectacle of blood becomes more horrible than the sight of desolating tyrannies and triumphant hypocrisies.

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE KAISER

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE KAISER *

[This essay has been published also in French, German and Japanese translations and an incomplete edition was published independently in England. The Japanese translation was undertaken by the personal direction of Marquis Okuma, when Prime Minister of Japan in 1916. This distinguished statesman, becoming interested in some of the political questions raised, brought the book to the attention of His Majesty the Emperor and His Highness the Crown Prince, as noted in the Japanese edition, and wrote a foreword for the same. Professor Shiozawa, whom I had the pleasure of meeting, also wrote an introduction further amplifying, as he himself explains, Marquis Okuma's views on German polity and the contrasting differences between Japanese and German principles of government. I have thought that this statement presenting the Japanese viewpoint on some of the fundamental principles of government would be of interest to Americans and the Western mind coming, as it does, from such an authoritative source and one so qualified to explain Japanese thought and polity. Therefore a translation of Professor Shiosawa's introduction with Vicount Okuma's foreword is included here with the original essay.

Of particular interest is the statement made by the distinguished Japanese statesman, that "the spirit of our [Japan's] national polity is fundamentally different from that of Germany," although both are monarchical, for that of Japan has been "the harmonious coöperation of the Sovereign and the Subject." And what will, I believe, be surprising to Americans, "the Imperial Household has, since the days of the gods (i.e., the prehistoric

* First printed in the *New York* (Sunday) *Times*, May 9, 1915. Later published in book form, Boston: Richard G. Badger, 1915; reproduced in this volume in lieu of a second edition.

age), considered it its mission to practice, and has continually and consistently been practising what the occidentals would term 'democratic principles'. . . . The will of the people has always been made the wall of the Imperial Household."

Marquis Okuma's criticisms of the Kaiser and Germany and his general views will also be found to have great interest particularly at this time.

I trust that the complimentary allusions to the American author, probably written only for the Japanese public, will be understood by the reader as only expressions characteristic of that Japanese etiquette which is one of the charms of a people noted for their courtesy. To delete them would be an ungraceful use of the editorial prerogative and so I let them stand as they were writ.

January, 1918.—M. P.]

FOREWORD BY

MARQUIS OKUMA

AND INTRODUCTION BY

PROFESSOR SHIOSAWA

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This book had the honor of being read by His Majesty the Emperor.

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This book had the honor of being read by His Highness the Crown Prince.

Criticizing the life of Napoleon the Great, the Kaiser once aptly remarked, "Alas for him! He knew the enemy he had to deal with, but he did not know himself. That was the cause of his final defeat." Napoleon himself confessed that he had overestimated his own powers in believing that he was equal to the task of achieving world domination and of making himself master of a great empire. His pride, however, seemed to have entered the marrow of his life, for he said in the same breath, "The world shall never look upon my like again." The well known adage that there was no such word as impossible in his dictionary, was uttered by him when he was at the height of his self-confidence. Taking advantage of the golden opportunity of the French Revolution, Bonaparte, a native of Corsica, came to command the popularity of the whole French nation. The fame of his army was such that it resounded throughout the length and breadth of the entire world and made the whole of Europe tremble with fear. Indeed his genius seemed to have bordered on the divine. Who would have thought that he would have to bury his bones in the lonely isle of St. Helena? Such, however, was his lot. Does not this show that any attempt at world domination must necessarily end

in an empty dream?

Having been born in the royal family of the Hohenzollerns, and having been brought up according to the traditional teachings of Frederick the Great, Kaiser Wilhelm came to believe that he was a hero beyond parallel. It is doubtful, however, whether his genius can ever compete with that of Napoleon. Nevertheless he came to entertain the ambition of world domination, and pursued the traditional militaristic policy of Frederick. Especially for the last sixteen or seventeen years the Kaiser has devoted himself assiduously to the construction of a world empire, and he has brought about the present world war. Who can say that his fate will be different from that of his French predecessor?

Pride goes before a fall, and pride is, after all, a sort of mental derangement. It is no wonder that Dr. Prince should have directed his attention to this phase of the Kaiser's psychology. To be proud of one's powers, and to imagine the impossible as within the bounds of the possible is a case of insanity. It is as if a drunken man misbehaves himself under the influence of liquors. A monarch with but a brief history behind him, he had the arrogance to proclaim to the people: "The Imperial throne is divinely ordained. The Hohenzollerns alone are entitled to it by the special appointment of Heaven." He not only tried eternally to preserve his autocratic government within his own dominion but also attempted to realize the traditional ambitions of Frederick the Great by bringing the

whole world to his feet. Is not this a sign of his mental derangement?

Although the Kaiser criticized Napoleon as having been ignorant of himself, yet it is doubtful whether the Kaiser is himself free from such a charge. The Book of Tactics says: "If one knows both oneself and one's opponent, one is sure to win. If one knows oneself but not the opponent, one may win or lose. If one knows neither oneself nor the opponent one is sure to suffer a defeat." If the Kaiser failed to calculate the strength of England, France, and Russia, the Kaiser did not know the opponent. If the Kaiser failed to perceive that the strength of Germany was unequal to meet the combined forces of the Allies, he did not know himself. Thus if he knew neither himself nor the enemy, how could he escape the inevitable result as predicted by the Chinese tactician?

It was his pride that brought him to his present extremity. His blind ambitions deprived him of his intelligence. Fighting, as he does, for no justifiable cause, he has defiled the dignity of his army. The German people who have been enjoying glorious prosperity since Frederick the Great by mobilizing the forces of the whole Empire, are now dissipating all their resources, human as well as material, by the mistaken policy of their leader. He is not only bringing pain and misery into the lives of the people of all nationalities, but has brought his German people to the verge of ruin. Is this the way to be the father of a nation? We shall not wonder if the

people desert him. The present war will not only leave an uneffaceable wound on the life and civilization of the world at large, but it may also lose the Kaiser the confidence of his people. This can by no means be said to be conducive to the interests of the Kaiser and of the Hohenzollerns. If the Kaiser fails to observe these plain truths, he is justly open to the charge of insanity.

I sincerely hope that this translation of Dr. Prince's work will serve as a good lesson to the proud and arrogant.

MARQUIS OKUMA.

December, 1916.

Last summer Dr. Morton Prince, a noted American psychologist, visited our shores. One day, through the introduction of Mr. Miyaoka, he had an interview with Marquis Okuma at his Waseda residence. I was present and had the privilege of listening to the interesting conversation that passed between the host and the guest. After a hearty discussion of various subjects, such as the present world politics, government, science, and psychology, individual and racial, the doctor directed his topics to the discussion of the conditions in Germany, and especially of the Kaiser and his militarism. . . . We can well imagine the acuteness of his observation, that penetrates into the very sore spot in the personality he dissects. Incidentally it will vouch for the value of his work on the psychology of the Kaiser, of which he was kind enough to send us a copy soon after through Mr. Miyaoka. I then read the book to the Marquis and we discussed the subject.

The Marquis commented minutely on this work; among other things he pointed out the fundamental differences that exist between the spirit of our polity and that of Germany as elucidated by Dr. Prince, the gist of which was as follows:

"The form of German polity, especially with

regard to the basis and powers of the Imperial throne, seems to resemble ours at first sight, but if we look a little closer into its substance we shall find that the two are diametrically opposed. We can well understand when an American gentleman like Dr. Prince in reviewing the present German monarchial system from his democratic standpoint points out the incompatibility of monarchial government with democratic principles. For there is no denying the fact that the present German monarchial principle has a tendency to come into conflict with democratic principles. We must not forget, however, that the spirit of our national polity is fundamentally different from that of Germany. With us the Imperial Household has since the days of the gods (i. e., the pre-historic age) considered it its mission to practice, and has continually and consistently been practicing, what the Occidentals would term 'democratic principles.' Thus the interests of the Imperial Household and the interests of the nation have been inseparably one, and have never been known to come in conflict with each other. Clear and unequivocal evidence may be said to be scattered throughout every page of our history. Especially noteworthy are the cases of Emperor Nintoku and Emperor Daigo, the former shedding tears over the scanty smoke that ascended from the roofs, the latter taking off his coat on a chilly night to share the pain and suffering of the poor. To say nothing of older examples which abound in our history, the life and works of Em-

peror Meiji, the Founder of New Japan, are just a case in point. The traditional spirit of our Imperial Household is well revealed in a letter to the people accompanying the famous Five Articles, a part of which was as follows: 'If any one of Our subjects does not get his due at this reconstruction of the entire government, it will be Our fault. We can be true to Our heavenly mission and to the glorious precedents of Our forefathers, only when We devote Our body and soul to meet the present national difficulties, and at the head of Our people attain meritorious works in the footsteps of Our ancestors.'

"Thus the harmonious co-operation of the sovereign and the subject having been the fundamental basis of our national polity, no such thing has ever existed in our history as a strife between the Imperial Household and the people. Look at European history and you will find a series of bitter strifes between Kings and subjects, which sometimes unfortunately led to bloodshed. The absence of such separation of the will of the people from that of the sovereign, and the absence of any conflict of interests between the two, shows the superiority of our polity in this respect. In other words, with us the Imperial Household has always practiced democratic principles, and the will of the people has always been made the will of the Imperial Household. This is radically different from the present autocratic government of Germany, which governs in accordance not with the will of the peo-

ple but with the will of the Imperial Household. As pointed out by Dr. Prince, the prerogatives of the Kaiser aim at the protection of the interests of the Imperial Household against the aggression of the people, but the power of our Imperial Household proceeds from the fundamental idea that the interests of the sovereign and the subject are inseparably one. There can be no interest of the Imperial Household apart from the interest of the people. What Dr. Prince says in criticism of the prerogatives of the Kaiser is just and adequate in the case of Germany, but you cannot justly apply his criticisms to the powers of our Imperial Household because of this basic difference.

"Dr. Prince, starting from his strong American democratic standpoint, and reviewing the selfish government of Germany, expresses deep sympathy with the German social democrats. That is natural enough for an American gentleman. But we must remember that each country has its own history, its own manners and customs, and its own complex elements of national life. Just as the plants differ according to the soil in which they are cultivated, so the government of each people must differ in its form and its workings. What an American thinks fit and proper may not necessarily be so in another country, any more than what the Germans think best can be imposed upon other nations. The statement of Dr. Prince in this respect must not be applied without reservation to our social conditions.

"If the reader reads this work with these points in mind, he will find it very interesting and instructive. Erudite scholar as Dr. Prince is, he wields his sharp dissecting knife so skilfully that it never fails to touch the sore spot of personality. In one passage especially he delineates the process by which an ambition based on selfish pride finally results in bringing a nation into ruin and throwing the whole world into trouble. This is a good moral not only to emperors and Kings but to anybody who has the welfare of a people at heart. His quotation in one passage of an arrogant nobleman makes the story highly dramatic."

The above is a mere outline of the Marquis' remarks on this book. Later I personally visited Dr. Prince and explained the Marquis' view to him, and especially the passage of the Emperor Meiji above quoted. The learned doctor nodded assent and said, "Since I came to Japan I have carefully studied the relation of the Imperial Household to the people, and have come to share the view of Marquis Okuma that in Japan the nation practices democratic principles under the leadership of the Imperial Household, and that in that respect the Imperial Household of Japan is different from that of Germany."

In short, this work attempts to dissect the psychology of the Kaiser with the political conditions of Germany as its background. The discussion is always to the point. It reveals the true position of the Kaiser and lays bare political conditions in Ger-

many. It shows clearly the antagonism prevalent in Germany between the autocratic and democratic ideas, the understanding of which is the only key to the German political relations. As was pointed out by Marquis Okuma, the discussion is not formally in accord with our line of thought. Strip it of its outer garments, however, and you find that the spirit in which it was written is in harmony with ours. It will undoubtedly serve as the proverbial stone of another mountain to polish our own gems.

As Dr. Prince has consented to the translation of his book by any competent translator, I asked my friend, Mr. Yuya Goma, to do the work, and I have revised the manuscript with utmost care. We hope that the present translation is enough to convey the idea of the author to our public.

SHOTEI SHIOSAWA,
Hogakuhakushi.

December, 1916.

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE KAISER

I

THE KAISER'S ANTIPATHY

IN the consciousness of the Kaiser there is nothing that is more dominant than his increasing and virulent antipathy to a great body of citizens constituting no less than one-third of his empire—the Social Democrats.

We have all read of the Kaiser's hatred of the party known as the Social Democratic Party. We have read the epithets which he has constantly hurled at them, and of his antipathy to their creeds. "Traitors," "a plague that must be exterminated," "a horde of men unworthy to bear the name of Germans," "foes to the country and empire," "people without a country and enemies of religion," he has called them.

To a delegation of striking miners he said:

> For me every Social Democrat is synonymous with an enemy of the empire and of his country. If, therefore, I believe that there are any Socialist tendencies in the movement [the strike of 100,000 men], stirring up to unlawful resistance, I shall act with merciless rigor and bring to bear all the power at my disposal—which is great.

Again:

The doctrines of the Social Democrats are not only opposed to the commandments of God and Christian morality but are also altogether unpractical, being equally injurious to the individuals and the whole community.

So violent is the hatred of the Kaiser toward this party that he even has thought it might come to suppressing it by the army. He said to the young soldiers at Potsdam:

For you there is only one foe, and that is my foe. In view of our present Socialist troubles, it may come to this, that I command you to shoot down your own relatives, brothers, and even parents, in the streets, which God forbid; but then you must obey my orders without a murmur.

Why so much feeling? Why such recurrent outbursts of anger and hatred against a political party which in numbers is twice as large as any other single party in the empire, a party which in 1912 cast 4,250,000 votes * and which was represented

* The total vote cast was 12,207,000. The number of Social Democrats elected was not fairly proportionate to the voting strength of the party owing to the inequality of representation of the urban and rural districts. The distribution of seats in the Reichstag has not been changed since 1871, more than forty years ago, when the constitution under Bismarck was adopted. During this time the population of Germany has increased from approximately 40,000,000 to about 68,000,000 and the cities and industrial centres have gained enormously in population, relatively to the rural districts, and what were agricultural towns have become industrial centres and manufacturing communities. Consequently, one result of the election laws is that the cities and industrial and manufacturing centres where the Social Democrats preponderate have very small representation, while the rural districts where the conservatives (Junkers) are a majority have a disproportionately large representation. Thus greater Berlin with 850,000 voters, where the Social Democrats are in a vast majority, is represented in the Reichstag by only eight members while the same

in the German parliament in 1912 by 110 members, the representatives of over 21,000,000 people, nearly one-third of the population?

number of voters in the small rural districts are represented by forty-eight members.

The inequalities of representation in the State Legislatures and city governments are due to the peculiar election laws existing in the different states of Germany. In Prussia, for example, there is what is called the "three-class system." The voters are divided into three classes according to the amount of taxes paid, the total taxes being divided into three equal parts. "Then, starting with the highest taxpayers, those voters whose taxes total the first third of taxes paid constitute the first class of electors. They are the wealthiest men and naturally are smallest in numbers.

"The second class is made up of those electors who pay taxes equal to the second division. Their number is a little larger. The third class is made up of all the rest of the voters.

"Each class elects the *same number* of deputies to the [Prussian] Reichstag [Diet]. Obviously the respectable middle class composed of that element in Continental politics known as the *bourgeoisie* throws its vote with that of the aristocracy against the people at large. In one careful analysis of this system the ratio in the division was roughly as follows: one voter in the first class; thirty-two voters in the second class; three hundred and fifty voters in the third class.

"Now the exclusive gentleman in the first class elected just as many members of the Reichstag [Diet] as did the 350 workingmen in the third class, or the thirty-two well-to-do business men in the second class." (*The Kaiser,* edited by Asa Don Dickenson, p. 105.)

Again: The city of Berlin in 1910 with a population of 2,000,000 was governed by 33,062 persons, owing to the three-class system of voting.

S. P. Orth (*Socialism and Democracy in Europe*) gives various instances of the inequality which appears in the cities. "In Berlin in one precinct one man paid one-third of the taxes and consequently possessed one-third of the legislative influence in that precinct. In another precinct the president of a large bank paid one-third of the taxes, and two of his associates paid another third. These three men named the member of the Diet from that precinct."

In Saxony the electorate is divided into four classes according to their income. The members of each class have respectively 1, 2, 3,

These are strong words of the Kaiser's I have quoted. They are not mere invectives uttered during the heat of a political campaign. They are not to be classed with those emotional castigations with which political stump-speech orators, working themselves up to a state of passionate indignation, flay their adversaries, and which are promptly forgotten as soon as the campaign is ended—albeit the Kaiser is essentially a stump-speech orator.

We have all learned not to take seriously the ephemeral indignation of the political orator. But the Kaiser's denunciation of the Social Democrats is the expression of an antipathy which is fixed, deep-rooted, persistent, and is a part of his personality, for it has manifested itself in the form of recurrent attacks of anger and hatred ever since he came to the throne, twenty-seven years ago. It is like unto an obsessing idea, common enough, which, fixed deep down in the mind, rises in consciousness whenever its object presents itself.

Fixed antipathies are always, for the psychologist, objects of interesting study, but for others, even in an Emperor, they are little more than mat-

and 4 votes. Consequently, in 1909, 18,491 voters of the fourth class, having 4 votes each, cast 73,964 votes, while 32,567 voters of the first class cast only 32,567.

Corresponding inequalities of representation necessarily followed. In consequence of all these conditions ballot reform was the principal immediate issue of the Social-Democratic party before the war.

It may also be pointed out that the 4,250,000 votes cast by the Social Democrats in 1912 do not represent the whole opposition to the autocracy, inasmuch as certain liberal groups, the progressives and the people's party cast together 1,506,000 votes.

ters of intellectual curiosity unless the antipathy is one of practical political import, one that affects the policies of Government and the course of history.

If the antipathy of the Kaiser were only of that trivial kind common to many people, which is manifested as a dread of snakes, or of death, or other banal object, its study would be of little practical interest excepting for its victim, William II. himself, although the revelation of its origin and meaning would give an insight into one component, however unimportant, of an exalted personality.

The periodical recurrence of the antipathy and the psychological reactions to which it gave rise would probably affect the happiness of no one but himself and the unhappy members of his family who would have to bear the brunt of it. No one is interested in other people's symptoms.

But it is different when such a recurring antipathy is of a political nature. Then by a study of the underlying causes of this obsessing idea we not only can obtain an insight into important components of the personality of a great historical character, but we should expect to find the true motives which have determined those policies of Government and the course of history which have been the direct result of the antipathy.

The Kaiser's hatred of the Social Democrats has had momentous practical consequences. It is safe to say that it has been more than any other single factor the motive which has determined him to

maintain, against the progressive spirit of modern civilization, the present autocratic system of government, to resist all liberal attempts to change the Constitution so as to give responsible representative government to the people and to defend what he claims as his prerogatives. It has determined other tyrannous measures which have suppressed freedom of speech and the press and banefully oppressed the liberty of the German people. I refer to the law of lèse-majesté.

This law, a return to the feudalism of the Middle Ages, is the means the Kaiser employs to punish those who talk back. He may insult his subjects, call them all manner of names, misrepresent their principles, their purposes and ideals, excite animosity against them "as enemies to the country and religion," but if they answer back they are met by the law of lèse-majesté, and this law is enforced, as every one knows, with merciless severity to suppress political opponents.

Against the Democrats the law has been used as a weapon of suppression, though without success. Under this law statistics showed that up to 1898, during only the first decade of William II.'s reign, more than 1,000 years of imprisonment had been inflicted upon offenders. A recent responsible writer asserts that up to 1914 the sentences had reached 30,000 years, but I do not know upon what authority these figures are based.

It is not surprising that editors of Social Democratic newspapers, many political leaders of the

party, and writers for the Democratic press have been among those who have served terms in prison for lèse-majesté, or offense against the press law.

There have been times when scarcely a week passed without three or four trials. But against the Social Democratic members of the Reichstag when making use of their prerogatives as elected representatives of the people, this law has not been sufficient to satisfy the Kaiser's animosity. So on one occasion when they refused to rise and cheer him, in response to a demand, the Kaiser had introduced, through his Chancellor, a bill to permit the criminal prosecution of these delegates. To its credit, be it said, the majority refused to permit this encroachment upon its rights.

It is safe to say that such a criminal law as lèse-majesté and its abuse for political purposes in England would cost the King his crown.

To this antipathy of the Kaiser may also be traced in large part responsibility for the consolidation of the autocratic and military party in Germany. For, by suppressing the political power of the only militant party that has opposed this autocracy, the Kaiser has been enabled to solidify his power and intrench himself with his army as the dominating political force which has determined the foreign policies of the empire.

It is safe to say that if the democracy had been in power, or if the constitutional system of government had been such that the Social Democratic Party, in and out of the Reichstag, could have made

its influence felt, the foreign and military policies and methods of the Government would have been far different and there would have been no war. Germanism and Pan-Germanism would not have threatened the world.†

† Surprise has been expressed that the Social Democrats, in view of their avowed principles and their platform, did not in the beginning throw their influence against the war, but are patriotically supporting the government. In other words, that there is a United Fatherland. There is no question that the Social Democrats were bitterly opposed to this war and yet they cast their 111 votes in the Reichstag unanimously in favor of the war budget, but it was *after war had been declared* by the Upper House and the Emperor.

This seems on the face of the facts a complete reversal of the Party policy and yet it is easily understood.

The Social Democrats, though opposed to militarism and war, are first and all the time patriots. They have always declared that if the Fatherland were attacked they would rally to its defense, and all the world knows that the German people as a whole have been made to believe that the Fatherland was attacked.

In 1907 Bebel, then leader of the Party, declared in a debate in the Reichstag that *if the Fatherland were attacked* even he, in his old age, would "shoulder a musket" in its defense. And in the next Party Convention he declared:

"I said, *if the Fatherland really must be defended,* then we will defend it. Because it is our Fatherland. It is the land in which we live, whose language we speak, whose culture we possess. Because we wish to make this, our Fatherland, more beautiful and more complete than any other land on earth. We defend it, therefore, *not for you but against you.*"

Likewise Von Vollmar later said in the Bavarian Diet:

"If the necessity should arise for the protection of the realm against foreign invasion, then it will become evident that the Social Democrats love their Fatherland no less than do their neighbors; that they will as gladly and heroically offer themselves to its defense. On the other hand, if the foolish notion should ever arise to use the army for the support of a warring class prerogative, for the defense of indefeasible demands, and for the crushing of those just ambitions which are the product of our times, and a necessary concomitant of our economic and political development,—then we are of the firm conviction that the day will come when the army will

More than this, it is impossible, I believe, for any one to study the internal politics of Germany without arriving at the firm conviction that the

remember that it sprang from the people, and that its own interests are those of the masses."

As S. P. Orth, from whose work I take these quotations, says, "This makes their position very clear."

When war was declared the position which the Social Democrats were obliged to take was also clear. It was not a question of opposing the war. As Patrick Henry declared, in his famous speech at the beginning of our own Revolution, "Gentlemen may cry 'Peace! Peace!' But there is no Peace. The war has actually begun." And so with the Social Democrats, it was only a question of voting supplies. The Social Democrats disclaimed all responsibility for the war. As Deputy Haase said in the Reichstag in explanation of the vote of his colleagues:

"The responsibility for this calamity falls upon those who are responsible for the imperial policies that led to it. We absolutely decline all responsibility. The Social Democrats fought this policy with all their might. At this moment, however, the question before us is not war, or no war. The war is here. The question now is one of defence of the country. Our nation and the future of its liberty are jeopardized by a possible victory of Russian despotism, the hands of which are stained with blood of the best of its own nation. Against this danger it is our duty to secure the culture and independence of our land."

And the *Vorwaerts,* the official organ of the Social Democrats, on July 30th, just before the declaration of war, announced:

"We are opposed to militarism, and we reaffirm our opposition to monarchism, to which we have always been opposed, and always will be. We have been compelled from the first to lead a bitter struggle against the temperamental wearer of the crown. We recognize, however, and we have stated it repeatedly, that William II. has proved himself to be a sincere friend of peace among the nations, particularly in later years. . . . But even the strongest character is not entirely free from influence, and we regret to say that proofs are accumulating in abundance that the clique of war shouters have been at work again to influence the government in favor of the devastation of the whole of Europe. . . .

"In England it is the general opinion that the German Kaiser in his capacity as the ally and adviser of Austria was the arbiter in

elimination of German militarism, for which the war is being waged, and therefore the hope of permanent world's peace, must rest upon the German Democratic Party. From this viewpoint, the study of the Kaiser's antipathy for the Social Democrats offers a most fruitful psychological study.

Why, then, I repeat, so much feeling when the Kaiser thinks of the Social Democratic Party? Why such hatred of it? Why such anger? Why such a personal attitude?

To explain it on the ground of differences in political principles, as a political antipathy intensely expressed in terms of an intense emotional personality, is a superficial and inadequate psychological explanation, although it is commonly satisfying as a political explanation. The two are not synonymous. The reasons for this distinction will appear as we proceed.

If the party represented only a small band of criminal agitators, of militant anarchists, let us say, who sought by assassination and terrorism to destroy the existing Government, such an attitude of mind would be easily comprehensible and would need no analysis. But the Social Democratic Party

this trouble and had it in his power to let peace or war fall from the folds of his royal robes. *And England is right.* As conditions are, William II. has the decision in his hands."

It will thus be seen that although the Social Democrats feel that the Kaiser and the military party are to blame for the war, they also necessarily feel that as patriots they must support the Fatherland as would be the case with any party in any country. But it also follows that if the Democracy had been in control of the government of Germany there would have been no war.

in 1888, on the accession of William II, on the basis of one voter in every five of the population, represented less than 4,000,000 subjects, and in 1912 over 21,000,000, a third of the total population.‡ It is, therefore, representative of a large part of the public opinion of the empire, and, above all, of the working classes. Indeed, it is the largest political party in the empire. Criminal agitation is, therefore, out of the question.

In other countries political feeling in times of crises often runs high, and at times statesmen, rulers, leaders of political parties generally, have strong political bias and feel intensely hostile to their political opponents; but they do not regard them as foes of their country, and God, and religion, to be crsuhed by every force in the power of the Government; and they rarely carry their hostility, and anger, and hatred into social and industrial life,

‡ The steady growth of the Social Democratic Party has been phenomenal and is of importance in the bearing it has upon the future. In 1871 the party cast only 124,000 votes and from that time to 1912 there has been an almost continuous increase, as may be seen from the following table:

1871	124,000
1874	352,000
1877	493,000
1878	437,000
1881	312,000
1884	550,000
1887	763,000
1890	1,427,000
1893	1,787,000
1898	2,107,000
1903	3,011,000
1907	3,259,000
1912	4,250,000

as has been the case with the German Emperor.

Furthermore, the persistency of the Emperor's antipathy is remarkable. It is like an obsession. He has retained, undiminished, his hatred of the Social Democrats from his accession to the outbreak of the war, and has never ceased to angrily stigmatize them with such emotional epithets as I have cited.

Now it is probable, owing to a psychological law, that when strong emotion, out of all apparent proportion to the cause, is excited by some object, that object has struck some sentiment, a "complex" of ideas and emotions deeply rooted in the personality, but not squarely admitted and faced by consciousness. Examples of this we see every day.

A strong protectionist inveighs with intense anger against the principle of free trade and the political party that advocates this principle in its platform. The reason he consciously gives is the economic disadvantage which, he apprehends, will result to the country at large. But though this may be the reason, or rather one reason for his political opinion, it is not the real reason for his *emotion*—his anger and his invectives.

These are due to the fact that the free-trade doctrine strikes a chord within him which resonates with selfish fear for his own business interests, and the reaction of this chord is anger. In other words, to use a homely phrase, while apparently speaking from the viewpoint of political principles, he is really "talking out of his pocket." But he does not squarely face and perhaps is only half conscious

or entirely unconscious of this fact. This selfish viewpoint is his "unconscious attitude of mind."

Now, is the Kaiser's antipathy to the Social Democrats merely the expression of an academic disbelief in the Marxian principles of Socialism and a disbelief in the practicability of such principles if applied by the State to political government? Or are these only ostensible reasons for his antipathy? If the latter, a study of the Kaiser's mind ought to reveal deep-rooted sentiments of another kind which will explain his emotional reaction. But in that case, for a complete explanation, we must inquire what there is that is peculiar in the political tenets of the Social Democracy that touches these sentiments and excites the reaction. In other words, it is a question of the Why.

These questions rise above a banal curiosity to inquire into a peculiar personal dislike of an Emperor, however that might be justified by the exalted world-position which he occupies. They are important in that, if pursued, they may lead to a deeper understanding of his personality, and they may unfold both his viewpoint of government as exemplified by the German system and the antagonistic viewpoint of the German Democracy, which for many years has been striving against the power of the Emperor to force its ideals and aspirations upon the autocracy that rules Germany.

All these questions are involved in the psychology of the personality of the Kaiser. The political questions are involved, for no personality can be

understood apart from its environment to which it reacts, and which is largely responsible for the formation of "sentiments."

The sentiments are of prime and fundamental importance in the formation of a personality. I use the term "sentiments" in a restricted psychological sense and not in accordance with popular usage. I shall have occasion later to explain how sentiments are formed after we have become acquainted with some of the Kaiser's mental attitudes.

Meanwhile I would simply explain in justification of this inquiry, that character depends upon the psycho-physiological organization of ideas, derived in the broadest sense from life's experiences, with the innate primitive instinctive dispositions to behave or react to given situations (i. e., to react to the environment).

Thus, on the one hand, sentiments are formed which characterize our attitude toward life, including therein our personal, social, political, and industrial relations to the world about us; and, on the other, the inborn natural instincts of man are harnessed, controlled, and repressed, or cultivated and given free rein. Upon the development of sentiments, therefore, not only the behavior of the individual depends, but the whole social organization. Of course, in a brief article of this kind we shall be obliged to limit ourselves to a few of the sentiments involved in the questions placed before us and therefore to a very limited study of the Kaiser's personality.

II

THE KAISER'S PREROGATIVES

Let us go back to the year 1888, when the Kaiser came to the throne. In his very first speech to the Prussian Diet he proclaimed with noticeable emphasis that he was "firmly resolved to maintain intact and guard from all encroachment the chartered prerogatives of the Crown." (*The Kaiser,* edited by Asa Don Dickenson, page 113.) It was noticed that he laid marked stress on these words, so that it was publicly commented upon by those who heard him. This intention to defend his prerogatives the Kaiser has consistently maintained ever since, and more than once has proclaimed. What are the "prerogatives" about which the Kaiser took the very first opportunity to warn Germany and about which he has been so tenacious? They can be briefly stated.

In the first place, we must know it is the Kaiser's prerogative not to be responsible to the people or to Parliament, but only to himself. He does not derive his power from either, but he reigns by his own right. This is his prerogative. Furthermore, he not only reigns, but it is his prerogative to govern. The King of England reigns, but, as has so often been said, he does not govern. In England the responsibility for governing rests entirely with the Ministry, which in principle is only a select com-

mittee of Parliament. It is the English Parliament, therefore, and practically the elected House of Commons that governs.

In the second place it is the Kaiser's prerogative to appoint a Chancellor to help him govern. He has no Cabinet, nor Board of Advisors. The Chancellor is responsible only to the Emperor. Parliament may be entirely opposed to him, but in such case he does not necessarily resign, as would the British Prime Minister, nor is it the customary usage. He may not have been a member of Parliament when appointed. The Kaiser alone may dismiss him, as he dismissed Bismarck. The Emperor may disregard him and his advice, if he likes; so that in practice he may be his own Chancellor, as it is commonly said in Germany he has been ever since Bismarck's dismissal and as Bismarck foretold would be the case.

A third prerogative is to appoint the Ministers, the heads of the great departments—Navy, Foreign Affairs, Colonies, etc., who are under the Chancellor. Thus all executive power resides in the Kaiser. Parliament has none. We may say it is the Kaiser's prerogative to be the administration.

A fourth prerogative is to be Commander in Chief of the Army and to have absolute authority over the forces of the army both in peace and in war. (Art. 63 of the Constitution.) It is his prerogative to "determine the numerical strength, the organization, and the divisional contingents of the imperial army"; also to appoint all superior offi-

cers. (Art. 64.) That the Kaiser regards this as one of his most cherished prerogatives the world well knows.

A fifth and exceedingly powerful prerogative is to appoint and control the seventeen members of the upper house—the Bundesrath, or Federal Council—the most powerful upper house in the world. The Kaiser thus has the votes—only fourteen being required—to defeat any amendment to the Constitution, and in practice he has always controlled a majority of the Council, which has been the creature of the Kaiser throughout its history. With the consent of the Council he can declare war, but, as the Council is a lady of easy consent, this limitation need not bear hardly and the wooing need be but short and light.

A sixth prerogative is to initiate all legislation, although indirectly, through his controlled Federal Council, of which the Chancellor is President. The lower house, the Reichstag, elected by the people, cannot initiate legislation, so well did Bismarck fix the Constitution for the benefit of Prussia and the Kaiser.

All measures must originate in the upper house, which can also veto them when amended in the Reichstag, and can dissolve the latter (with the Kaiser's consent) if it doesn't like its ways. (Think of the House of Lords dissolving the Commons!) The Kaiser has thus very great power in controlling legislation. (With almost innumerable parties, none of which has a majority, in the House, log-

rolling under an astute Chancellor has been raised to a fine art that would make an American State Legislature blush like a neophyte.)

The Reichstag, however, can refuse to vote supplies and to pass measures favored by the Kaiser. The elected representatives of the people can thus talk, resolve and criticise, and refuse to follow the Kaiser and thus create a public opinion which he may or may not dare to oppose, but they can do little more.

III

THE KAISER'S DIVINE RIGHT DELUSION

Finally, the Kaiser claims that his prerogative to govern is derived from God, granted by the Almighty to his House, the House of Hohenzollern. This is far from being meant as a figure of speech or mere rhetoric, or an allegorical expression of religious responsibility for duties to be performed. It is a deep, all-abiding belief and principle of action.

It is difficult for us Americans of the twentieth century fully to grasp this belief in a present-day man of boasted culture, from whom we expect common sense. We may laugh at it, but in its practical consequences it is no laughing matter. It is fundamental to the Kaiser's viewpoint and to an understanding of his attitude toward his subjects

and the world. Another sovereign derives his right to reign, if not to govern, from the Constitution of his country, which means in the last analysis by contract with his people.

But the German Emperor refuses to acknowledge any responsibility to the people, or any dependence upon the people, or the Constitution, or contract, for his right to govern. He derives this right directly from God. Whatever rights and powers the people possess descend from the Kaiser, who grants them through the Constitution; the rights and powers of the Kaiser do not ascend from the people, as in a democracy.

The concentration of irresponsible hereditary power in one man and those appointed by him is plainly an autocracy. "The Divine right of Kings to rule" is a doctrine dating back to the Middle Ages, and is by Americans naïvely supposed to have ended nearly a century ago with the dissolution of the "Holy Alliance," whose designs upon South America gave rise to our Monroe Doctrine in 1823.

This doctrine of Divine right, then, is one of the prerogatives, if not in his mind the great prerogative, which the Kaiser announced he was resolved to defend. And it does not belong to the present Kaiser alone, but was possessed, as he claims, by his long line of ancestors of the House of Hohenzollern, and will descend to his successors of this house. It is the prerogative of his house. Thus he announced:

It is the tradition of our house that we, the Hohenzollerns, regard ourselves as appointed by God to govern and to lead the people whom it is given us to rule, for their well-being and the advancement of their material and intellectual interests.

And again:

I look upon the people and nation handed on to me as a responsiblity, conferred upon me by God: and that it is, as is written in the Bible, my duty to increase this heritage, for which one day I shall be called upon to give an account; those who try to interfere with my task I shall crush.

And again:

I regard my whole position as given to me direct from heaven, and that I have been called by the Highest to do His work, by One to Whom I must one day render an account.

This claim as German Emperor, or as King of Prussia, has been announced again and again by the Kaiser, and his words have been quoted by the press, by magazine writers and pamphleteers and bookmakers unto weariness of the reader.

The prerogatives we have briefly summarized are imperial, but be it noted they are double-headed in that—mutatis mutandis—they also belong to William II as King of Prussia so far as the constitutional relations of the kingdom to the empire make them applicable.

The odd notion of Divine right the Kaiser picked up from his grandfather, William I, who, when he was crowned King of Prussia at Königsberg, to show he was above the Constitution which his pred-

ecessor had granted the people, raised with his own hands the crown from the altar, "set it on his own head, and announced in a loud voice, 'I receive this crown from God's hand and from none other.' "

And, referring to this historical incident, the present Kaiser, William II., in a speech, now historic, at the same place, said:

> And here my grandfather, again, by his own right, set the Prussian crown upon his head, once more distinctly emphasizing the fact that it was accorded him by the will of God alone, and not by Parliament or by any assemblage of the people or by popular vote, and that he thus looked upon himself as the chosen instrument of Heaven, and as such performed his duties as regent and sovereign.

From a psychological point of view, it does not matter—any more than it signified anything to the Kaiser and his grandfather—that, as a matter of fact, the first ruling Hohenzollern of Brandenburg, Elector Frederick I., acquired his title to the Electorate by taking from King Sigismund of Hungary, in 1411, a mortgage on the province (the nucleus of modern Prussia) as security for a loan to that hard-up potentate of about one hundred thousand gulden. A little later he foreclosed the mortgage and took title—a rather poor title at that, as there was already a mortgage on the property which it was convenient for Sigismund to repudiate. Perhaps royal second mortgages—like marriages—are made in Heaven, and thus they become "Divine Rights."*

* In 1701 Elector Frederick III. took the title of (first) King of Prussia as Frederick I.

What does psychologically matter is that the present Kaiser has persuaded himself, forgetting all about this business transaction, that his early Hohenzollern Shylock (in foreclosing the mortgage) "felt within himself the call to journey to this land" of Brandenburg—plainly a Divine call—and "was convinced that the task [of governing] was given him from above." (Kaiser's speech, Feb. 3, 1899.)

What counts psychologically is that the Kaiser believes that a Divine right to rule is his prerogative. How, in this age, a man who has shown such marked ability in certain directions can be such a fool—I mean psychologically, of course—as to persuade himself to believe such stuff, is another story that would make an interesting psychological study in itself, and in the last analysis could probably be traced to subconscious wishes which have produced this conscious delusion, just as such subconscious processes determine the delusions of insane people.

Our conscious thoughts are much more determined by subconscious processes, of which we are unaware, than we realize.

One great popular delusion is that our minds are more exact logical instruments than they really are, and we stand in awe of the minds of great men, thinking that because they are superior in certain directions, therefore they are superior in all other directions of their activities where they claim superiority; whereas, as a matter of fact, a man may

be eminently superior in certain fields of mental activity and psychologically a perfect fool-thinker and fool-performer in other fields.

Helmholtz said of the eye that it was such an imperfect optical instrument that if an instrument maker should send him an optical instrument so badly made he would refuse to accept it and return it forthwith. He might have said the same thing of the human mind. It is a very imperfect instrument of thought. All we can say of it is that though a poor thing it is the best we can get. The deeper insight we get into the mechanism of the human mind, the poorer thing it appears as an instrument of precision.

This Divine Right delusion is psychologically interesting in that it very closely resembles and behaves like the delusions characteristic of the mental disease paranoia. This is not to say—indeed it would be absurd to say as some have said—that the Kaiser is afflicted with paranoia. But it is true that in normal people we find the prototypes of mental processes observed in abnormal mental conditions. The essential characteristic of paranoia is a systematized delusion: that is, some belief into which all sorts of facts of the environment are interwoven and through which such events, casual actions of other people and their motives are interpreted. Thus, an insane person may imagine he is the object of persecution and then proceed to interpret any kind of act of others, really unrelated to himself, through this belief, imagining that it is

directed towards the end of persecuting him. Or a paranoiac may imagine that he is the divine emissary of God and then interpret one hundred and one everyday events of life as divine messages to himself.

In normal people we see the prototype of such a delusion in the form of a mildly fixed idea which leads a person to wrongly interpret other people's motives and acts. You may say, if you like, that he believes such and such a thing because he wishes to, or because of some firmly fixed belief through which he interprets it. The difference between the normal and abnormal person is that the former can, if he desires and the truth is properly presented, change his belief; the abnormal person cannot.

It would be an extravagance to say that the Kaiser's delusion is anything more than a normal fixed idea which he could change if he wished to. But this fixed idea is so strong, so deeply rooted in his personality, and so directly the expression of a cherished and cultivated wish, conscious or subconscious, that it dominates his interpretation of facts which to an ordinary person flatly contradict it. It leads him to entirely ignore both palpable facts, such as the purchase with cold cash, by his ancestor, of the throne, or more exactly, electorate of Brandenburg, and universally accepted understandings of the relation of God to the worldly affairs of men —so universally accepted that they have passed into the common-sense of mankind. We may say, paraphrasing the words of a subconscious personality

known as "Sally" in a case of multiple personality describing the attitude of mind of one of her other selves: "There are so many things he cannot or will not see. He holds to certain beliefs and ideas with unwearying patience. It makes no difference that the facts are all against him. He still ignores the facts, still idealizes himself and his prerogatives."

The Kaiser's fixed idea is, according to psychological laws, determined by wishes—his wish to be sole and autocratic ruler of Prussia and the Empire, his wish to be the sole arbiter and director of the imperial destinies, his wish, "considering himself the instrument of the Lord, without heeding the views and opinions" and will of his subjects to "go his way"; his wish to decide everything, like a patriarch for the people, and to treat them like children; his wish to be looked up to as the supreme power—all these desires determine in him the belief that he is the "anointed of the Lord," a ruler by Divine authority. For only by such authority could he logically find justification for the assumption of such powers and the fulfillment of his desires. In other words, through the acceptance of the Divine Right Delusion he finds a means for the fulfillment of his wishes. And curiously enough, but still according to psychological laws, this fixed idea with its powerful instinct of self-assertion has awakened in his Junker and militaristic supporters sentiments of self-abasement through which they yield submissively to this as-

sumed prerogative of the Kaiser and adopt an attitude of Divinity Worship. Thus we have a politico-religious cult in which the Kaiser is the Godhead. And thus we have wishes conscious and subconscious, but working subconsciously, making a fool—psychologically speaking—of the Kaiser.

The most curious part of this whole Divine Right business is that in Germany, with all its "Kultur," there has been scarcely one single voice among all the people of Germany publicly to deny this claim, excepting the voice of the Social Democracy; or, if there has, it has been like a voice crying in the wilderness—or perhaps from behind prison bars, where such rashness brought the prisoner, condemned under the feudal law of lèse-majesté. We shall presently see what the German democracy thinks about it.

IV

THE GERMAN AUTOCRACY AND THE ARMY

The practical upshot of this whole German system of government, in which imperial prerogatives and an impotent opéra bouffe Reichstag are essential ingredients, is that the Kaiser with his Chancellor and the Ministers of the several departments (Foreign Affairs, Navy, Post Office, etc.), a bureaucracy responsible only to the Kaiser, constitute an autocracy independent of Parliament and the voters. Consequently the Government is intended

to be and is for the State, by the State, not of the people, by the people.

The Kaiser's point of view as to his own place in the State is shown by some of his sayings: "There is only one master in this country—I am he and I will not tolerate another." "There is no law but my law; there is no will but my will," he told his soldiers, and, "The King's will is the highest law," he wrote in the Golden Book of Munich.

And so, as a German Professor, Ludwig Gurlitt, has said:

> He regards his people, the masses, as children not yet of age, and thinks the Government competent to prescribe the course of their social and cultural development—a profound and fatal mistake . . . a mediæval idea!

Autocracy makes for efficiency, but it also makes for the suppression of the aspirations of the people and self-government. But if the Kaiser, the bureaucracy, and an emasculated Parliament were the whole system of government, autocracy would be incomplete. The system would crumble away as by an earthquake when democracy became successful at the polls.

The system, therefore, must be supported by power of some kind. Without power behind the throne, or behind any government, autocratic, monarchical, or republican, that government would fall at the first shock of internal conflict. In a real republic that power is the will of the people—commonly called public opinion. But we have seen that the German system does not rest upon public opin-

ion. Upon what, then? William II., indeed, as the "instrument of the Lord," has flaunted his own defiance of public sentiment.

Five years ago he said:

> Considering myself as the instrument of the Lord, and without heeding the views and opinions of the day, I go my way.

Behind the German autocracy is the army, under the absolute control of the Kaiser. Upon the army the Kaiser depends for the security of his rule. The army is the power behind the throne.

As one writer remarks:

> "The army is the foundation of the social structure of the empire."

The Kaiser, on one occasion, declared:

> With grave anxiety I placed the crown upon my head. Everywhere I met doubt, and the whole world misjudged me. But one had confidence in me; but one believed in me—that was the army. And relying upon the army, and trusting in God, I began my reign, knowing well that the army is the main tower of strength for my country, the main pillar supporting the Prussian throne, to which God in His wisdom had called me.

He said in 1891:

> The soldier and the army, not parliamentary majorities and decisions, have welded together the German Empire. My confidence is in the army—as my grandfather said at Coblenz: "These are the gentlemen on whom I can rely."

And again, asserting his belief in military force as the means upon which the empire must rely to

accomplish its ends at home and abroad, he quoted the saying of Frederick William I.:

> If one wishes to decide something in this world, it is not the pen alone that will do it if unsupported by the power of the sword.

In his first official act as Emperor (June 15, 1888), he declared:

> The absolutely inviolable dependence upon the war lord (Kriegsherr) is, in the army, the inheritance which descends from father to son, from generation to generation. . . . So we are bound together, I and the army. Thus we are born for one another, and thus we will hold together in an indissoluble bond, in peace or storm, as God wills.

This close connection between the army and the Prussian Kings, as Professor Gauss points out, is a tradition which William II. has sedulously maintained, just as we have seen he has maintained the traditions of a Divine right to rule.

V

THE KAISER'S SENTIMENTS

With the meaning of all these prerogatives in mind, let us look a bit more closely into the psychology of the Kaiser. In doing so let us bear in mind that in the doctrine of Divine right we see developed in the Kaiser a strong sentiment of the most personal kind, of birthright, of self-interest. And,

besides this, in all the other prerogatives which the Kaiser has so defiantly resolved to defend against all encroachments, we also have sentiments of self-interest—sentiments of possession, of rights pertaining to self.

All these sentiments are bound up with a consciousness of his own personality (a "self-regarding" sentiment), with his ego. And there is a great deal of ego, of consciousness of his ego, in his personality. Perhaps his enemies would say, as was said of the great orang-utan, Bimi, in Kipling's tale—Bimi, who also wished to crush his enemies in furious outbursts of jealous rage—"there is too much ego in his cosmos."

Now, as a matter of psychology, "sentiments," as I have already said, are of tremendous importance as factors in personality and as forces which determine attitudes of mind, reactions of the personality to the environment and conduct.

Upon the formation of "sentiments" the character of a person and his social behavior fundamentally depend. And by the formation of sentiments in the course of the individual's mental development the primitive innate instincts of human nature are harnassed and brought under control and their impulses given proper direction. Thus these primitive impulses are repressed or cultivated according to the ideals of society. Otherwise, driven by the impulses of our innate instincts, we should all run amuck through society.

We must understand, then, a little more pre-

cisely what, psychologically and technically speaking, a sentiment is. I am not using the word in the popular sense. Without going into the psychology deeply, we may say that a sentiment is an idea of something, as its object, organized or associated with one or more instinctive emotions which give the idea impulsive force.

In the personality of every human being—and the same is true of animals—there are a number of emotional instincts. These instincts are characterized by a particular emotion which each possesses, and may be named indifferently, for our present purposes, either after the emotion itself or after the biological aim which the instinct serves.

Every person, for instance, possesses a pugnacity instinct of which the emotion is anger. Other such instincts are fear, parental feeling, disgust, curiosity, self-assertion, self-abasement, reproduction, and so on. All such instincts have a biological function in that they serve either to protect, like anger and fear, the individual (and the species) from danger against its enemies and prevent its extinction, or, like the parental and reproductive instincts, serve to perpetuate the species, or, like the curiosity instinct, to acquire knowledge and learn by experience, and so on. Emotion, as the very word itself indicates, moves us—i. e., it is a force that impels toward some end and the emotion of each instinct carries it to fulfillment.

When an emotion—i. e., instinct—has been excited by some object, whether it be a material thing,

like a snake, or another person, or something mental —an idea of a material object, or a thought as of a possible danger to the individual, or of a political principle—the emotion may become so associated with and bound to the object that whenever the object is presented in consciousness the emotion is excited. This particularly happens when the emotion has been frequently excited by the same object.

Thus a person may acquire a fear of snakes, or thunderstorms, or hatred of a person. Two or more emotional instincts may be organized in this way into a system about a given idea as their object.

Now, when an idea always excites one or more emotions, so that the idea is always accompanied by the same emotional reaction, the whole is called a sentiment. Thus we have the sentiment of love of a mother for her child, of hatred of a tyrant, of disgust for a vicious person, of pride of self, and so on.

Practically, psychological analysis shows that the organization of a sentiment is more complicated than such a simple arrangement would make it, and that the sentiment is deeply and widely rooted in a number of ramifying, previous mental experiences and innate emotions. This is expressed by popular language when we say a given sentiment is deeply rooted in a person's personality. The emotions serve to give their ideas great intensity and driving force for action.

It is held by some psychologists that a sentiment

always includes innately organized systems of several emotions so that a different emotion is necessarily excited according to the situation in which the object presents itself. Thus a hated person will awaken in us joy, or sorrow, or anger, or fear, according to whether he suffers injury, or escapes destruction, or prospers, or is likely to get the better of us.

In accordance with this view a sentiment is an organized system of emotions centred about an idea of an object. The mechanism, as I have stated it, however, is sufficiently accurate for our purpose.

With these general principles in mind, one has only to read the Kaiser's speeches to recognize that his *ideas of himself and of his prerogatives,* which he jealously defends, are organized with instinctive emotions of great intensity—emotions belonging to greed of possession, and pride, and self-assertion (or self-display), and pugnacity, and vengeful emotion, and jealousy. These ideas are therefore sentiments deeply fixed and organized in his personality, and given great driving force by their emotions, which tend to carry them to activity and fruition.

Hence it is that the Kaiser's sentiments of himself and his prerogatives exhibit great intensity of feeling and determine his conduct to assert his rights and to exercise and enjoy them by being his own Chancellor and ruling the army and empire, and, if need be, to defend them most vigorously.

VI

THE KAISER'S SELF-REGARDING SENTIMENT

But we must leave these traits of the Kaiser's personality for the immediate issue of our study. One sentiment, however, ought to be considered more intimately if certain of his most notorious peculiarities are to be understood. I refer to what has been called the "self-regarding" sentiment.

Every person possesses such a sentiment, although it varies according to the ingredients that enter into it. Professor William McDougall, one of the most eminent of contemporary psychologists, has analyzed this sentiment, and attributes it to the biological instincts of self-assertion and self-abasement compounded in varying proportions with the idea of self. (These instincts are common to animals as well as men and have a biological end.) We thus get different types of self.

When the first instinct of self-assertion—also called self-display—with its emotion of positive self-feeling is the chief instinct, then we have a type in which pride is the main characteristic of the idea of self. When the second instinct (with the emotion of negative self-feeling) is happily blended in the sentiment, we have a type of self-respect.

To illustrate the former type, Professor McDougall (Social Psychology) draws the character of an imaginary Prince in whom the first instinct is the

dominating one. It is interesting to see how perfectly his picture represents the Kaiser:

Imagine the son of a powerful and foolish Prince to be endowed with great capacities and to have in great strength the instinct of self-display with its emotion of positive self-feeling. Suppose that he is never checked, or corrected, or criticised, but is allowed to lord it over all his fellow-creatures without restraint. The self-regarding sentiment of such a child would almost necessarily take the form of an unshakable pride, a pride constantly gratified by the attitudes of deference, gratitude, and admiration of his social environment; the only dispositions that would become organized in this sentiment of pride would be those of positive self-feeling or elation and of anger (for his anger would be invariably excited when any one failed to assume toward him the attitude of subjection or deference).

His self-consciousness might be intense and very prominent, but it would remain poor in content; for he could make little progress in self-knowledge; he would have little occasion to hear, or to be interested in, the judgments of others upon himself; and he would seldom be led to reflect upon his own character and conduct. The only influences that could moralize a man so endowed and so brought up would be either religious teaching, which might give him the sense of a power greater than himself to whom he was accountable, or a very strong natural endowment of the tender emotion and its altruistic impulse, or a conjunction of these two influences.

A man in whom the self-regarding sentiment had assumed this form would be incapable of being humbled—his pride could only be mortified; that is to say, any display of his own shortcomings or any demonstration of the superiority of another to himself could cause a painful check to his positive self-feeling and a consequent anger, but could give rise neither to shame nor to humiliation, nor to any affective state, such as admiration, gratitude, or reverence, in which negative self-feeling plays

a part. And he would be indifferent to moral praise or blame; for the disposition of negative self-feeling would have no place in his self-regarding sentiment; and negative self-feeling, which renders us observant of the attitude of others toward ourselves and receptive toward their opinions, is one of the essential conditions of the influence of praise and blame upon us.

The inordinate cultivation in the Kaiser of the self-regarding sentiment with the unalloyed instinct of self-display also explains, psychologically, the manifestations of certain traits which have amazed the world. I mean his colossal vanity as manifested by his fondness for dressing himself up in all sorts of uniforms and constantly changing his costumes—on occasions as often as five or six times in a single day, and even during the course of a Court reception—his fondness for having himself photographed or painted, or his portrait made as busts, lithographs, medals, and bas-reliefs, always posing in heroic attitudes for the purpose.

It is interesting to compare the snap-shots of the Kaiser with the posed photographs (there are thousands of photographs of him), and not only as himself, but in the heroic character of a Roman Emperor mounted on a charger, and again in imitation of the Emperor Charlemagne.

It explains his self-assumption to be an artist—a painter, a musician, a composer, an architect, an art critic, a preacher, and Heaven knows what else. It also gives a psychological explanation of his inability to stand personal criticism, and for his vain obtuseness in not being able to understand how

any one should not look upon him excepting with reverent awe. One of the authors of "The Kaiser" cites the following two incidents.

One of his subjects had been sentenced to prison for hinting something disrespectful about his sovereign:

> William was genuinely amazed that such an unnatural crime could ever have been committed. He "read and reread the papers in the case with the closest attention"; and finally said to the waiting official: "It would seem that this man hitherto has not been a crimnal—son of respectable parents, himself in a respectable walk of life, with a good education. And yet—how do you explain this—this insult to the Anointed of the Lord? Strange! Strange!"

On another occasion:

> After reading a speech of the Socialist leader Bebel, containing some animadversion upon himself, he turned to the officer in attendance with clouded brow and flashing eye, and remarked in a voice trembling with passion: "And all this to me! To me! What is the country coming to?"

This self-regarding sentiment is also at the bottom of that dominating trait—love of power—which has led him to aspire to world power and to believe that with his army and with a stronger navy, toward the upbuilding of which he has directed untiringly his energies, he could conquer the world. It even led him to think of conquering the United States, for when we were engaged in war with Spain he declared, as I have authority for saying, *"If I had had a larger fleet I would have taken*

*Uncle Sam by the scruff of the neck."**

That this saying of the Kaiser's meant more than mere momentary ebullition of petulant feeling or a thoughtless boast becomes manifest when we bear in mind that it was made towards the end of June, 1898, after the arrival of Vice-Admiral von Diedrich and his fleet at Manila on June 12. It is significant that von Diedrich, when asked by Dewey why so large a German naval force—five ships, a more powerful force than that of the American fleet—was present, replied, "I am here by order of the Kaiser, sir," and the same explanation has been given since. We know now that there was an attempt made to form a coalition of Continental monarchies against the United States to intervene in the war in favor of Spain, but that it was blocked by England who, there is evidence to show, threat-

* In a letter to the author, July 7, 1898, Joseph Chamberlain, then Colonial Secretary of Great Britain, wrote:

"Of course you will win, and will be able to dictate terms to Spain. The Continental Powers will not interfere because England will not join them. I am certain that if opinion here had been different to what it is, you would have had to face a European coalition.

"A fortnight ago (*do not quote me as the authority*) the German Emperor said to a friend of mine, 'If I had had a large fleet I would have taken Uncle Sam by the scruff of the neck'—and this represents the view of the older monarchies who begin to desire a Monroe Doctrine for Europe. But, in view of the attitude of this country, they dare not move.

"You are therefore free to work out your destiny."

I have now been fully authorized to publish this letter. It was printed in full in the *New York Tribune* of April 28, 1917. There is much other corroborative evidence, which is undoubtedly accessible, of this attempt to form a European coalition against the United States and of its being blocked by England. (See letter of Mr. G. Creighton Webb, in the *New York Times,* June, 2, 1915.)

ened to place her navy on the side of this country. Consequently Germany and the other Powers dared not move. As it was we came to the brink of war in July through the action of von Diedrich in interfering, after the battle of Manila, May 1, with the blockade by Dewey.*

The remark of the Kaiser that he "would have taken Uncle Sam by the scruff of the neck" must be taken in connection with all the events of the time and particularly with the attempt to form a European coalition against the United States which probably would have been successful had it not been for the action of England.

And so this same self-regarding sentiment, distorted and unbalanced, in co-operation with other sentiments, led him in 1914 to have contempt for the other Powers and to believe that he had a strong enough army to terrify Russia and her ally, France, into submission, and so he gave Austria authority to take Servia "by the scruff of the neck"; to feel, in case the gleam of the "shining armour" and the clang of the rattling sabre did not suffice, that he had a strong enough army to take Russia "by the

* It has come to light that events went so far that a German ship, it has been reported, cleared for action and Dewey, in the famous choleric interview (July 10) with the German Admiral's representative, Flag-Lieutenant v. Hintzer, threatened war if Germany wanted it. This part of the interview was thus reported to Mr. John Barrett by "one of the officers of the *Olympia* who heard the conversation": "If the German Government" (said Dewey) "has decided to make war on the United States, or has any intention of making war, and has so informed your Admiral, it is his duty to let me know. . . . But whether he intends to fight or not I am ready." (*Admiral George Dewey,* by John Barrett: 1899: p. 115.)

scruff of the neck," and so he declared war against that country; to feel that he had a strong enough army to take France "by the scruff of the neck," and so he declared war against France; to feel that he had a strong enough army to take Belgium "by the scruff of the neck," and so he invaded that country with his army; and it led him more than twenty years ago to believe that some day he would have a strong enough navy to take England "by the scruff of the neck," and so he builded and builded his navy and drank to "Der Tag."

Of course, the Kaiser's hypertrophied and one-sided self-regarding sentiment was not the sole psychological factor in determining his attiude of mind towards the United States and the other Powers. There were many factors, but it was one; and it accounts for his notorious contempt for other nations and at that time, particularly, for the United States. There were also sentiments of World-power and Empire, of German Kultur and War-Worship; a desire to have a "place in the sun," to possess colonies and, in particular, the Philippines and those of England and France; and to extend the German Empire to the Ægean Sea on the south and the North Sea on the north.

The self-regarding sentiment, obviously, has played also a large part in the Divine Right Delusion, in co-operation with the wishes we have considered, forming a large ego-centric complex.

Such, and other manifestations of the Kaiser's self-regarding sentiment, due to the impulsive force

of its highly developed instinct of self-display (self-assertion), would make this element of his personality an interesting psychological study by itself. I merely wish now to point out that it is the extreme type of this sentiment that is responsible for many of his extravagances of speech and action, and that it plays a part, as we shall see, in his reactions to democracy.

VII

AIMS OF THE GERMAN DEMOCRACY

Now let us return to the Kaiser's hatred of democracy. This also is a sentiment organized with several emotional instincts, etc., which we need not bother about here. That he has a hatred of democracy is obvious.

But why?

To know that he has a hatred is not enough. We want it explained, to know why. It is not a sufficient explanation to say that he disbelieves in the principles of democracy. That would not be sufficient to account for the development of the sentiment of hatred and for the reaction of anger which democracy excites. What created the hatred? For so much emotion there must be a deeper-lying cause —some hidden sentiment which, we may suspect, conflicts with the sentiments of his cherished prerogatives and his self-regarding sentiment.

We want to know the Why. With this object

let us consider the object of the hatred—the aims of the party of democracy, one of the great political forces in Prussia and the empire; one with which, as we have seen, the Emperor has been passionately in conflict since his accession to the throne. We cannot understand the psychological reaction of the Emperor without understanding the aims and the potential power of this political force. For this purpose I shall have to ask the reader to bear for a moment with a slight digression, keeping in mind what has been said about the Kaiser's sentiments until we return to our main theme.

What does the Social Democratic Party stand for and in what respect are its aims antagonistic to the Emperor's prerogatives and the German system of government? The party is widely regarded in the United States, I am constrained to believe, as the party of socialism. But this idea needs considerable modification. Indeed, so much so that the party would, if its aims were understood, receive the moral support of Americans.

Socialism has an ominous sound to American ears. The word has a stigma for many and is calculated to repel. At one time in its early history Marxian Socialism, formulated by Marx himself as "the social ownership of the means of production and distribution," was the dominating aim of the German Socialist Party.

But times have changed. The aims of the party have undergone various metamorphoses as the result of conflicts of factions within, fusions and po-

litical evolution. Since the Kaiser came to the throne in 1888 a revolution has taken place in the aims, methods, tactics, and programs of the party. In accordance with this change, in 1890, the name was changed to the Social Democratic Party. Socialism has been relegated to the background and democracy has become the paramount aim and issue.

In other words, the principles of the socialist, Marx, have given place to those of the brilliant democratic leader, Lassalle. Both men are dead, but democracy survives. As one authority (S. P. Orth) puts it, "Marx is a tradition, democracy is an issue."

To-day one hears very little of Marx and a great deal of "legislation" based on democratic principles:

> The last election (1912), with its brilliant victory for Social Democracy, was not won on the general issues of the Erfurter program, but on the particular issue of the arrogance of the bureaucracy and ballot reform.

Marxian propagandism has been sloughed off. But even if the Democratic Party still stood for socialism as its paramount aim this fact would not necessarily make it antagonistic to the Emperor's prerogatives or the German system of government. The State might become engaged in all sorts of individual enterprises without the fundamental structure of Government becoming altered. As a matter of fact, Germany is to-day the most socialized nation in the world.

We will not stop to inquire into the origin of this State Socialism. It does not matter for our purposes that these State socialistic measures were offered as a "bribe," to use Bismarck's term, to the Social Democrats to cease agitation against the government, and that the Emperor long ago dropped this policy when he found that the Social Democrats would not be bribed. They would have none of these measures. They wanted political rights, political freedom of thought and speech, and the right to manage their own government just as we do ours in the United States.

The German State owns railroad, canal and river transportation, telegraph and telephone systems, harbors and a parcel post. It conducts banks, insurance, savings banks, and pawnshops. It administers sick and accident insurance and old-age pensions. The municipalities own public utilities of all kinds, theatres, markets, and warehouses.

The State, or municipality, obviously might go further and administer iron, coal, and manufacturing enterprises; it might undertake all sorts of socialistic functions without altering one whit the prerogatives of the Crown, or of Parliament, or of the relations of the Government to the people. Governmental autocracy would still exist and very likely would administer these industrial enterprises with the same satisfying efficiency with which it administers everything else it has taken hold of.

The intense anger and hatred with which the Emperor reacts to the Social Democrats cannot, there-

fore, be explained by the principles of socialism per se, although he may disbelieve in extreme Marxian socialism. Even if these were still the aim of the party, there must be some other explanation that a Social Democrat should be stigmatized as an enemy of the empire, of religion and God, to be shot down by the army if his party became too strong.

Let us examine then the demands as given in the latest program (1912) of the Social Democrats and some of the legislation for which they have fought. The demands are given in fourteen articles.

Number one demands equal opportunities for all, special privileges to none—good American doctrine. Number two relates to reform of the ballot laws and has been the main immediate issue. *"Universal, direct, equal, secret ballot"* is demanded—also American doctrine. Owing to the present inequality of the ballot the Democrats have been badly handicapped in that they cannot elect their proportionate number of representatives.

Number three relates to the existing system of government. *A true Parliamentary Government* is demanded, and a Ministry, like that of England, responsible to Parliament, instead of the present autocratic system by which the Ministry is responsible only to the Emperor. Also, it is demanded that *"the power to declare war or maintain peace" be given to the lower house* (Reichstag). Consent of the Reichstag to all State appropriations (as with the House of Commons and the American

Congress).

Numbers four and five relate respectively to the organization of the army and reform of administrative justice, abolishing class privilege at law, etc. Number six demands the "right to combine, meet, and organize." Number seven relates to the establishment of a national Department of Labor, factory inspection, and a legalized universal eight-hour day, etc. Number eight relates to reform of the industrial insurance laws, and lowering the age of old-age pensions from 70 to 65, etc.

Number nine: complete religious freedom. Separation of Church and State. No support of any kind for religious purposes from public funds—good American doctrine again. Number ten demands universal free schools. Number eleven relates to reform of taxation demanding abolition of indirect taxes and taxes on necessities of life and reduction of tariff on those schedules which encourage trusts.

Number twelve supports "measures that tend to develop commerce and trade." Number thirteen: "A graduated income, property and inheritance tax" in order to dampen "the ardor of the rich for a constantly increasing army and navy." Number fourteen: "Internal improvements and colonization"; but the *"cessation of foreign colonization now done for the purpose of exploiting foreign peoples for the sake of gain."*

The first thing that will strike the reader is the absence of anything essentially socialistic in the

principles formulated in this program. They are rather what we in this country would call "Republican," "Progressive," and "Democratic." They are not nearly as socialistic as many of the functions now undertaken by the German State. With the exception of those articles that relate exclusively to German conditions (such as numbers four and eight) and the abolition of indirect taxation, they express good American doctrine and are, for the most part, axiomatic in this country.

No American and no Englishman would see anything in them to get excited about, although he might hold a different opinion about the expediency of one or the other demand. Undoubtedly the spirit of German democracy goes further than the program, especially in particular parts of Germany; nevertheless this program formulates the demands of the national party.

Between the American Republic and German democracy there is, or should be, a bond of common sympathy, the bond of common political ideals and common purpose—the love of political and religious liberty, freedom of thought, freedom of speech, and freedom of the press without fear of imprisonment or punishment under "lèse-majesté" or any power of the State; the emancipation of mankind from the tyranny of autocracy; the "right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness" according to the dictates of the individual conscience; the rule of the people and not of an autocracy, the subordination of the State to the will of the people—

and to this end government based not upon an army, but upon public opinion as expressed by the votes of the people.

When these ideals and purposes of the German democracy are realized in the United States, American public opinion will have the strongest ties of sympathy with the great masses of Germany, struggling for these ends against an intrenched "State."

Between German democracy and American public sentiment there can be no conflict. It is only with the autocratic classes that there can be antagonism, but the autocratic classes mean the State as an artificially created entity isolated from and distinct from the masses of the people.

Why, then, does the Emperor almost alone, even among Germans, react to the ideals of democracy with such passion, such anger, and such hatred? On psychological grounds we can anticipate that such emotion must be for personal reasons and because they strike some intense emotional sentiment.

We find the key to the puzzle when we come to examine Articles 3 and 4. Number three has been the paramount issue of the democracy—it is its foundation stone. Number two, the reform of the ballot, while the main political issue of the day, is only a means to this end.

The fundamental issue is (1) *a true Parliamentary Government, with parliamentary power in conformity with modern democratic ideas, such as obtains in England; and* (2) *the abolition of a Chancellor and Ministry appointed by the Kaiser and*

responsible only to the Kaiser and the substitution of a Government responsible to Parliament. Thus the Government and the army would be responsible to the people and rest upon public opinion.

This democratic principle seems to our ideas not only harmless enough, but a matter of course and only the expression of the age we live in. But to the Kaiser it means a personal cataclysm. It means the abolition of the greatest of the Kaiser's prerogatives; it means the denial of the Divine Right of Kings; it means the downfall of the House of Hohenzollern, in that it means the reduction of the prerogatives of the house to reigning without governing.

He could be no longer his own Chancellor, as he is recognized generally to be to-day in fact. His wings would be clipped. He would be shorn of autocratic power. He could no longer dictate policies of government. The will of the people would rule. What would be the use of a "divine right" to sit as a social ornament upon a throne and watch the people rule?

Furthermore, his "self-regarding sentiment," characterized by the instinct of self-assertion and the emotion of pride, would receive an unbearable rebuff. He would no longer be the central figure in Europe, overlording all other rulers by his personality, his autocratic power, and his prerogatives. The conflict between the Kaiser and the democracy thus becomes a personal conflict on his part.

VIII

THE REAL CAUSE OF THE KAISER'S ANTIPATHY

Gathering together the facts which we have collated, we have found in the Kaiser intensely strong sentiments of his prerogatives, an almost abnormal self-regarding sentiment, and a powerful, steadily growing political party acting in antagonism to those sentiments and threatening in case of success to rob him of his prerogatives.

Now, with these facts in mind, let us analyze the antecedent contents of the Kaiser's mind a little more intimately. If he has been a thinking being at all, we know, in view of the political and historical facts we have studied—any assertion to the contrary would meet with incredulous skepticism—there have been thoughts, however fleeting, of what would happen to himself and his house if the democratic reforms should prevail; thoughts of being robbed of his prerogatives, robbed of his power to rule the Kingdom of Prussia, to rule the Imperial Bundesrat by his power as King of Prussia, to rule the Reichstag through the Bundesrat; thoughts of being robbed of the prerogatives to be his own Chancellor, to appoint his own Ministry, to control the army, to be independent of Parliament and public opinion and the public will—in short, robbed of being an autocratic ruler of the Kingdom of Prussia and the German Empire by Divine Right.

And there has been a full realization of the increasing power of democracy, steadily growing in numbers, and rising, swelling, year by year, like a great irresistible tidal wave, threatening sooner or later to carry all before it and overwhelm the system of autocracy. And against this growing avalanche of ballots of the democracy he sees no defense for himself save the army, and so he calls upon his soldiers to be prepared to "shoot down your own relatives, brothers, and even parents in the streets," when he shall give the word of command.

Such thoughts and such realizations of future danger could not but excite the biological defensive instinct of fear. And this instinct, being associated with its object, the idea of democracy, forms a sentiment, the fear of democracy. This sentiment is further associated with or crystallized about other egoistic sentiments of self and his House and his prerogatives. Hence it may be described as a fear of democracy because of the danger to himself and his House of Hohenzollern, a fear of being deprived by the hands of the democracy of his prerogative to be an autocrat. It is a fear of democracy, not for Germany but for himself. He fears for his own life, so to speak, for, if you rob him of his prerogatives, do you not take away that which to him is his life?

This does not mean that he is aware of this very personal egoistic or egocentric fear-sentiment. He undoubtedly would not admit it to others, nor is it

likely that he could, even if he would, admit it to himself, because it has not been squarely faced, but has been thrust aside, repressed by the pride of his self-regarding sentiment and not allowed to come to the full light of consciousness. Though not recognized by himself, it is there all the same, repressed into the subconscious, or, if you prefer, in the background of the mind (which, after all, is a part of the subconscious).

Repressed into the subconscious, it is there necessarily intimately systematized with, and has deep roots in, the many associated antecedent thoughts that, as we have seen, gave rise to it. So long as these so-called psycho-genetic thoughts are there unmodified—conserved also, like a phonographic record, in the subconscious—he could not get rid of his fixed fear of the democracy if he would.

In this light his famous declaration of his prerogative, "I am the Supreme War Lord," receives deeper meaning when at the same time we remember he is the head of that autocracy that wields the power. We can see into the background of his mind. He sees the danger, we see the fear. We see, too, in the background of his mind a realization of a growing democracy, and we find there upon what methods he relies if the German democracy should win at the polls and change the Constitution. To oppose the will of the people he has the army. And we see into his inner consciousness when he prepared (as already quoted) the minds of his young soldiers for "the day."

IX

THE KAISER'S ANTIPATHY AN OBSESSION AND A DEFENSE REACTION

Now let us go one step further. Although this egocentric sentiment of fear for himself and his dynasty is repressed into the subconscious, it is not for that reason inert and incapable of affecting his conscious processes. On the contrary, as we are forced to believe from the result of psychological investigations into such conditions of personality, it determines many of his conscious processes of thought, of his political principles and his activities against his most dangerous political enemy.

In the first place, it induces a defense reaction of an intensely emotional character which aims to direct his activities in a direction that will protect him against the dangers of democracy. *This defense reaction is anger and the sentiment of hatred.*

It should be explained that psychological analysis of the emotions goes to show that the sentiment of hatred is made up of several emotions associated with its object, of at least fear and anger and vengeful emotions, which last also includes anger besides that most conspicuous trait of the Kaiser—the self-regarding sentiment.

The way the defense reaction comes into play is this: The instinctive emotions and their sentiments are awakened and recur from time to time when-

ever the subconscious egoistic sentiment or any of its associated psychogenetic thoughts—those of his possible fall from power—is touched. The sentiments of fear he will not admit to himself, and they are repressed as such; but the fear-emotion appears in consciousness disguised as hatred, of which it is a component. Anger against and hatred of democracy he is prepared to admit. They are fully faced and rise into the full light of consciousness, although their real underlying cause is hidden.

Such an intensely fixed emotional idea (hatred), recurring whenever its object is presented to consciousness, is, in principle, an obsession, although it may not be so beyond control as to be pathological. But, as in the Kaiser's case, it may be only the apparent obsession, i. e., a defense reaction to the real obsession hidden in the subconscious. *The Kaiser's real obsession is a subconscious phobia, a fear of democracy for himself and his House.*

It is interesting to notice in this connection how the national hatred of one nation for another is recognized by popular language as a phobia or fear. We speak of an Anglo-phobia, of a Russo-phobia, to describe the hatred of, let us say, Germany for England and Russia. Though the nation would not admit being afraid, nevertheless, by the very term employed, it is popularly recognized that the hatred is really though unconsciously the expression of a fear.

In the case of the Kaiser's phobia of democracy,

the impulsive forces of the biological instincts of pugnacity (anger), fear, self-assertion, etc., provide the energy of the fighting spirit and carry to fruition his political ideas aimed at repressing the Social Democrats. This is exemplified by the Kaiser's exhortations, threats, and epithets hurled in his speeches at these alone of his political enemies, and by the laws enacted and the use of the lèse-majesté to suppress them. By suppressing the Social Democracy he is defended from his peril. Hence, as I have said, anger and hatred is a defense reaction.

There are other ways in which the Kaiser's subconscious phobia unconsciously determines his mental behavior—by this I mean his modes or reasoning, his political principles and activities. As is well recognized not only by psychologists but by popular notions, such a repressed, unadmitted sentiment becomes a motivating force, a subconscious motive that directs our conscious reasonings.

Thus the Kaiser rationalizes, as psychologists say, his political objections to democracy—that is, unwilling to admit his real objections, he finds and formulates logical reasons why democracy is wrong and why his own opinions are right, really believing in them, perhaps, as God-given. Saving the introduction of the Deity, this is nothing more than what every one does who is unconsciously influenced by subconscious motives of which he is unaware.

When we say that a person is unconsciously influenced by this or that, unconsciously governed

by a prejudice or sentiment like jealousy or fear or ambition or what not, we mean that he is governed by a motive which is subconscious, which he will not admit to himself, and of which he is therefore unaware. It determines his thoughts just as the hidden works of a clock determine the movements of the hands and chimes.

THE MORAL

What is the moral of all this? Surely the insight into the Kaiser's mind which a study of his sentiments and his phobia has given us reveals something more important than the mere personality of an exalted personage—exalted in the eyes of the world. It gives us an insight into the political forces which are wrestling within the German Empire for those ideals for which humanity has been striving through all the ages. It reveals the forces which for years have been striving with might and main to suppress these ideals. And it reveals the forces upon which the world must depend to overthrow Germanism.

The Kaiser and his House of Hohenzollern and all that they stand for have become Civilization's World-Problem.

If the Powers of Europe want lasting peace through the overthrow of autocracy and militarism, i. e., Germanism, the obsession of the Kaiser points the way—look to the democracy of Germany!

THE AMERICAN VERSUS THE GERMAN VIEWPOINT

THE AMERICAN VERSUS THE GERMAN VIEWPOINT*

I

FRENCH AND GERMAN LESSONS AT THE FRONT

SINCE the war began numerous articles by organized German propagandists have appeared scattered through the press and magazines of this country, and in pamphlets.

These articles have given us the German viewpoint of government, of the causes of and responsibility for the war, of the manner in which war should be carried on, of German ideals and other matters.

With the exception possibly of Dr. Dernburg, Dr. von Mach stands out as the most prolific writer among these propagandists. Furthermore, a few days ago he presided in Washington at the propagandist meeting of "German Americans," which passed resolutions demanding unneutral action by our government.

What, then, is the German viewpoint?

I turn to Dr. von Mach for the above reasons and because he has instructed us in a long series of articles specifically entitled the "German Viewpoint." These cover about every aspect of German

* Printed in the Boston Sunday *Post,* February 7 and 14, 1915.

thought and activity. With only one of these viewpoints am I interested here, that of the German army's method of carrying on war. I will cite only so much as will enable one who has not read the original article to understand this viewpoint.

Dr. von Mach begins by quoting the following words of the great von Moltke, written in 1880:

"Nobody, I think, can deny that the general softening of men's manners has been followed by a more humane way of waging war. The introduction in our generation of universal service in the army has marked a long step in the direction of the desired aim, for it has brought also the educated classes into the army."

"The truth of this statement," Dr. von Mach contends, "is fully borne out by the reports which have reached Germany from the front."

He then goes on to illustrate for our edification this "viewpoint" by a series of pictures of German army life constructed to show "the humane way of waging war" under the influence of the educated classes in the army.

These pictures are drawn from an account written by Professor von Hartmann, now serving as a lieutenant in the army. The first picture is of an incident which, we were told, "may well form the basis on which to construct a picture of the German army in the field to-day." It is called a "French Lesson at the Front. Place—A Stubble Field in Belgium. Time—Autumn, 1914."

Songs the Germans Sing

The soldiers, halted after a forced march, "are lounging in the field, talking and laughing" in animated groups. Breakfast finished, they "are in excellent humor." Some splendid fellows from the country have lighted their pipes and we hear them "singing the beautiful home and soldier songs" which we are told (though not in italics) *"often soften for the time being even the hardest hearts of warriors."*

One sample of these beautiful, softening songs, expressive, we may suppose, of German sympathy for the enemy, is this:

> "France, poor France, how will you fare
> When our German militaire
> Visits you? Colors: Black and white and red.
> Poor little France, it is too bad!"

Sympathetic songs like these are heard all over the field.

Then follows the French lesson. Here we see the German soldier passing his leisure, not in the rough, uncouth pastimes proverbial of soldiers of other lands, but in the higher intellectual pastime of acquiring culture.

On an order from the commanding officer "attention" is called, and the whole company is gathered about the professor-lieutenant who proceeds to give a lesson in French to men eager for "kultur" that will be of use when in a few weeks they will be in Paris. Then the army takes up its march again.

Then we have another picture—that of the marching soldiers, with softened hearts, singing a touching song of comradeship. This song I shall refer to later. Once more the picture changes.

"The song died away, the thunder of the cannon grew louder;" the soldiers are going into battle. Now we have a picture constructed to show us the religious culture, the deep, reverent spirituality of the soldiers: their "grand conception of God and man;" they sing Koerner's "Prayer During Battle," beginning "Father, I call to Thee." The very air seemed purified.

"Whatever selfish train of thought the individual soldier or officer had been following fell into insignificance before the grand conception of God and man."

An American Viewpoint

Thus we see in a succession of emotional pictures how von Moltke's dream—if I may call it a dream—has come true.

These are delightful idyls, charming pictures of a Christian army, of an "army of the Lord," of the softening of men's manners, and of the humane German way of waging war. It is the German viewpoint. But there is an American viewpoint; let us contrast them.

Dr. von Mach has given his pictures as drawn by an eye witness, Professor Hartmann, a German. Let me, too, draw some pictures, and let me, too, take my pictures from an eye witness in Belgium;

but he shall be a neutral witness, an American, Mr. E. Alexander Powell, who had unusual opportunities to observe what he describes in his book, recently published, "Fighting in Flanders." He was one of the few correspondents on the firing line.†

If any one has not read that book let him do so at once if he wants to realize the manner of the German invasion and of the heroic defense of their country by the Belgians. He lets you understand, too, how war is actually fought.

I cite this account because I wish to disregard all *ex parte* testimony. All the Belgian accounts are those of interested witnesses. We shall see the war as waged in Belgium not from the Belgian or the German viewpoint, but from the American viewpoint.

Dr. von Mach's first picture is entitled:

"A French Lesson at the Front."

Let me call mine:

"A German Lesson at the Front."

It is a triptych in three scenes:

† At the time this article was written, February 1915, we did not have the report of Lord Bryce's Commission and the mass of independent testimony to German atrocities later given to the world on the evidence of eye-witnesses. The official Belgian statements of the time were *ex parte* but they have been fully corroborated. I therefore required a neutral American witness. Mr. Powell's testimony has since been supported by many witnesses, amongst them Mr. Hugh Gibson, whose evidence is appended as footnotes to the text further on.

SCENE I

PLACE—AERSCHOT TIME—AUGUST, 1914

(To understand the picture we must remember that orders had been deliberately given to burn and pillage Aerschot by the German commander after the German troops had entered the town. This, the commander himself told Mr. Powell, was in retaliation for the shooting of the chief of staff by a boy, 15 years of age, the son of the burgomaster. "What followed," Mr. Powell was given to understand —the execution of the burgomaster, his son and several score of the leading townsmen, the giving over of the women to a lust-mad soldiery, the sacking of the houses, and the final burning of the town —"was the punishment which would always be meted out to towns whose inhabitants attacked German soldiers.")

My picture is of what Mr. Powell saw:

In many parts of the world I have seen many terrible and revolting things, but nothing so ghastly, so horrifying as Aerschot. Quite two-thirds of the houses had been burned and showed unmistakable signs of having been sacked by a maddened soldiery before they were burned.

Everywhere were the ghastly evidences. Doors had been smashed in with rifle-butts and boot heels; windows had been broken; pictures had been torn from the walls; mattresses had been ripped open with bayonets in search of valuables; drawers had been emptied upon the floors; the outer walls of the houses were spattered with blood and pock-marked with bullets; the sidewalks were slippery with broken bottles; the streets were strewn with women's clothing.

It needed no one to tell us the details of that orgy of blood and lust. The story was so plainly written that any one could read it.

For a mile we drove the car slowly between the blackened walls of fire-gutted buildings. This was no accidental conflagration, mind you, for scattered here and there were houses which stood undamaged, and in every such case there were scrawled with chalk upon the doors, 'Good People. Do not burn. Do not plunder.'

The Germans went about the work of house-burning as systematically as they did everything else. They had various devices for starting conflagrations—all of them effective.

Despite the scowls of the soldiers, I attempted to talk with some of the women huddled in front of a bakery waiting for a distribution of bread, but the poor creatures were too terror-stricken to do more than stare at us with wide, beseeching eyes. Those eyes will always haunt me.

I wonder if they do not sometimes haunt the Germans. But a little episode that occurred as we were leaving the city did more than anything else to bring home the horror of it all. We passed a little girl of 9 or 10 and I stopped the car to ask the way. Instantly she held both hands above her head and began to scream for mercy. When we had given her some chocolate and money and had assured her that we were not Germans, but Americans and friends, she ran like a frightened deer. That little child, with her fright-wide eyes and her hands raised in supplication, was in herself a terrible indictment of the Germans.

Scores Were Shot Down

Do you like the picture, Dr. von Mach? Quite a picture, isn't it? Let us complete it in order that we may study all the details in justice to German art.

Piecing together the stories told by those who did survive that night of horror, we know that scores of townspeople were shot down in cold blood, and that, when the firing squads could not do the work of slaughter fast enough, the victims were lined up and a machine gun was turned upon them.

We know that young girls were dragged from their homes and stripped naked and violated by soldiers—

many soldiers—in the public square in the presence of officers.

We know that both men and women were unspeakably mutilated, that children were bayoneted, that dwellings were ransacked and looted, and that finally, as though to destroy the evidences of their horrid work, soldiers went from house to house with torches, methodically setting fire to them.

Is this the "humane way of waging war" which the great Moltke thought had followed "the general softening of men's manners," and the bringing of "the educated classes into the army" through universal service? Wouldn't he be proud of German "kultur" if he were alive to-day?

Perhaps you think I ought to give the reason why the 15-year-old son of the burgomaster shot the German officer. Well, I will.

Shot to Defend Sister

The Germans claimed it was, or looked like, a prearranged plan on the part of the townspeople, who, it is asserted, opened fire upon the troops. The Belgians give another reason for the boy's action. It was in defense of his sister's honor. You can read the detailed story if you wish to know it, in Mr. Powell's book.

I do not know if that story is true; Mr. Powell does not know. But there must have been some reason, or perhaps the boy was a fanatic, or half-witted. Surely no sane man, and surely no man holding the responsible position of burgomaster, would give a dinner party to German officers and arrange to

have his own son shoot one of them, knowing that there was no escape from the consequences of such an act committed in his own home.

But accept either story you like, what do you think of a commanding officer, of the mode of conducting war that executes several score of the leading townsmen, that shoots down women and children, that gives over the women to the soldiery, that orders the sacking of the houses and, finally, the burning down of the town, house by house, because a boy shot an officer?

Is this the German idea of a "humane way of waging war"?

If you think this mode quite justified, let me tell you how it impressed an American, one, remember, accustomed to the sights of war in many lands:

> It was with a feeling of repulsion amounting almost to nausea that we left what had once been Aerschot behind us.

But the Belgians nevertheless learned their German lesson at the front.

Here is the second panel of the triptych. Please look at it. It represents a second "German lesson at the front":

SCENE II

PLACE—LOUVAIN TIME—SAME

The Germans had entered the city. The inhabitants had evacuated it before their arrival. Yet, in spite of that fact, the Germans destroyed it.

They used a motor car, equipped with a large tank for petrol, a pump, a hose and a spraying nozzle. The car was run slowly through the streets, one soldier working the pump and another spraying the fronts of the houses. Then they set fire to them. Oh, yes, they were very methodical about it, those Germans.*

* Mr. Hugh Gibson, Secretary of the American Legation in Brussels, has recently published (Nov. 1917) his absorbingly interesting "private journal" giving his observations from day to day during those savage times from the invasion of Belgium to the execution of Miss Cavelle (Aug. 1915). He was able to get into Louvain during the shooting-up and burning of the city. I am now able to give further "pictures" of Louvain and evidence of German methods from this neutral diary of an eye-witness. (I quote by permission.)

"We . . . set off on foot down the Rue de la Station, . . . The houses on both sides were either partially destroyed or smouldering. Soldiers were systematically removing what was to be found in the way of valuables, food, and wine, and then setting fire to the furniture and hangings. It was all most businesslike. The houses are substantial stone buildings, and fire will not spread from one to another. Therefore the procedure was to batter down the door of each house, clean out what was to be saved, then pile furniture and hangings in the middle of the room, set them afire, and move on to the next house.

"It was pretty hot, but we made our way down the street, showing our passes every hundred feet or so to soldiers installed in comfortable armchairs, which they had dragged into the gutter from looted houses, till we came to a little crossing about half way to the Hôtel de Ville. Here we were stopped by a small detachment of soldiers, who told us that we could go no farther; that they were clearing civilians out of some houses a little farther down the street, and that there was likely to be firing at any time.

"The officer in command spoke to us civilly and told us to stick close to him so that we could know just what we ought to do at any time. He was in charge of the destruction of this part of the town and had things moving along smartly. His men were firing some houses near by and he stood outside smoking a rank cigar and looking on gloomily. . . .

"Machine guns were at work near by, and occasionally there was a loud explosion when the destructive work was helped with dynamite.

"A number of the men about us were drunk and evidently had been in that state for some time. Our officer complained that they

What was the excuse for all this? I wonder. That is not as pretty a picture as the one you had had very little to eat for several days, but added glumly that there was plenty to drink. . . .

"He (the officer) was rabid against the Belgians and had an endless series of stories of atrocities they had committed—though he admitted that he had none of them at first hand. He took it as gospel, however, that they had fired upon the German troops in Louvain and laid themselves open to reprisals. To his thinking there is nothing bad enough for them, and his chief satisfaction seemed to consist in repeating to us over and over that he was going the limit. Orders had been issued to raze the town—'till not one stone was left on another,' as he said.

"Just to see what would happen I inquired about the provision of The Hague Conventions, prescribing that no collective penalty can be imposed for lawless acts of individuals. He dismissed that to his own satisfaction by remarking that:

"'All Belgians are dogs, and all would do these things unless they are taught what will happen to them.'

"Convincing logic!

"With a hard glint in his eye he told us the purpose of his work; he came back to it over and over, but the burden of what he had to say was something like this:

"'We shall make this place a desert. We shall wipe it out so that it will be hard to find where Louvain used to stand. For generations people will come here to see what we have done, and it will teach them to respect Germany and to think twice before they resist her. Not one stone on another, I tell you—kein Stein auf einander!'

"I agreed with him when he remarked that people would come here for generations to see what Germany had done—but he did not seem to follow my line of thought. . . .

"We went on into the freight yards and were greeted by a number of officers with hopeful talk about a train coming from Brussels with food. We were given chairs . . . settled down and listened to the stories of the past few days. It was a story of clearing out civilians from a large part of the town; a systematic routing out of men from cellars and garrets, wholesale shootings, the generous use of machine guns, and the free application of the torch—the whole story enough to make one see red. And for our guidance it was impressed on us that this would make people *respect* Germany and think twice about resisting her." Pp. 159-165.

draw of the happy, animated groups of German soldiers, "lounging on the field, laughing and talking"; with lighted pipes, "singing the beautiful home and soldier songs which often soften for the time being, even the hardest hearts of warriors."

But would you like an idyl of that kind? Here is one; it is the third panel of our triptych, a third German lesson at the front.

SCENE III

PLACE—TERMONDE TIME—SAME

Our American had made his way with difficulty from Aerschot to Louvain.

From the windows of the plundered and fire-blackened houses which lined the road from Aerschot to Louvain, still hung white flags made from sheets and tablecloths and pillowcases—pathetic appeals for the mercy which was not granted.

At Louvain we came upon another scene of destruction and desolation. Nearly half the city was in ashes. Most of the principal streets were impassable from fallen masonry. The splendid avenue and boulevards were lined on either side by the charred skeletons of what had once been handsome buildings. The front of many of the houses were smeared with crimson stains.

In comparison to its size, the Germans had wrought more wide-spread destruction in Louvain than did the earthquake and fire combined in San Francisco.

The looting had evidently been unrestrained. The roads for miles in either direction were littered with furniture and bedding and clothing. Such articles as the soldiers could not carry away they wantonly destroyed. Hangings had been torn down, pictures on the walls had been smashed, the contents of drawers and trunks had been

emptied into the streets, literally everything breakable had been broken. This is not from hearsay, remember; *I saw it with my own eyes.* And the amazing feature of it all was that among the Germans there seemed to be no feeling of regret, no sense of shame. Officers in immaculate uniforms strolled about among the ruins, *chatting and laughing and smoking.*

Attitude of German Officers

Mr. Hugh Gibson, secretary of the American legation in Brussels, was in Louvain on the second day and this is what he *saw:*

. . . . The Germans had dragged chairs and a dining table from a nearby house into the middle of the square in front of the station. . . . Some officers, already considerably the worse for drink, insisted that the three diplomatists join them in a bottle of wine. And this while the city was burning and rifles were cracking, and the dead bodies of men and women lay sprawled in the streets.

Indeed, their "beautiful home and soldier songs" as you say, had softened their hearts, but the scene is a different one, isn't it?

But we have the same happy soldiers "lounging, talking and laughing," just as your professor describes them, and smoking and drinking (though it is beer and wine instead of coffee) and "everybody is elated," just as you say.

But the Belgian townspeople, what of them? Do the happy soldiers see them? I don't know.

Louvain was not destroyed by bombardment or in the heat of battle. The Germans had entered it unopposed and had been in undisputed possession

for several days. Why did they burn the city house by house and shoot down the townspeople, men, women and children?

As with Aerschot, there are two versions, contradictory and irreconcilable.

The Germans say that in accordance with a conspiracy they were attacked by the townspeople; what we called "sniping" in Vera Cruz. The townspeople say that in the inky blackness of night the German garrison, mistaking for Belgians a body of their own troops retreating and falling back upon Louvain, opened fire upon them, and so what approximates a massacre of civilians followed, and the city was deliberately burned.

It doesn't matter. Even if the Germans were attacked (though it be denied) were they justified in shooting down, indiscriminately, civilians?

Why Was Louvain Burned?

But "why did you burn Louvain at all?" That was the question which Mr. Powell asked the commanding general, von Boehn.

" 'Because,' replied the general, 'the townspeople fired on our troops. We actually found machine guns in some of the houses. And,' smashing his fist down upon the table, 'whenever civilians fire upon our troops we will teach them a lasting lesson. If women and children insist on getting in the way of bullets so much the worse for the women and children.' "

Yes, as General von Nieher officially notified the citizens of Wavre, "without distinction of persons the innocent will suffer with the guilty," and, as was announced by proclamation to the citizens of Hazzelt in the case of sniping, "a third of the male population will be shot."

And so, as Mr. Powell, in another place, says, "the citizens had attacked them and they would teach the citizens, both of Louvain and of other cities which they might enter, a lasting lesson. They did. No Belgian will ever forget—or forgive—that lesson. *The orgy of blood and destruction lasted for two days.*"

It was a German lesson at the front, a lesson in German viewpoints. Not so charming as the French lesson you picture, Dr. von Mach, but it was better taught and learned—taught to the world, was it not?†

† "Many subsequent visits to Louvain, and conversations with people who were there when the trouble began, have only served to strengthen the impression that the whole affair was part of a cold-blooded and calculated plan to terrorise the civilian population.

"While we were there, it was frankly stated that the town was being wiped out; that its destruction was being carried out under definite orders. When the German Government realised the horror and loathing with which the civilized world learned of the fate of Louvain, the orders were cancelled and the story sent out that the German forces had tried to prevent the destruction, had fought the fire, and by good fortune had been able to save the Hôtel de Ville. Never has a government lied more brazenly. When we arrived, the destruction of the town was being carried on in an orderly and systematic way that showed careful preparation. The only thing that saved the Hôtel de Ville was the fact that the German troops had not progressed that far with their work when the orders were countermanded from Berlin.

General von Boehn's View

The interview between Mr. Powell and General von Boehn is destined to become classic. It had been sought by the general, who had expressed a wish to have an opportunity to talk with Mr. Powell, to give him the German version of the treatment of the Belgian civil population for the enlightenment of the American public. Mr. Powell was accordingly invited to dine with the general. Here is more of the conversation as given by the former as "nearly verbatim" as he could remember it.

"It was only when he learned how civilization regarded his crimes, that the Emperor's heart began to bleed.

"The true facts as to the destruction of Louvain will startle the world—hardened though it has become to surprise at German crimes. Unfortunately, however, it is impossible to publish the details at this time without endangering the lives of people still in Belgium under German domination. But these people will speak for themselves when the Germans have been driven from Belgian soil, and they are once more free to speak the truth." Gibson's *Journal,* etc., pp. 171-2.

"One of the officers I saw to-day told me that the Germans were deliberately terrorizing the country through which they passed. It is a perfectly convincing explanation of German doings in this country, but I did not think they were prepared to admit it so frankly. This frank fellow made no claim that civilians had attacked the German troops; his only observation was that they might do so unless they were so completely cowed that they dared not raise their hands. He emphasized the fact that it was not done as a result of bad temper, but as part of the scheme of things in general. For my information, he remarked that in the long run this was the most humane manner of conducting war, as it discouraged people from doing things that would bring terrible punishment upon them. And yet some of these Belgians are ungrateful enough to complain at being murdered and robbed." Ibid., p. 190.

"But why wreak your vengeance on women and children?" I asked.

"None have been killed," the general asserted positively.

"I am sorry to contradict you, general," I asserted, with equal positiveness, "but I have myself seen their bodies. So has Mr. Gibson, the secretary of the American legation in Brussels, who was present during the destruction of Louvain."

"Of course," replied General von Boehn, "there is always danger of women and children being killed during street fighting if they insist on coming into the streets. It is unfortunate, but it is war!"

"But how about a woman's body I saw with the hands and feet cut off? How about the white-haired man and his son whom I helped to bury outside of Sempst who had been killed merely because a retreating Belgian soldier had shot a German soldier outside their house?

"There were 22 bayonet wounds in the old man's face. I counted them. How about the little girl, two years old, who was shot while in her mother's arms by an Uhlan and whose funeral I attended at Heyst-op-den-Berg? How about the old man near Vilvorde who was hung by his hands from the rafters of his house and roasted to death by a bonfire being built under him?"

The general seemed taken aback by the exactness of my information.

"Such things are horrible if true," he said. "Of course, our soldiers, like soldiers in all armies, sometimes get out of hand and do things which we would never tolerate if we knew it. At Louvain, for example, I sentenced two soldiers to 12 years' penal servitude each for assaulting a woman."

"Apropos of Louvain," I remarked, "why did you destroy the library?"

"We regretted that as much as any one else," was the answer. "It caught fire from burning houses and we could not save it."

General von Boehn is as good as a guide book in explaining German war pictures, is he not?

Richard Harding Davis' Views

I have refrained from quoting the Belgian account of what happened because it is *ex parte* testimony. But another American eye witness, Richard Harding Davis, writes:

For many miles we saw procession after procession of peasants fleeing from one burning village, which had been their home, to other villages, to find only blackened walls and smouldering ashes.

"Fifty Germans were killed and wounded," said General von Ludwitz, the military governor of Louvain, "and for that Louvain must be wiped out—so!" In pantomime with his fist he swept the papers across the table. . . . Were he telling us his soldiers had destroyed a kitchen garden his tone could not have expressed less regret. Davis watched the scene from the windows of the train in which he was held at the station. The Germans that night "crowded the windows of the train, boastful, gloating, eager to interpret."

Outside the station in the public square the people of Louvain passed in an unending procession, women bareheaded, weeping, men carrying the children asleep on their shoulders, all hemmed in by the shadowy arm of gray wolves. Once they were halted, and among them was marched a line of men. These were on their way to be shot. And, the better to point the moral, an officer halted both processions and, climbing to a cart, explained why the men were to die. He warned others not to bring down upon themselves a like vengeance.

As those being led to spend the night in the fields looked across to those marked for death they saw old friends, neighbors of long standing, men of their own household. The officer bellowing at them from the car was illuminated by the headlights of an automobile. He looked like an actor held in a spotlight on a darkened stage.

At Louvain that night the Germans were like men after an orgy.

Awful Price Belgians Paid

If the Belgian civilians sniped the German soldiery the latter were undoubtedly justified in shooting offenders but, Dr. von Mach, do you think they were justified in shooting the citizens indiscriminately, the innocent with the guilty?

And, if you do, do you think they were justified in systematically burning and pillaging the homes and workshops and other buildings of the guiltless?

You have imagination; think what that means: the poor and the rich, the sick and the well, the old and the young, the helpless and the strong, the bread winners and their dependents, all made destitute without a place wherein to live or to work, without means of support, the innocent and the guilty, thrown helpless upon the world to be fed by American charity, and later—what? And all this because, if you believe the allegation, some rash hotheads sniped a chivalrous, humane soldiery.

In every large city there are hotheads and mental defectives and fanatics. It was a policy of terrorism and intimidation. Do you think this the only policy that would suffice to overcome resistance to the conquerors? Could they not, for instance, have been satisfied with temporarily rounding up the inhabitants in concentration camps to stop sniping?

We Americans did not sack and burn Vera Cruz, though they sniped us. No, as Mr. Powell says,

"The bombardment of cities, the destruction of historic monuments, the burning of villages and, in many cases, the massacre of civilians was the price which the Belgians were forced to pay for resisting the invader."

You ask us to imagine (with your kindly professor) the "iron line" after the French lesson he describes, again on the march and singing "Ich hatt emen Kameraden." After each verse rang the refrain:

"The birds in the woods are singing,
Are singing to warm your heart.
At home, ah, at home, your dear ones,
We'll meet and never will part.
Gloria! Gloria! Victoria!
With heart and hand for the Fatherland!

Listen once more. Do you hear the song of those same humane German soldiers?

Do you see them again marching, but now drunk with the orgies of sackings and burnings and killings of Aerschot, of Vise, of Tirlemont, of Liège, of Termonde, of Malines, of Louvain and God knows how many towns and villages and hamlets? In the glare of the flames you see them; and again with light hearts they sing:

"The birds in the woods are singing,
Are singing to warm your heart.
At home, ah, at home, your dear ones,
We'll meet and never will part."

It is the same refrain. And as they sing you see, too, by the same light of the burning towns

and villages, the long lines of panic-stricken Belgians fleeing from their "homes," and you see, near by, the condemned—husbands, sons, brothers, "dear ones"—being led away to the place of their killing.

Other Pictures Drawn

There are other pictures of other scenes which I might draw; the picture of the people—innocent—non-combatants, women and men—killed in their beds in Antwerp by bombs thrown by a Zeppelin in the attempt to assassinate the royal family.

This picture, one that Mr. Powell saw, would include among the killed and wounded a child mangled by a shell; a woman leaning out of her window, her head blown off; another woman blown to fragments splotching the floor, the walls, the ceiling with . . . and then fill in the picture with tottering walls and skeletons of houses wantonly blown to pieces.*

* Mr. Hugh Gibson besides being in Louvain had the good fortune to be in Antwerp the night of the Zeppelin raid. His Journal (above mentioned) gives a detailed description from his own observation of the destruction and murder wrought. From it I take the following bits to substantiate Mr. Powell's statements:

"The first bomb was in a little street around the corner from the hotel, and had fallen into a narrow four-story house, which had been blown into bits. . . . The street itself was filled with débris and was impassable. From this place we went to the other points where bombs had fallen. As we afterwards learned, ten people were killed outright; a number have since died of their injuries and a lot more are injured, and some of these may die. A number of houses were completely wrecked and a great many will have to be torn down. Army officers were amazed at the terrific force of the explosions. The last bomb, dropped as the Zeppelin passed

I pass over the destruction of works of art that never can be replaced; but to complete Dr. von Mach's pictures of the "German viewpoint," let me mention only one of the many he has omitted, that of Malines Cathedral.

over our heads, fell in the centre of a large square—la Place du Poids Publique. It tore a hole in the cobblestone pavement, some twenty feet square and four or five feet deep . . . many of the houses were expected to fall at any time. . . . Another bomb fell not far from the houses of the Consul General and the Vice Consul General, and they were not at all pleased. . . .

"The line of march [of the Zeppelin] was straight across the town, on a line from the General Staff, the Palace where the Queen was staying with the royal children, the military hospital of Ste. Elizabeth, filled with wounded, the Bourse, and some other buildings. It looks very much as though the idea had been to drop one of the bombs on the Palace. The Palace itself was missed by a narrow margin, but large pieces of the bomb were picked up on the roof and shown me later in the day by Inglebleek, the King's Secretary. The room at the General Staff, where I had been until half an hour before the explosion, was a pretty ruin, and it was just as well for us that we left when we did. . . .

"Inglebleek, the King's Secretary . . . said that the Queen was anxious I should see what had been done by the bombs of the night before. He wanted me to go right into the houses and see the horrid details. I did not want to do this, but there was no getting out of it under the circumstances.

"We drove first to the Place du Poids Publique and went into one of the houses which had been partially wrecked by one of the smaller bombs. Everything in the place had been left as it was until the police magistrate could make his examination and report. We climbed to the first floor, and I shall never forget the horrible sight that awaited us. A poor policeman and his wife had been blown to fragments, and the pieces were all over the walls and ceiling. Blood was everywhere. Other details are too terrible even to think of. I could not stand any more than this one room. There were others which Inglebleek wanted to show me, but I could not think of it. And this was only one of a number of houses where peaceful men and women had been so brutally killed while they slept." Pp. 140-144.

Picture a deserted and undefended city, "as silent and deserted as a cemetery; not a human being to be seen." That city, Malines, bombarded by the Germans, although not a Belgian soldier in it.

And picture a splendid cathedral looming high above that silent city; and then imagine shells deliberately aimed at that wonderful cathedral until it was little more than a heap of debris; and then, the cathedral destroyed, imagine, in that city of the dead, shells bursting with a shattering crash in deserted buildings, the whole front of those buildings crashing down about you in a cascade of brick and plaster! That was what Mr. Powell saw. Is this wanton bombardment of a deserted city and of a great work of art, a cathedral of religion, "the German viewpoint"? And is this that effect of bringing "the educated classes into the army"—of German kultur—for which the great von Moltke hoped?

Dr. von Mach in his "German viewpoint" goes on to tell of the German soldiers when going into battle singing, during *"the thunder of the cannon,"* Koerner's battle hymn, company after company joining in the magnificent song:

"Father, I call to Thee.
The roaring artillery's clouds thicken round me,
The hiss and the glare of the loud bolts confound me.
Ruler of battles, I call on Thee;
O Father, lead Thou me!"

Shall we picture the soldiers again amidst these "roaring artillery's clouds," "the thunder of the can-

non;" and again singing, while they bombarded the cathedral dedicated to their God, "Father, I call to Thee?" and did "the very air seem purified" "before the grand conception of God and man"? Perhaps, after all, it is only a matter of viewpoint.

No, Dr. von Mach, you and your fellow propagandists, Dr. Dernburg and Dr. Münsterberg, Dr. Albert and others, appeal in vain to the American people. You do not know the true full-blooded American of the twentieth century. Americans are governed by feelings of humanity, of pity, of mercy, of fair play.

Those are the ideals of our national conscience. Americans believe in a government for the people and by the people, not in a government by an autocratic military caste, without pity, without mercy, without regard for the rights of mankind.

If I read the signs of public opinion aright, if I correctly understand American ideals of human rights, Germany stands condemned by American opinion. America cares nothing for the "necessities of war," whether argued as an excuse for crimes against humanity by a German General Staff in 1914, or a "Spanish Butcher" in Cuba in 1898; she cares nothing for fine-spun specious arguments as to why Germany was not to blame for the invasion of Belgium. She sees only a peaceful, unoffending nation defending her inalienable rights to her own soil. And she sees the inhabitants for this offence shot down, and their houses, one by one, put to the torch; she sees tens of thousands of homes deso-

late, and hundreds of thousands of inhabitants driven into exile, or starving and dependent upon American charity—all this, mind you, not as a sporadic instance in one city, but repeatedly, day by day, in many cities and towns; and not as unavoidable accidents from the shelling of the enemy in battle, but deliberately and systematically and unnecessarily, after the capture and occupation of the city, for the sole purpose of revenge, to overcome resistance by terrorism, as officially proclaimed and officially justified. It is for these reasons, if for no others, that Germany appeals in vain to American sympathy.

The German Ideal of Government

Before closing let me say a word upon one of the German ideals of government. *This ideal is, the responsibilities of government should be undertaken* for *the people* by *the state.*

The "state" stands for an abstract conception of authority, an entity. In practice it is an autocratic caste, at the head of which is the Kaiser, who, as he has time and again proclaimed, rules by "divine right."

"We, the Hohenzollerns, regard ourselves as appointed by God to govern and lead the people whom it is given us to rule, for their well-being and advancement of their national and intellectual interests," announced the Kaiser.

And again: "Those who are willing to help me

I heartily welcome whoever they may be; those who oppose me in this task I will crush." In such a state we have the embodiment of "efficiency" or kultur.

As Professor Francke has told us, the German people, in every class (with the exception of the party with democratic ideals) consider it an "obligation," a duty, to subordinate self, all individual interests, all individual desires and welfare to this state.

It is the conception of "state" and citizenship," of Plato and Socrates. The German state governs for the people. And as the basis of efficiency is power to impose, the army and militarism become the foundation of the state, and the autocratic caste that governs in the name of the state becomes a military caste. "We belong to each other. I and the army. Thus we are born for one another, and thus we will stand together in an indissoluble bond in peace or storm, as God will it," proclaimed the Kaiser.

The authority of the state rests on the Kaiser and the army, not on the will of the people, as in the American republic, England and France.

From the American viewpoint we are forced, however unwillingly, to the conclusion (in consideration of German warfare and German ideals of government) that Germany must be regarded *in war as the enemy of civilization, and in peace as the enemy of democracy.*

Between the autocratic German viewpoint and

the democratic American viewpoint there is an irreconcilable conflict—a conflict of ideals that cannot be settled by argument, by citation of facts, by appeals to logic or to moral judgment.

It can only be settled by the arbitrament of arms. If the allies win, we may expect that the ideals of the democratic viewpoint will receive a world-wide acceptance. It was thus that the conflict between the ideals of freedom and slavery was settled in this country only by the acceptance of the arbitrament of war.

If, on the other hand, Germany wins, the United States of America still remains to be settled with, and that conflict of viewpoints, between American democratic ideals and German autocratic ideals, will still exist, to be settled some day in the future by the arbitrament of the sword.

II

THE GERMAN POLICY OF TERRORISM

In my first article I contrasted the methods of the German army in carrying on war in Belgium, as seen from the American viewpoint, and as seen from the German viewpoint.

And I pointed out why, in consequence of this difference in viewpoints, Germany had lost the sympathy of real Americans.

There are numerous other policies, both military and political, in regard to which the two viewpoints

are radically antagonistic. These differences have produced that irreconcilable conflict of opinion upon which I dwelt.

Some of these I discuss to-day; but before doing so let me point out and insist, as emphatically as I can, that it was not the German soldier that was responsible for the inhuman atrocities in Belgium, and the laying waste of the cities and towns.

The soldier must obey. The responsibility lies wholly upon the men "higher up," upon the government which ordered the policy and gave the commands. The German soldier is not to be blamed.

That it was the government policy to overcome resistance of the civilian population by a policy of terrorism—by exacting money tribute from captured cities, by taking hostages to be killed in case of resistance by civilians, by shooting a large number of unoffending citizens in retaliation for offences committed by others, and to deter further resistance by burning wholesale the houses and turning out the inhabitants destitute, and by many other ruthless acts that were a revival of the middle ages—needs no argument.

The policy was publicly announced to the world through proclamations issued by such commanding generals as von Buelow, von Emmich, von Boehn, von der Goltz, von Nieher, von Luetwitz and Major Dieckmann.

It is only by reading these proclamations that we can fully realize this policy, a relic of the middle ages, and comprehend the viewpoint from which

the Germans ordered the atrocities committed. For example, the following were issued:

First, two general proclamations of August 4 and August 9, by Generals von Emmich and von Buelow respectively, to the Belgian nation, announcing the German policy and demanding a "free passage."

That in the absence of resistance the population would be treated kindly, but that "we will act severely on any attempt by the population to show resistance to the German troops or to do injury to the military interests."

That "the destruction of bridges, tunnels and railway lines will be regarded as hostile acts."

That Belgians "will have to choose" and

That "it depends on your wisdom and understanding patriotism to avoid for your country the horrors of war."

Proclamations Threaten

Accordingly, on August 17, a proclamation from the German viewpoint to the citizens of Hasselt announced: "In the case of civilians shooting on the German army, *a third of the male population will be shot.*"

On August 22, a proclamation by von Buelow announced to citizens at Liège that:

"It was with my consent that the general had the whole place (Andenne) burnt down and about 100 people shot," and that Liège would be treated

in the same way if the inhabitants attacked the German troops.

On August 25, a proclamation by von Buelow announced to the citizens of Namur:

1—That citizens who did not betray the presence of Belgian and French soldiers would be "condemned to hard labor for life," and that every such soldier found would "be immediately shot."

2—That any citizen who did not inform the authorities of the existence of any arms, powder or dynamite which he knew of would be shot.

3—That 10 hostages would be taken from "each street," and if there was any uprising in the street the corresponding "10 hostages will be shot."

On August 27, a proclamation by von Nieher notified the citizens of Woevre that if the balance of the war levy of $600,000 was not paid on September 1, "the town of Woevre will be set on fire and destroyed," and "without distinction of persons, the innocent will suffer with the guilty."

Some 50 houses were set on fire and hostages taken in reprisal for alleged but denied sniping.

On September 8, a proclamation by Major Dieckmann notified the citizens of Grivegnee, of Beyne-Heusay, Bois le Breux, and Fleron of a large number of acts and failure to act for which the penalty was death.

Among these misdemeanors, some trivial, a failure to obey the order "hands up," and failure to inform the military commandant of the location of "quantities greater than 100 litres of petroleum,

benzine, benzol, or any similar liquid," of which he had knowledge. (It followed that if an employee did not inform on his employer, or a friend upon a friend, he incurred death, and if he did, his employer or friend incurred death.)

Persons held as hostages, when their relieving substitutes did not present themselves within 24 hours of the appointed time, incurred death, and also if the population of the communes did not remain "quiet in any circumstances."

On September 4, a proclamation by von Boehn notified the inhabitants of Termonde to "hoist the white flag immediately and to cease fighting. If you do not agree to this summons the town will be razed in a quarter of an hour by a very heavy bombardment."

On October 5, a proclamation by von der Goltz announced:

"In future, the localities nearest to the place where similar acts (destruction of a railway line and telegraph wires) take place *will be punished without pity, it matters little whether they are accomplices or not.* For this purpose hostages have been taken near the railway lines thus menaced," etc.

In view of these proclamations, the claim of the Belgians that when German troops have been resisted at the entrances of a village with shots fired by regular Belgian troops, the population has been held responsible, and punished by executions, fire and pillage, is not incredible. One instance, at

least, is vouched for by Powell, the instance he threw up at General von Boehn without contradiction.

That such proclamations were not mere bluff, but were literally carried out, the facts cited by them give evidence. The world knows it, too, from the ruins of cities and towns just as it knows by the debris that an earthquake destroyed Italian cities.

The Evidence of German Soldiers' Diaries

And the world knows it from the accounts written in the diaries of captured German soldiers, even if all other evidence be disbelieved.

I have cited the evidence of Americans; let me cite the evidence of these German diaries in order that the German propagandists in this country may understand the reasons for the failure of their appeal to the American viewpoint. It will be seen that the German method of warfare is not confined to Belgium, but is carried into France.

At the entrance of the village (near Dinant) were about 50 villagers shot for having treacherously fired upon our troops during the night. Many others were shot so that we counted over 200. Women and children, with lamps in their hands, had to witness the terrible sight. We ate our rice among the corpses.

(*From the diary of Private Philip of Kamenz, Saxony, First Battalion, 178th Infantry.*)

Langevillier, Aug. 22.

Village destroyed by the Eleventh Pioneer Battalion; three women hanged on trees.

(*From a soldier's diary.*)

Of the inhabitants, 300 were shot. Those who survived the volley were requisitioned as grave diggers. The women were a sight, but it cannot be helped.

(*Private Schlauter of the Third Battery Fourth Field Artillery, of the Guard.*)

Cirey, Aug. 24.

In the night, incredible things have taken place; shops plundered, money stolen, violences. . . . Simply to make your hair stand on end.

(*From an officer's diary.*)

Dinant, Aug. 25.

The Belgians, at Dinant on the Meuse, fired on our regiment from inside the houses. We shot every one we could see, or we threw them out of the windows, women as well as men. The bodies lay three feet deep in the streets.

(*From a soldier's diary.*)

Aug. 26.

The charming village of the Gue d'Hossus has, apparently, though innocent, been destroyed by fire. It seems that a cyclist fell down, which made his gun go off itself. He was immediately shot at. The male inhabitants were simply thrown into the flames. Let us hope that such horrors will not take place again. At Leppes, about 200 men were shot. There, an example was necessary; it was unavoidable that some innocents should suffer; but a proof of all suspicious of guilt ought to be required, so that such an indiscriminate shooting of all men might be controlled.

(*Diary of an officer of the 178th Regiment of Infantry, 12th Saxony Army Corps.*)

Laval-Morancy, Aug. 28.

Apparently a day of rest. Confiscation of all provisions, bread, jam, wine, cigars; killed geese, chickens, etc. Played piano, plundered fast!

(*Diary of a soldier.*)

We have thus destroyed eight houses with their inhabitants. In one house only, two men with their wives and a

girl of eighteen were stabbed with bayonets. I might have pitied the girl, for she had such an innocent way of looking at us, but it was impossible to do anything against the infuriated mob; then, indeed, they are no longer men, but brutes. We are now on our way to Sedan.

(*Last page of an unknown soldier's notebook.*)

Rethel, September 8.

Unfortunately, discipline is getting looser and looser. Spirits, wine and plunder are the order of the day.

(*From an officer's notebook.*)

Sept. 8, 1914.

Tuesday, 8-9-14.—Reveille 5 a. m. Very violent fight in the woods. Artillery brought into action. Order to shoot down all Frenchmen, the wounded excepted, even if they offer to lay down their arms, because the French allowed us to come within a short distance, then took us by surprise with intense firing.

(*Last page from a killed soldier's notebook.*)

The American Way by Contrast

It has been claimed by the apologists for Germany that this policy of terrorism was justifiable under the circumstances.

That is a matter of viewpoint.

The policy is justifiable if we deny all humanitarian notions of warfare and admit the German contention that under circumstances, the circumstances of this war, everything is permissible.

That it is not the American viewpoint, was shown by our attitude towards Spanish rule in Cuba.

We Americans went to war with Spain and drove

the Spaniards from Cuba, and gave back the island, after conquering it, free to the inhabitants.

Why?

Because of the atrocities committed against the non-combatant inhabitants in pursuance of a military policy by Spain, without pity, without mercy, and without regard to human rights, under General Weyler.

The American conscience would not stand for that.

But have not the Germans outdone the Spaniards? The Spaniards did not aim at a policy of terrorism so much as to cut off the source of rebellion; they did not burn the cities and towns. Yet when the Spanish viewpoint of war was shown to the American people; when the press was able to bring home to the full consciousness of the American people the cruelties inflicted by the "bloody Weyler," as he was called, on the inhabitants of Cuba, the American conscience was aroused and no "necessities of war" were accepted as an excuse. There arose an irrepressible conflict between the American viewpoint and the Spanish viewpoint.

If we were willing to take up arms to enforce this American humanitarian viewpoint upon Spain, regardless of the Spanish necessities of war, do not Germany and her organized propagandists appeal in vain to the American people to morally tolerate the still more atrocious German methods of carrying on this war?

War as Taught by the German War Book

That it is the German contention that under circumstances nearly everything is permissible in war is shown both by their writings and acts.

In a book issued by the general staff of the German army, entitled "Usages of War on Land," extracts from which I have in a review before me, there are a number of passages teaching this doctrine to the soldiers. In one he is taught that:

> A war conducted with energy cannot be directed merely against the combatants of the enemy state and the positions they occupy, but it will and must in like manner seek to destroy the total intellectual and material resources of the latter. Humanitarian claims, such as the protection of men and their goods, can only be taken into consideration in so far as the nature and object of the war permit.

Was it from this viewpoint that the splendid cathedrals of Rheims and Malines and other great public monuments were bombarded and shattered?

In another passage the soldier is taught to guard himself against the danger of "sentimentality and flabby emotion" of modern thought:

> The danger can only be met by a thorough study of war itself. By steeping himself in military history an officer will be able to guard himself against excessive humanitarian notions; it will teach him that certain severities are indispensable to war, nay more, that the only true humanity very often lies in a ruthless application of them.

Was this the viewpoint from which, as described in the German soldiers' diaries, they threw women as well as men out of the windows of the houses

until the bodies lay piled three feet in the street, cast the "male inhabitants into the flames," stabbed the women in the homes with bayonets or hung them to the trees, shot down Frenchmen who offered to "lay down their arms"—acts that made even the hair of the German soldier "stand on end"?

And was it with this passage from the text-book in mind that the Kaiser in 1900 instructed his troops embarking for China in the following words:

> When you come into touch with the enemy, give no quarter, make no prisoners. A thousand years ago the Huns, under their King, Attila, made themselves a name which still lives in tradition. Do you likewise strike home, so that for a thousand years to come no Chinaman may ever again dare to look askance at a German.

On the other hand, certain acts, such as looting of private property, are forbidden, but little attention seems to have been paid to such prohibitions in this war.

It must be from the German viewpoint, as taught in this official text-book, that Admiral Schliepe, in the *Lokal Anzeiger* (as cited by the *New York Times*), complained bitterly that Germans in their conduct of war, and especially in this war, have been far too considerate!

The purely human side of war receives too much attention!

England is choking Germany, and under the circumstances everything is permissible! England may throw up her hands and exclaim, "Oh, those German barbarians!" The British may accuse Ger-

mans of being invaders also, but these names must be borne. And other German authorities high up, even Admiral von Tirpitz, the naval secretary of state, have given voice to the same sentiments.

And so, from this viewpoint, Germany, according to the press despatches, goes into a wild ecstasy of enthusiasm because her fleet bombards the English towns of Scarborough, Whitby and Hartlepool, two of these unfortified pleasure resorts like Atlantic City and Bar Harbor and Beverly, and knocks hotels and dwelling houses to pieces and kills non-combatants, men and women—servant girls and babies in arms, and then proudly sails safely home. Under the circumstances, as they say, everything is permissible.

And from this viewpoint it must be that German aeroplanes dropped bombs upon English towns, ripping to pieces the houses of non-combatants and killing men, women and children; and by the same policy bombs have been dropped in Paris and Antwerp and Warsaw and numerous undefended places with intent to kill, or perfect indifference as to whether non-combatants were killed or not.

It was according to this viewpoint that Germany sowed the North Sea with mines and blew up harmless fishing and other vessels.

The Policy of Destroying Merchantmen

And now comes the announcement by the German Government that it will blow up and sink, if it

can, by submarines, British merchantmen with their crews and passengers, though the latter be Americans and other neutrals; and this notwithstanding the laws of war require that crews and passengers shall first be removed in safety before the ship is destroyed.

And if by chance, owing to the use of a neutral flag by English merchantmen to escape (a practice common in all wars, by all nations) an American ship is mistaken for an English one and blown up with its crews and passengers—so much the worse for the American ship.

The established rule that the ship shall be first searched to determine its nationality is to have no binding force on a German submarine. The avowed policy is to attack the non-combatant British merchant marine by submarines, and as submarines cannot take off crews and passengers, the human freight will have to go down with the ship. And this notwithstanding the fact that transatlantic liners carry for the most part American passengers.

Are we to have another *Titanic* disaster? That would have happened if the *Lusitania* had been sunk by a submarine.

Then as to the flag. German warships are to have a right to use a neutral flag to deceive and capture merchantmen as did the *Emden* and other cruisers, but the use of a neutral flag by merchantmen to escape capture or being blown up must be protested!

And as our ships cannot always be distinguished

by the flag or at sight without being boarded and searched, they run the risk. This is the meaning of the new German proclamation.

I pass over the immediate responsibility of Germany's political and diplomatic activities for the war—her secret agreement with Austria, kept from the powers during all the preliminary negotiations; her secretly backing Austria while claiming to be working for peace; her refusal to join a conference of four powers to act as mediators; her refusal to give the same promise that France did to respect the neutrality of Belgium; her plans for the invasion of France through Belgium, long in advance, by the construction on the Belgian frontier of a system of strategic military railroads of little commercial use; her refusal to accept any of the several modes of mediation acceded to by Russia; her suppression of the offer of Russia (now just come to light) to leave the dispute to The Hague; her declaration of war, although she knew Russia and Austria had actually agreed upon a basis of mediation by which peace might well have been preserved.

All this is too large a subject for discussion here, but may be read in the official publications of the despatches of the great powers.

The Prostitution of Intellectual Honesty

And now, in closing, one word regarding the so-called "Intellectuals": Are we not compelled to

believe it is owing to the unconscious influence of the German viewpoint that a large number of German university professors and others distinguished in literature, science and learning, men of great personal probity and culture and hitherto commanding the respect of the intellectual world, have, in their aim to tell us "The Truth about Germany" in that and other publications, sacrificed their intellectual honesty to the cause of the fatherland.

Are we not compelled to believe that it is from the German viewpoint that these intellectuals and, still more flagrantly, the organized political propagandists in this country, represented in the press by Dr. Dernburg, Dr. von Mach, Dr. Albert, Dr. Münsterburg and Mr. Ritter, all of whom we are glad to respect for their culture in other fields, have misrepresented facts of common knowledge relating to the causes of and responsibility for this war —have perverted the meaning of official dispatches and actions and motives of the governments of England and France and Belgium and Italy and Russia, and have sought, by the shallowest sophistries, to throw dust in the eyes of the public and gain the sympathy of the American people?

If one wishes to recall to mind examples, one need only think of the audacious assertion of the propagandists that Germany offered to make a new treaty with England to guarantee the neutrality of Belgium and that England refused—a reckless assertion without a single scrap of authoritative evidence; the sophistical assertion that England and

France had already violated the neutrality of Belgium before Germany did; that England and France intended to invade Belgium, thus forcing Germany to do so; the disingenuous argument and misrepresentation that Belgium had forfeited its own neutrality before the war; that England claimed to declare war solely because of her treaty with Belgium without regard to her obligations to France; that England wished for war and did not try to prevent it; the disingenuous claim that Germany strove to hold back Austria and maintain peace, and many other statements similar in kind.

By their publications the propagandists have been successful to a certain psychological and political extent; to a psychological extent in that they have undoubtedly presented to those who were already national sympathizers with the fatherland, to those who have the will to believe, a point of view by which they can justify to themselves, in spite of the facts, their belief in the justice of Germany's cause; to a political extent in that they have produced a solidarity among those who have the will to believe.

But to neutral Americans, the publicists, the diplomats, the historians, the jurists, the men of American universities, and the "man-in-the-street," who without previous affiliations and without previous national prejudices have studied for themselves the facts as revealed in the official publications of the belligerent nations, all this prostitution of intellectual honesty must be destined to be useless.

THE AMERICAN CONSCIENCE
1914-15

(It is difficult at this date, 1917, when we are actually at war with Germany and stirred to the depths of our being by the great issues at stake, to go back in thought to those pre-war days of 1914 and 1915, when we were still neutral and passive. It is almost impossible to put ourselves into the attitude of mind of those days previous to the sinking of the *Lusitania*, to fully realize and feel the atmosphere of doubt, hesitation and timidity as to what course we should pursue, how far we should go in the maintenance of American rights and American honor, and in what manner and degree we should express our sympathy with the allied nations. Although, as I believe, the great majority of native born Americans, not of German descent, particularly those who had studied the issues of the war, were intensely sympathetic with the cause of the Allies, who they believed were fighting the battles of humanity and civilization, there was still considerable hesitation on the part of a good many to give public expression to this sentiment, and many more doubted whether our Government should take positive action in defense of American rights. Immediately after the sinking of the *Lusitania* opinion in favor of action was general, but even this became to a degree quiescent as the days of diplomatic note writing dragged on and nothing was done. But finally, when Germany decreed ruthless submarine warfare to begin February 1, 1917, on friend and foe alike, all doubt and hesitation disappeared. The American conscience awoke and the nation found itself at last. The issues raised in this essay, therefore, are now dead. Nevertheless it is not well to neglect entirely the lessons of the past which may usefully serve the future, and it does no harm to record them from time to time lest we forget. And so I venture to include this and the following essay (The Disintegration of an Ideal) in this collection though the issues they touched fortunately, though tardily, proved to be ephemeral.)

THE AMERICAN CONSCIENCE, 1914-15 *

DOES silence give consent?

Germany broke the moral and international law of nations and invaded a neutral state—Belgium. The American answer was silence.

Germany broke the moral and international law of nations and committed wholesale atrocities, as a policy of terrorism, upon a Belgian civil population. The American answer was silence.

Germany broke the moral and international law of nations and ruthlessly, as a policy of terrorism, destroyed and carried off private property. The American answer was silence.

Germany broke the moral and international law of nations and laid tribute of millions of dollars upon a defenceless population. The American answer was silence.

Germany broke at least the moral law of humanity and appropriated for its own armies the food of a whole nation, leaving the inhabitants to starve or to be fed by America. The American answer was silence.

Germany broke the moral and international law of nations and bombarded with its warships, and dropped bombs from aeroplanes upon unfortified

* Printed in part in *The Boston Herald*, April 3, 1915.

cities and towns, killing non-combatants, men, women and children. The American answer was silence.

Germany broke the moral and international law of nations and sowed the high seas with floating and other mines, destroying neutral ships. The American answer was silence.

Germany now breaks the moral and international law of nations and destroys, by submarines, the merchantmen of the enemy without first rescuing the passengers and crew, but sinking them with the ships —if they cannot save themselves. The American answer thus far has been silence. Now Germany has torpedoed and sunk an American passenger steamship, the *Falaba,* drowning 112 of her passengers and crew, and has similarly destroyed the steamer *Aguila,* with an estimated loss of nine lives. In the case of the *Falaba* the submarine made no attempt to help the drowning passengers, and it is believed that some persons were killed by the explosion of the torpedo, so little time was given them to save themselves. In the case of the *Aguila,* it is reported that the submarine opened fire with her guns, killing a woman passenger, the chief engineer and two of her crew. There is reason to believe an American lost his life on the *Falaba.* Every day brings us news of a new barbarity.

How long, we may ask with all due regard to conservatism, is this kind of warfare to go on without awakening a response from the American conscience? I do not mean from our government at

Washington. It has already committed itself to silence and will do nothing; it is too late to act, though very likely it will demand a money indemnity for the loss of an American life, if that has occurred. I mean a public remonstrance from the sentiment of the communities in which we live, let them express it by any means and in any form they will. It is not too late for the American people to express their sentiments by public meetings, petitions, resolutions of public bodies and organizations, State Legislatures and other ways.

Some of my friends of a conservative, cautious attitude of mind reply in answer to this, "What good will it do to protest?" To this, those who do not look at all national questions from only a material point of view reply, "A good deal of good that cannot be measured in materialistic terms or in terms of the present." Let me endeavor to justify this answer.

This is plainly not a matter involving the question of neutrality. But it is one that does involve the assertion of American ideals of humanity and of the national conscience. It is one, I believe, that, so far as we fail to stand up manfully for those ideals and follow the impulses of our conscience, involves the loss of our national self-respect and of national honor. It is one of moral duty and self-respect.

There are a large number of Americans, the great majority as I believe, who hold that by not protesting against the "scrap of paper" doctrine and

the invasion of Belgium and all the barbarities that have been practised against that brave little nation, the United States lost the great opportunity that was hers of taking a position in this world as a great moral force—a position rightly due her. If the United States had done that, she would have been not only such a moral force in this war, but, in time to come, after peace has been restored, having shown the courage of her convictions, she would, by force of character, be recognized in the council of nations as a dominant factor in determining the general acceptance of and submission to international laws that in the future will limit the barbarities of war, and perhaps even secure an international court with power to prevent them.

To the opportunist who asks, "What good will it do?" we may ask in turn, "What harm will it do?" The answers usually given are two:

First, we should gain the enmity of Germany.

But suppose we should—what of it? Are we to refrain from asserting in the face of the world, if need be, what we believe to be morally right in fear that we should become ill-favored in the eyes of a nation whose policy of barbarity has shocked the world? Besides, all the signs of the times go to show that we are fast becoming the object of hatred of that nation, because, in addition to our known sympathy with her enemies, we refuse to be unneutral and stop selling munitions of war to any nation that commands the seas. So, looking at it in a purely practical, hard-headed way—if that is

what is wanted—we shall gain Germany's ill-will anyway.

Count Apponyi, in reply to the argument that all the parties to this war were awaiting the judgment of America, has already written voicing the sentiment of Austria-Hungary: "Well, that *was* so, but, as far as we are concerned, it is no more."

The second and most common answer is that we hope, if we keep silent—though we may venture to appoint a day to pray for peace in our churches —when the time comes for peace the United States will be able to play the part of a friendly mediator.

Even if this hope be fulfilled, will the gain to the world make up for what has been lost? And even if Germany by that time shall have retained any friendly feeling for us and be willing to accept us as an arbitrator, what will the Allies say to us? Is it not reasonable that they will say, could they be blamed for saying: "Go to! What have you to say to what terms we shall impose,—you who stood by, in dumb silence, you who saw violated every moral law of nations, every law of humanity violated, every human right for which Democracy stands—for which you claim to stand—and had not a word to say of protest. Go to! What have you to say to terms of peace!" And would not the Allies be right?

Whether a protest of the nation would have affected Germany's policy of terrorism in carrying on this war and changed her methods, no one can say. Yet it is reasonably a probability that if an

early protest by our government had been made, expressing the moral uprising of a nation, Germany would have thought twice before bombarding unfortified towns, sinking merchantmen with their crews and passengers, and carrying out her harsh policies in conquered Belgium; and her future policies would have been modified. Otherwise, why has she sought to obtain by an organized propaganda the moral support of the United States? No one has more emphatically insisted upon the advantage accruing from the moral support of neutrals than Bismarck. He made it one of the foundation stones of his diplomatic strategy and expressed it in his famous declaration: "If we attack, the whole weight of the imponderables, which weigh much heavier than material weights, will be on the side of the adversaries whom we have attacked."

As one of the ablest writers on the war, Professor Munroe Smith,† has pointed out, it was just these *imponderables*—"love of independence, fidelity to treaty engagements and resentment against flagrant wrong"—that determined Belgium's hopeless resistance to Germany against overwhelming force. The failure of German military strategy was due to overlooking these imponderables. The moral protest of American sentiment is an imponderable.

But, waiving this point, there is another and cogent reason why it would "do good" to have the na-

† Military Strategy versus Diplomacy in Bismarck's Time and Afterwards; *Political Science Quarterly*, March, 1915.

tional conscience express itself by protest. This reason is because of our duty to ourselves and to our own ideals of right and humanity. It is for ourselves, even if not for others, that we should speak out.

History shows that the moral conscience of a nation, as well as of the individual, can only be maintained by standing up for its own ideals, for what it believes to be right. If, when our conscience is shocked, we do not do this, it soon becomes blunted and callous, and we cease to have convictions that will inflexibly determine the attitude of the nation when moral issues are presented. Already, apparently, our conscience has become dulled to the atrocities of this war. At first we were stunned, we could scarcely realize the horror of it all. Then we were silent. Then our conscience became blunted, callous, and now we take it all as a matter of course. A few days ago we read that the British merchant steamer *Tanistan* was, without warning, torpedoed by a submarine and went down with all her crew, saving one. We read also that the British steamer *Blackwood* was similarly torpedoed while the crew of the submarine, which came up from below, made no attempt to assist in the rescue, but coolly looked on. Then it was a Dutch vessel and now an English ship crowded with passengers. We read again that a neutral Swedish merchant vessel is sunk, with all the crew, and we pass on to the next item with hardly a conscious emotion. To-morrow it may be the *Lusitania*,‡ or even the American ship *Phila-*

‡ The *Lusitania* was sunk about a month later, May 8.

delphia. Such news items of the day form simply a paragraph to be casually read with a blunted conscience—forgotten to-morrow!

If we think our national ideals and our national conscience are worth preserving, we must be willing to express publicly that conscience, and with no uncertain voice. And if we wish American sentiment to be an "imponderable" that will influence not only our own Government but world-thought and the decisions of other nations, we must insist upon being heard. William Lloyd Garrison was actuated by the spirit of both these motives when he wrote the memorable words engraved by Boston on the pedestal of his statue:

> "I am in earnest. I will not equivocate. I will not excuse. I will not retreat a single inch, and I will be heard."

We will all admit that an individual is a man of character according as his conduct is inflexibly determined by fixed convictions. Well, the same is equally true collectively of a nation. And when a nation that meditates war, or is engaged in war, knows in advance that any intended action will inexorably meet with the resistance of the moral convictions of neutral nations, it will, as Bismarck counselled, hesitate before it loses the advantage of that neutral nation's moral support.

It will, then, "do good" to have the national conscience speak out, because a nation that thus asserts and maintains unshaken its convictions, will

itself be deterred by those convictions from committing unjustifiable acts when tempted by the necessities of the moment, and also be a moral force in deterring other nations from making unjust wars and violating international laws of warfare. Therefore is it a duty to ourselves.

II

Let us not forget that in protesting against German methods of carrying on the war we protest against more than the actual barbarities themselves. These are only the expression of German political and military philosophy, of the German national conscience. In protesting we would raise our voice, therefore, against those German ideals and that German culture which teaches that "might goes before right"; "that the State is power and war is its first most elementary function"; that war is in itself a good thing, "the basis of all healthy development" and "a moral necessity" demanded by "political idealism"; that strong states have a moral right to overcome weak states which *ought* to go to the wall; that "efforts directed towards the abolition of war must be termed not only foolish but absolutely unmoral and unworthy the human race"; that "the idea of perpetual peace" is "a profoundly unethical conception"; that in war all things are permissible for the State to gain its ends; that "inexorability and seemingly hideous callousness are among the attributes necessary to him who would achieve great

things in war" (Field Marshal von der Goltz); that "in concluding treaties the State does so always with the tacit reservation that there is no power beyond and above it to which it is responsible, and it must be the sole judge as to whether it is expedient to respect its obligations"; that "he who commands, what need has he of agreements?"; that it is a crime in a statesman not to seize opportunities to make war upon a rival that seems likely to become stronger than itself, or is "weakened and hampered by affairs at home and abroad"; "that the acts of a State cannot be judged by the standard of individual morality."

These are a few of the many maxims that might be taken at random from the writings of German publicists and military writers. They fairly express the national conscience of Germany, and are exemplified by the methods adopted in inciting and carrying on this war. They are not, therefore, merely academic philosophies, they are ideals which have passed into the thought of the present generation, and have been endorsed by the military party responsible for the crime of this war.

That German culture is responsible for militarism has been thus asserted by one German writer, G. Fuchs: "We Germans have a characteristic form of culture in nothing at all *except as soldiers.*" "The German nation owes its present position as a European Power to the only form of culture which it has as yet created, its army. It will need to assert itself as an International Power by a similar

manifestation, or disappear dishonorably." "The army is the only great organism of culture, comprising the entire nation, which we possess." "All culture is bought at the price of blood."

As one writer, a close and hitherto sympathetic student for many years of German Government and life (W. H. Dawson) has said: "Germany stands forth, on its own confession, as the representative of national and social conceptions, ideals, and aims which are entirely alien to those pursued by other civilized nations. Its culture is a tribal culture based on force, yet it seeks to impose this culture on mankind for mankind's benefit."

If the people of our country were fully cognizant of, or fully realized the meaning of German military and political culture, I believe there would be an uprising of national sentiment which would sweep our Government before it and compel a protest against Germany's methods in this war. Every student of German culture has arrived at the conclusion that their methods in this war are not simply momentarily chosen expedients to meet military exigencies. To so regard them is a very superficial point of view. There can be no manner of doubt that they carry out long accepted principles and long-thought-out policies ingrained in the thought of the autocratic military caste. They are the expression of a philosophy of national life, of a political philosophy formulated by its philosophers, historians, publicists, statesmen and military writers, and adopted by the autocratic class that rules Ger-

many. They are the expression of German ideals of government, of world power and of the methods of advancing them. Breaking the treaty with Belgium and the invasion of that country was not simply an emergency measure; it was the putting into practice of a deep ingrained political philosophy. The policy of terrorism which incited the atrocities in Belgium, burned down cities and towns, took and killed hostages, shot down innocent citizens to intimidate the guilty, commandeered the food of seven millions of people and left them to starve—all this was not simply the sequel of a novel emergency measure; it was the practical expression of a political and military culture which may be read over and over again in official literature; and so with the killing of non-combatants by bombs and the sinking of merchantmen with their crews and passengers. It was the expression of the national conscience. Nothing, I think, shows this interpretation more plainly than the "stormy applause" which greeted Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg's now historic speech in the Reichstag, when he proclaimed the intention of the government to "hack its way through Belgium." One would have thought that the very awfulness of that violation, even as a "military necessity," would have awakened silent awe in the assemblage. But, as the *Vossische Zeitung* reported: "The jubilation which greeted these words baffles description. One man spoke here in the name of the nation."

From this point of view Germanism and Pan-

Germanism are the greatest moral questions that have been presented to America and the world since the question of slavery was settled.

Between these ideals of German autocracy and the ideals of American democracy there is an irreconcilable, and, *what I firmly believe will prove to be the case, an unavoidable conflict.* It is more than a figure of speech to say that war—a moral war—is on between the American people and Germany. But that war is not with German democracy, with whom lies the future hope of the Empire. Between the 20,000,000 of plain people of Germany, its democracy, and American democracy, there is a bond of sympathy based on common ideals, common aspirations, common love of political liberty. The moral war is with Germany's autocracy, and it is against this ruling caste that American sentiment should, and sooner or later will, utter its protest. It will not, and should not be content with a pusillanimous morality.

When our own American material "rights," our ships, our cargoes, our trade in cotton or wheat or copper, our money, are molested, we protest quickly enough, and it is fair to say, if an American life is threatened—though not in Mexico. And when a bungling, stupid German naval officer, without authority from his government, sinks the American ship *Frye,* we protest and demand reparation, as we should. And now when England and France defending the cause of democracy, the world over, announce a modified blockade of German ports as a

retaliatory means of stopping German barbarities and bringing this war to an end, a clamor goes up that we demand our technical rights and protest in the interest of commerce. Apparently our commercial interests are not willing to make this temporary sacrifice, but there is talk of retaliation excited by German propaganda.

But when our ideals, the ideals of the American conscience are defied—we remain silent. And yet idealism for humanity has been the strongest moral element in our national life. If Sumner and Phillips and Garrison and Lowell and Andrew and Lincoln were alive to-day would they remain silent? And so we may ask, "Is the American conscience dead?" Or is it that we are awaiting another Whittier to sing as in the olden time?—

"Tell us not of banks and tariffs,—cease
your paltry pedler cries,—
Shall the good State sink her honor that
your gambling stocks may rise?
Would ye barter man for cotton?—That
your gains may sum up higher,
Must we kiss the feet of Moloch, pass our
children through the fire?
Is the dollar only real?—God and truth and
right a dream?
Weighed against your lying ledgers must our
manhood kick the beam?"

THE DISINTEGRATION OF AN IDEAL

THE DISINTEGRATION OF AN IDEAL *

I

THE IDEAL

IN 1821 the Grecian "Senate" sent a formal appeal to the people of the United States for sympathetic support in the rebellion of Greece against Turkish oppression, just as the Belgian government sent an appeal in 1914 protesting against the violation of Belgian independence by Germany and the atrocities committed by the German army.

"The interest felt in the struggle rapidly increased in the United States. Local committees were formed, animated appeals were made, and funds collected with a view to the relief of the victims of the war." Accordingly, on the assembling of Congress in December, 1823, President Monroe in his annual message addressed the following words to the Congress:

> A strong hope has been long entertained, founded on the heroic struggle of the Greeks, that they would succeed in their contest and resume their equal station among the nations of the earth. . . . From the facts which have come to our knowledge, there is good cause to believe that their enemy has lost forever all dominion

* Printed in the New York *Times*, November 21, 1915.

over them; that Greece will become again an independent nation. *That she may obtain that rank is the object of our most ardent wishes.* (Italics not in original.)

The President, plainly, did not pretend to moral or political neutrality. On the contrary, he did not hesitate to express the sympathy of the Administration and the nation in the struggle that Greece was maintaining to attain her independence and sovereignty. In complete accord with this message of the President, Webster introduced a resolution to provide for defraying the expense incident to the appointment of an agent or commissioner to be sent to Greece to investigate the conditions there.

The specific intent of the resolution was not a matter of great importance. On its face it only purported to seek detailed information on the existing conditions in Greece, just as an agent might have been sent at the beginning of this war to Belgium to collect information regarding the conditions from which the inhabitants were suffering as a result of the German invasion. The agent, or commissioner, was not to be a diplomatic representative to the Grecian Government. Whether such an agent should be sent or not was only a matter of expediency, and probably Webster himself cared very little, it being a minor matter. Indeed, Webster said he "did not desire that the resolution should be at present acted upon, but simply that it lie upon the table for the consideration and deliberate reflection of the House." The resolution ostensibly sought to carry out in a practical form

the President's policy of moral support. But its author had another object in view which was more than an expression of sympathy of the American nation with a people struggling both against the oppression of the Turks and the hostile attitude of the allied monarchies of Europe. It was not really necessary for Congress to define our attitude. This had already been done by the President. Monroe had laid down the policy of the Government in its relation to Greece, and this was to give the moral support of our nation to the cause for which the Greeks were fighting. In this he had the backing throughout the country of public opinion, which was universally in sympathy with Greece. Action by Congress was no more necessary than it was in reply to that part of the message now known as the Monroe Doctrine, which stated our attitude toward the threatened attempt of the Allied Nations of Europe to interfere with the republics of South America. That statement of our policy was never acted upon by Congress, but it has become a fixed national policy. So the President's statement of his policy toward Greece required no action by Congress. But Webster sought in the occasion, not only to express his complete accord with the President, but to lay before Congress and the country his convictions as to what our larger policy ought to be when a small nation is oppressed by a greater power, particularly when that power pretends by the authority of autocracy and Divine Right to interfere with the destinies of a free people or a peo-

ple struggling to be free. Greece, as he expressly stated, was only an example of the principle.

The political conditions in Europe with which Monroe and Webster dealt were very different from what they are to-day, and the war that was being waged had a very different purpose from the present war. The Holy Alliance has ceased to exist; the war was a revolution for independence. But it is remarkable how modern are Webster's thought and argument. Much of his speech might be delivered to-day, when half the world is dying because of the aggression of two autocratic monarchies. The names of Belgium and Luxemburg and Serbia might be substituted for Greece, and the atrocities committed in Louvain, Aerschot, Termonde, Hartlepool, Scarborough, and on the high seas, or any one of a score of places in France and Serbia, might be substituted for Scio and Cyprus and Greece; the German policy of "frightfulness" and "terrorism," for the same Turkish policy in 1821, then upheld and morally justified by the allied powers.

Webster speaks of Greece and Turkey and the Holy Alliance, but when we read his words to-day the pictures that come into our minds are not of those states and that alliance of the far-away time of 1821, but of the small states whose peoples and whose sovereignties have been wronged in 1914, and of another alliance.

Then again, though the Holy Alliance is dead, one cannot help thinking that its principles still sur-

vive when one recalls to mind the "Little Peoples" held in subjection against their will and national aspirations by the autocratic empires of middle and eastern Europe—of the Poles, the Bohemians (Czechs), the Slovaks, the Croatians, the Slovenes, the Ruthenians, the Lithuanians, the Finns and Armenians. These people are now "dumb under an iron censorship."

The reason for the modernness of Webster's thought is that he dealt with international morality and with principles that do not change with time. His protest on behalf of Greece was a concrete application of these fundamental ideals. His motive is eloquently expressed in his peroration:

> I close, then, Sir, with repeating that the object of this resolution is to avail ourselves of the interesting occasion of the Greek revolution to make our protest against the doctrines of the allied powers, both as they are laid down in principle and as they are applied in practice. I think it right, too, Sir, not to be unseasonable in the expression of our regard, and, as far as that goes, in a manifestation of our sympathy with a long-oppressed and now struggling people. I am not of those who would, in the hour of utmost peril, withhold such encouragement as might be properly and lawfully given, and, when the crisis should be past, overwhelm the rescued sufferer with kindness and caresses. The Greeks address the civilized world with a pathos not easy to be resisted. They invoke our favor by more moving considerations than can well belong to the condition of any other people. They stretch out their arms to the Christian communities of the earth, beseeching them by a generous recollection of their ancestors, by the consideration of their ruined cities and villages, by their wives and children sold into an accursed slavery, by their blood, which they seem willing to pour

out like water, by the common faith and in the name which unites all Christians, that they would extend to them at least some token of compassionate regard.

The circumstances that led to Monroe's public statement of the attitude of his Administration toward Greece may be briefly told, but it is Webster's cogent argument and moral stand on behalf of international morality and democracy that have interest for us to-day, and let us see the change that has taken place in the national policy and how far we have traveled from the pillars that marked our ideals in the early days of the republic.

Early in 1821 a revolution burst out in Greece against the tyranny of Turkish rule. By that revolution, we all know, Greece eventually won her independence after nearly eight years of an indescribably bloody war. But this was only after the aroused conscience of the people of Europe and the United States had forced the monarchies of Europe —England, France, and Russia—to break with Metternich and the principles of the Holy Alliance and to intervene. During the first six years Greece had fought alone, unaided.

During the first year the progress of the revolution was favorable to Greece. Then there followed a policy and campaign of "frightfulness" which it would be difficult for us in this twentieth century to take in or believe, were it not that we have seen with our own eyes in the last year a very perfect example of this policy, complete in almost all its details. The Turkish atrocities in Greece in 1822

can be well appreciated by a consideration of present-day German atrocities in Belgium, France, and England, and the sinking of the *Lusitania* and other ships on the high seas.

Early in the second year of the war of Grecian independence there followed, to quote the words of Daniel Webster in his memorable speech in the House of Representatives, "that indescribable enormity, that appalling monument of barbarian cruelty, the destruction of Scio; a scene I shall not attempt to describe; a scene from which human nature shrinks shuddering away; a scene having hardly a parallel in the history of fallen man." The Turkish fleet had landed an army of 15,000 men on the beautiful Island of Scio. "Here," Webster tells us, "was the seat of modern Greek literature; here were libraries, printing presses, and other establishments which indicate some advancement in refinement and knowledge. . . . There was nothing to resist such an army. These troops immediately entered the city and began an indiscriminate massacre. The city was fired; and in four days the fire and sword of the Turk rendered the beautiful Scio a clotted mass of blood and ashes. The details are too shocking to be recited. Forty thousand women and children, unhappily saved from the general destruction, were afterward sold in the market of Smyrna, and sent off into distant and hopeless servitude."

The population of Scio and the actual number massacred are only roughly known, but according

to a modern writer, it is believed that out of 90,000 inhabitants, 23,000 were killed and 43,000 were sold as slaves.

I have no intention of entering into an account of the Grecian war of independence, or of discussing the indefensible methods of warfare employed on both sides. I mention these atrocities merely to call attention to events which largely determined the response of the United States Government, not only to the appeal of Greece for sympathetic support, but to the hostile attitude toward Greece of the continental monarchies.

In view of the political situation in Europe, the stand taken by the President, and supported by Webster, was more than a declaration of sympathy by our Government for a small nation oppressed by an autocratic and powerful one. That declaration was, indeed, outspoken, unequivocal and humanitarian. But the opinions expressed by the President had a deeper meaning. They rebuked, and were intended to rebuke, the Sovereigns of the Allied Powers—commonly called the Holy Alliance—who had thrown all their moral support in favor of Turkey and against Greece. The Allied Powers, dominated by Prussia, Austria and Russia, had only recently, sitting in congress at Verona, "discouraged, discountenanced, and denounced" the Greeks for their resistance to Turkish oppression. Metternich, the famous Austrian statesman and master of European diplomacy, who dominated the Holy Alliance, and through it governed Europe,

had said: "Three or four hundred thousand individuals hanged, butchered, impaled down there, hardly count."

In this situation, in the face of the most powerful nations of Europe, the President of the United States did not hesitate to take a decidedly antagonistic position and to offer the moral support of the nation to the cause of liberty and human rights. To appreciate fully the significance of our stand one must recall, what every schoolboy knows, that the Holy Alliance was based on the doctrine of the Divine Right of Kings, just as the German autocracy maintains that doctrine to-day.

In this connection it is curiously interesting to note the similarity of the sentiments and language of Francis I., Emperor of Austria, one of the three chief supporters of the Holy Alliance in 1821, and of the present German Emperor. Both sovereigns maintained the doctrine of the Divine Right to rule and the determination to tolerate no opposition to the autocratic will. "I want faithful subjects," said Francis I. "Be such: that is your duty. He who would serve me must do what I command. He who cannot do this, or who comes full of new ideas, may go his way. If he does not, I shall send him." And in a similar spirit William II., the present Emperor, said: "Those who are willing to help me I heartily welcome whoever they may be: those who oppose me in this task I will crush." Again: "There is but one law, and that is my law." And again: "One only is master within the Empire,

and I will tolerate no other."

In accordance with this principle, the allied sovereigns at Laybach in 1821 announced that "useful and necessary changes in legislation and in the administration of States ought only to emanate from the free will and intelligent and well-weighed conviction of those whom God has rendered responsible for power. All that deviates from this line necessarily leads to disorder, commotion, and evils far more insupportable than those which they pretend to remedy."

It was on this principle that the continental monarchies denounced the Greeks, though the whole world recoiled from the cruelties they suffered at the hands of their oppressors, just as the world today recoils from the cruelties suffered by the Belgians and Serbians. Webster, therefore, in protesting against the treatment of Greece by Turkey and the Allied Powers, directed the main force of his argument against the principles of the Holy Alliance. And he brought all the power of his splendid eloquence to bear to show to the American people how "utterly hostile" those principles were "to our own free institutions." The question was very different from that raised by Monroe in that part of his message, now known as the Monroe Doctrine, dealing with the designs of the Holy Alliance upon the South American Republics. There it was a question of direct interference with Republican forms of government and the forcible imposition of their system of government upon this

hemisphere. This we should regard, he said, as "an unfriendly disposition toward the United States."

It was, therefore, solely on the ground of principle and not because of any such "unfriendly disposition," toward us or infringement of our legal rights on sea or land, or interference with our commerce, that Webster urged that the moral support of the nation be given to the cause of Greece.

"I wish to take occasion," he said, "of the struggle of an interesting and gallant people in the cause of liberty and Christianity, to draw the attention of the House to the circumstances which have accompanied that struggle, and to the principles which appear to have governed the conduct of the great States of Europe in regard to it; and to the effects and consequences of these principles upon the independence of nations, and especially upon the institutions of free governments."

And referring to the denunciation by the Congress of Verona above mentioned:

> We see here, Mr. Chairman, the direct and actual application of that system which I have attempted to describe. We see it in the very case of Greece. We learn, authentically and indisputably, that the allied powers, holding that all changes in legislation and administration ought to proceed from Kings alone, were wholly inexorable to the sufferings of the Greeks and entirely hostile to their success. Now it is upon this practical result of the principle of the Continental Powers that I wish this House to intimate its opinion. The great question is a question of principle. Greece is only the signal instance of the application of that principle. If the

principle be right, if we esteem it conformable to the law of nations, if we have nothing to say against it, or if we deem ourselves unfit to express an opinion on the subject, then, of course, no resolution ought to pass. If, on the other hand, we see in the declaration of the allied powers principles not only utterly hostile to our own free institutions, but hostile also to the independence of all nations, and altogether opposed to the improvement of the condition of human nature; if, in the instance before us, we see a most striking exposition and application of those principles, and if we deem our opinions to be entitled to any weight in the estimation of mankind, then I think it is our duty to adopt some such measure as the proposed resolution.

One of the most objectionable principles held by the allied powers Webster considered to be the claim of "the right of forcible interference in the affairs of the States."

Webster's speech is characterized by its lofty tone of humanitarianism and profound belief in the principles upon which our nation is founded. Throughout it there breathes the love of liberty and of human rights. Self-restrained and without passion he boldly takes his stand as the defender of these ideals, and he would have the nation assert, without equivocation, the national conscience. They, the allied nations, had "expressed their opinions," and he would have us express our "different principles and different sympathies."

It is interesting, too, to note the entire subordination of selfish, material interest, and technical legal rights belonging to Americans. His protest is based entirely on the broad rights of mankind

and opposition to the oppression of one people by another.

Webster anticipated the objection—the admonition which we received in recent days from the President when we read day by day of the violation of Belgium—that we should scrupulously remain neutral in thought as well as speech, and mind our own business.

> As it is never difficult to recite commonplace remarks and trite aphorisms, so it may be easy, I am aware, on this occasion to remind me of the wisdom which dictates to men a care of their own affairs, and admonishes them, instead of searching for adventures abroad, to leave other men's concerns in their own hands. It may be easy to call this resolution Quixotic, the emanation of a crusading or propagandist spirit. All this, and more, may be readily said; but all this, and more, will not be allowed to fix a character upon this proceeding until that is proved which it takes for granted. Let it first be shown that in this question there is nothing which can affect the interest, the character, or the duty of this country. Let it be proved that we are not called upon by either of these considerations to express an opinion on the subject to which the resolution relates.

The propriety of a protest he placed upon considerations of our own duty, of our character and of our own interest. This conception of duty he returns to again and again; thus in one passage he said that the measure which he proposed he considered "due to our own character and called for by our own duty."

And again he argued:

> In my judgment, the subject is interesting to the

people and the Government of this country, and we are called upon, by considerations of great weight and moment, to express our opinions upon it. These considerations, I think, spring from a sense of our own duty, our character, and our own interest. I wish to treat the subject on such grounds exclusively as are truly American.

But in treating the subject on American grounds he rested his case on the higher plane of American ideals.

"Let this be, then," he continued, "and as far as I am concerned I hope it will be, purely an American discussion; but let it embrace, nevertheless, everything that fairly concerns America. Let it comprehend not merely her present advantage but her permanent interest, her elevated character as one of the free States of the world, and her duty toward those great principles which have hitherto maintained the relative independence of nations, and which have, more especially, made her what she is."

It is interesting to note that Webster, a profound thinker and statesman, by "permanent interest" had in mind, as he later on argued, not material interests or legal rights, but the broad interest we had in resenting the breaking of international law and interference with the rights of small nations by great nations.

It is true Webster in arguing from this ground struck solely at the pretensions of the Holy Alliance, which as an alliance not long afterward came to a timely end. But it is no perversion of his

argument to hold, as I shall later point out, that the principles from which he reasoned are equally applicable to the policies of "Might Makes Right," and "World Empire," and to the events which we have seen unfold themselves before our eyes to-day, to the consideration of a treaty as a scrap of paper, the violation of the sovereignty of small States by a powerful neighbor, the violation of all the civilized laws of war and humanity, the policy of "frightfulness" and "terrorism" as a method of warfare employed to-day as it was by the Turks against the Greeks, and the general breaking of international laws on the plea of "necessity."

Furthermore, two fundamental principles that underlay the Holy Alliance are fundamental to the German Government to-day—that of the divine right of kings and uncompromising hostility to democracy and to "government of the people, by the people, and for the people." To these two principles can be largely traced the existing "German militarism" which is responsible for this war and which the Allies are fighting to overthrow.

A careful study of Webster's attitude of mind, revealing, as it does, his intense love of liberty, his profound belief in government by the people, and his respect for the rights of man, leave no doubt in the mind that he would be as ready to-day, if he were alive, to protest against the violation of these principles as he was against the violation of Grecian liberty and independence.

The modernness of Webster's thought is brought

out vividly by a question which he anticipated—the same question which we have heard so often asked when a protest against the violation of Belgium and Germany's inhuman methods of warfare has been suggested. But the feeble answer given in these later days falls sadly short of the noble reply with which Webster rebuked his imaginary opponent. This passage deserves to be learned by every American and indelibly engraved in the conscience of the nation.

> It may, in the next place, be asked, perhaps, supposing all this to be true, what can we do? Are we to go to war? Are we to interfere in the Greek cause, or any other European cause? Are we to endanger our pacific relations? No, certainly not. What, then, the question recurs, remains for us? If we will not endanger our own peace, if we will neither furnish armies nor navies to the cause which we think the just one, what is there within our power?

He then went on to characterize the part which the imponderable force of public opinion and moral sentiment plays in restraining and punishing the violations of human rights—that force which France and Belgium and England have appealed in vain to America to bring to the aid of humanity in this war:

> It is already able to oppose the most formidable obstruction to the progress of injustice and oppression; and as it grows more intelligent and more intense, it will be more and more formidable. It may be silenced by military power, but it cannot be conquered. It is elastic, irrepressible, and invulnerable to the weapons of ordinary warfare. It is that impassable, unextinguishable enemy

of mere violence and arbitrary rule, which, like Milton's angels,

> Vital in every part . . .
> Cannot, but by annihilating, die.

Until this be propitiated or satisfied, it is vain for power to talk either of triumphs or of repose—no matter what fields are desolated, what fortresses surrendered, what armies subdued, or what provinces overrun.

Then, after narrating the unhappy events in Spain:

It is nothing that arrests and confiscation and execution sweep away the little remnant of national resistance. There is an enemy that still exists to check the glory of these triumphs. It follows the conqueror back to the very scene of his ovations; it calls upon him to take notice that Europe, though silent, is yet indignant; it shows him that the sceptre of his victory is a barren sceptre; that it shall confer neither joy nor honor, but shall molder to dry ashes in his grasp. In the midst of his exultation, it pierces his ear with the cry of injured justice; it denounces against him the indignation of an enlightened and civilized age; it turns to bitterness the cup of his rejoicing, and wounds him with the sting which belongs to the consciousness of having outraged the opinion of mankind.

Later on he describes in vivid language and glowing admiration the splendid resistance of the Greeks to the powerful hordes of Turkey. But as we follow his words to-day it is pictures of Belgium and Serbia that rise before us and intrude themselves into our consciousness. Then he returns to the question, What good will it do to protest?

It may now be asked, perhaps, whether the expression of our own sympathy, and that of the country, may do

them good? I hope it may. It may give them courage and spirit, it may assure them of public regard, teach them that they are not wholly forgotten by the civilized world, and inspire them with constancy in the pursuit of their great end. At any rate, Sir, it appears to me that the measure which I have proposed is due to our own character and called for by our own duty. When we shall have discharged that duty we may leave the rest to the disposition of Providence.

II

THE CONTRAST

Nearly one hundred years have gone by since the days of Monroe and Webster—since they uttered their protests to the most powerful nations of Europe. The policy of our nation has changed!

In 1821 we were a homogeneous nation imbued with common ideals and political beliefs, and with a uniform sentiment of American nationality. Racially we were a unity. To-day we are a polyglot nation speaking many tongues. We have lost the homogeneity of a single race. The people of many nations, each with different political traditions, affiliations, and sentiments, have been cast into the melting pot, and as yet a single national conscience has not been evolved.

It is only to be expected, therefore, that following the great invasion by immigration of all the peoples of the world to this country, our common national conscience should have become disintegrated. New forces have come into play to which

our early national ideals have yielded themselves. Americans, apparently, have thought it wise to compromise with these forces. These facts may explain the change that has taken place in our national attitude and policy toward certain foreign questions. Whether or not they justify it must be left to the judgment of each individual.

Though the policy of the nation has changed, yet history in many respects is repeating itself. Two powerful empires of central Europe have overridden the rights of two little States. In the one case, Serbia; by a preconcerted arrangement they demanded the right to overrule the sovereignty of that State and dictate the administration of its internal affairs. Indeed, there is every reason to believe, on the basis of historical evidence come to light, that these powers conspired to extend their empires over this and other small Balkan States to the Ægean Sea.

In the other case, Belgium, one of these empires, not only disregarded the accepted morality of international law, treated a treaty as a "scrap of paper," but by military force invaded that peaceful neutral State which had given no offense whatever—"hacked its way through." There was no question that a "wrong" was done, for it was admitted officially by the Chancellor. The other nations of the world, therefore, did not have to wait for evidence to see on which side the wrong lay.

In both cases atrocities were committed comparable in every way to those which the Turks had

committed in 1821-1823, and which in a large measure led to the moral stand taken by our Government in 1823. Indeed, the Turks are now committing equal atrocities against the Armenians, apparently with the moral support of the Central Empires, just as the atrocities against the Greeks in their revolution were supported by the Holy Alliance. In truth German publicists have resented any interference by outside nations, claiming the Turks are within their rights in taking any effective measures against the Armenians.

The contrast between the policy of our Government in 1823 and that of 1914 is sharply drawn. In 1823, though a young and weak nation, the Administration did not hesitate to take a definite stand in opposition to the most powerful Governments of Europe, and officially extend the sympathy of the nation and its moral support to an oppressed people. This sympathetic interest was not confined to the Administration, but found collective expression in public meetings throughout the nation, through organized associations and other ways.

In 1914 the Government of the United States, grown to be not only the most powerful of the neutral nations in this war, but one of the most powerful of all the nations of the world, maintained studied reticence and almost ostentatiously adhered to neutrality of sentiment. Even in the Congress, where one would have thought differences of opinion would have found expression, no one felt called

upon to take a different view. The President had admonished the people to be "neutral in thought and speech." But there was and could be no neutrality seeing that each individual had his own moral conscience in his own keeping. It was different with the official conscience of the nation, which was in the keeping of the President, and he held it safely under lock and key; or, to express it slightly differently, he closed the lid of the box upon it and sat on the lid. Congress, perhaps, might have forced the President off his seat on the lid by taking action in the form of a sympathetic protest against the invasion of Belgium and the German campaign of frightfulness, just as Monroe and Webster had protested in 1823. But Congress was pliant and timid, and official neutrality of thought and speech was maintained.

In the country at large, though the press and the great majority of citizens in a whole-hearted way warmly espoused the side of the oppressed nations, the sentiment was not mobilized by public meetings and organized bodies and other ways into collective expression. It was, therefore, pragmatically valueless. It was the sentiment of Americans, and had not become American sentiment. It is only the mobilized or official sentiment that counts in international relations. There were none, indeed, to lead in the mobilization of public opinion into a concrete force. And though many and influential citizens expressed through letters to the press and public addresses the sentiment of the country, with

a few notable exceptions there was a general silent acquiescence in the official attitude adopted by the Administration—in the principle of official Governmental silence. But this acquiescence did not wholly mean agreement or final acceptance. There was a large quota of Americans who believed and still believe that our Government should have protested in 1914 as in 1823.

Nevertheless, though history is repeating itself, one thing stands out very clearly, and that is that the American nation and Government no longer feels called upon to give expression to any opinion or sentiment that we may entertain upon the great moral and political principles involved in international affairs. Nor does our Government any longer consider that the "interest" of America is involved in the possible eventual supremacy of principles of government absolutely hostile to our own. Here, indeed, is a great change since 1823.

Objection may be raised to contrasting the American policy of 1914-1915 with that of 1823 on the ground that conditions and the questions involved in the former period were very different from those of to-day. But this is to take a very narrow view. It is to mistake a particular policy of a nation for the principles by which the policy is actuated. The interference of the Allied Monarchies of 1821 with constitutional government wherever established was only a particular application of their principles and a matter of expediency. This Webster well pointed out in the case of the Greek revolution. It was

when they attempted to impose their principles and their political doctrines on the rest of the world that we took issue with their application. And likewise we may protest against the imposition of the principles of the present Dual Alliance upon the rest of the world if we feel called upon to do so.

Regardless of political policy, the principles of the Holy Alliance were notoriously so opposed to those of our institutions that Monroe in his now famous message warned those nations not to attempt to establish their system of government on this continent. Their principles, aside from any particular mode by which they were put into practice, were entirely opposed to the rights of mankind, to the principles of democracy, to the rights of other nations, to humanitarianism, to government by the people.

Likewise, looked at in this broad way, it is generally conceded that the principles on which the German empire is governed and the doctrines which publicly have been avowed by that nation, by its publicists, its writers, its scholars, its press, its statesmen, its military men, and its Emperor, are as equally hostile to these other principles, and therefore to American institutions.

So much has been written on this matter, and the large mass of data accumulated substantiating this view is so readily accessible, that it would be reiteration or useless to go over it again here. It is sufficient to say that the principles and doctrines of "Might Makes Right," "World Empire

or Downfall," "The Morality of War," "the duty of a strong nation to wage war and to extend dominion over weaker nations," "the duty to extend German Kultur over the whole world"; "the principle of a chosen people," of government by an autocratic class, and that of the "Divine Right" to rule, the denial of representative government except in name; the principle of militarism by which a military caste is elevated to a position of privilege, and by which not only the democracy of the German nation but the world is to be crushed if it does not yield to German ambition; the principles of rule based on armed force, of lèse-majesté, of the denial of freedom of the press and of speech, of the right to wage war by the principle of frightfulness without regard to international law, not to speak of much else—these principles and doctrines are wholly hostile to those principles upon which our Government is founded. This is only a statement of fact which the most neutral and indifferent person may state without any committal of opinion as to the merits of the two systems of government. The difference between the two sets of principles, or national ideals, is the difference not simply between democracy and autocracy, but autocracy of a kind so unique in principle, so barbaric in methods, that it can scarcely be summarized in the few lines I have used. The Belgian and Serbian invasions, the general methods of warfare, and the planning for and the instigation of this war are only special applications of these principles, and it

is to these applications that the question relates.

If all this is admitted, then it follows that the situation in 1823 was not fundamentally different from what it is in 1915. And, as with the Holy Alliance, when the Dual Alliance attempts to apply its principles and its political doctrines to the rest of the world we have a right, at least, to take issue with their application.

In this presentation of the American ideal of 1823, and in contrasting with it the policy and attitude of our Government in 1915, we can see to what an extent that ideal has become disintegrated. By the contrast we can see how far we have traveled since 1823. It is obvious that in 1914-1915 we have made a complete somersault in our policy.

The ideal of 1823 may still persist in the older Eastern communities of the nation, but events have shown that even here it has ceased to be an all-abiding, inspiring creed. Nor does it permeate the national consciousness as a whole. The indifference and apathy of public opinion in the country at large, particularly in the West, grown up without traditions, show that so far as this ideal still survives it is no longer a living, vital force in our national political thought and a trait of the national personality. Rather it has degenerated into an academic opinion deprived of the vitality that springs from intensity of interest. It is difficult to formulate the nature of the change, but, psychologically speaking, its emotional interest has been displaced and attached to material and local affairs. Consid-

erations of self-interest, self-development, self-aggrandizement, self-concern, and self-safety have absorbed the interest. As defenders of humanitarianism have we not become a "slob" nation? Sympathy with suffering? Yes, in plenty. But national political resentment at the cause of the suffering—no. It is noteworthy that not a single leader has come forward to mobilize in practical form into an organized force such resentment as exists. Blasé to humanitarian appeals, to political oppression, barbarities, and injustice, we are content to follow along "the easier way" and justify to ourselves our course by the fact that the national conscience is no longer a unity. And so those considerations—"a sense of our own duty, our character and our own interest"—which in the former period determined us to express boldly our opinion without fear of consequences and in defiance of the allied nations of that time, no longer have weight and no longer govern the thought of the nation.

And yet when we think of this radical departure we cannot help recalling that in 1823, a small and weak nation that we were, the great monarchies of Europe cared little for our opinions—for either our moral support or our moral reprobation—but they had a high respect for what military action we might take. In 1914, when we had become a large and powerful nation, those same monarchies or their successors had a high respect for our opinions and little or none for our military effectiveness. The potentiality of our moral support, a force

which issues only from character, self-respect, high ideals, and assertion of convictions steadfastly held —what Bismarck so highly valued as the "imponderables"—was sought by every nation engaged in this conflict.

In 1823 we spoke out without any hope that our moral support would do any material good, but nevertheless we spoke because it might give "courage and spirit" to the oppressed and because we owed it as a duty to ourselves and our character. That duty done, we could leave "the rest to the disposition of Providence." It was one of the most noble acts in our history.

To-day, when the early expression of our opinion in condemning the violation of a small and helpless nation, the violation of the rules of civilized warfare and international law by every sort of atrocity, and the barbarous treatment of civil populations might have done some material good in mitigating the horrors of war, we refused, like Holland, Denmark, and Sweden, and other small nations, from timidity to speak. We do not consider that we owe it to the oppressed to inspire them, if we could, with "courage and spirit," nor that we owe it to ourselves, to our character, to assert our convictions.

And yet again, as we look back to the times of 1823, there can be no one who does not thrill with pride when he reads the noble protest of our little nation of that time. Is there any one who is not glad that our predecessors took the stand that they did and spoke the words that expressed the con-

science of the nation and brought cheer to the hearts of the oppressed? Is there any one who is not glad that our country condemned the brutal application of principles utterly hostile to those upon which our Republic is founded and which violated the rights of the Little Peoples? Is there any American who is not proud of the Administration of Monroe? Looking forward into the future we are forced to ask ourselves whether we shall be again regarded in the world of nations with that respect for our character which we had attained as the exponent of humanitarian ideals; whether that moral greatness of our country which once was ours, and because of which our sympathy was sought, shall not have vanished. When we lose our character we lose our force as an "imponderable" to uplift the violated nations from the miseries of injustice, of oppression, and of war. As an imponderable force in the world the nation once was mighty for good.

It remains to be seen whether our timidity, our fear to follow the path which Monroe and Webster boldly took, has not weakened our character as a nation and will not earn the reprobation of those who come after us. Will the generations that are to come look back to 1914-15 with that pride with which we to-day look back to the Administration of 1823?

THE WAR—A TEST OF THE GERMAN THEORY OF MILITARISM

A PAPER PRESENTED AT THE CONFERENCE ON "THE PROBLEMS AND LESSONS OF THE WAR" HELD AT CLARK UNIVERSITY, DECEMBER, 1915.

THE WAR—A TEST OF THE GERMAN THEORY OF MILITARISM

THE term "militarism" has different meanings for different people. With some its signification relates merely to the size of the army and navy maintained by a nation; with others to the motives, attitude of mind and political policies which are behind the military establishments, and the purposes for which they are to be employed. So that in this view one nation might maintain a very small military force and yet its Government rest upon and be actuated by "militarism"; while another, the United States, for example, or Great Britain, might maintain a very great military or naval establishment without exhibiting militarism. We must not confuse militarism, understood in this sense, with the American idea of "preparedness" against war—a policy of national defense which is now in the public mind in this country. The two have nothing in common excepting that they make use of military organization as a means to an end. It is the difference in the ends sought that distinguishes the two.

However militarism in general be defined, our thesis requires only that we deal with the German theory of militarism. There is a very general consensus of opinion throughout the world, outside,

of course, of the German Empire, as to the character of German militarism and the purposes which it has been meant to subserve. I believe I am right in saying that it is commonly agreed that the fundamental principle of German militarism is that the stability, power, and will of the nation rest on armed force; and therefore that it is to such armed force that the Imperial Government looks both to maintain itself within the empire and to enforce its will, its "Kultur," its ideals, and its policies upon other nations without the empire.

More concretely and concisely, German militarism in its external relations may be defined as the idea of extending the nation's trade and system of government by force. It would be easy to cite from numerous authorities to support this interpretation of German militarism.

Militarism thus becomes something much more than a system of defense against encroachments from within and without—it is a mode of, and organization for, attack in the enforcement of progressive policies, of national growth, and of the will of the State, whatever direction these may take. It has been even the boast, not only of the German Emperor but of a host of German publicists, that by the potential power of its army Germany has maintained peace itself between the great powers of Europe during the past twenty-five years.

With the questionable validity of this claim I am not here concerned, any more than with the proph-

ecy of the Emperor in 1902, when he said: "The powerful German Army guarantees the peace of Europe." The irony of Aug. 1, 1914, makes such claims tragic. My only motive in citing them is to summarize the functions which militarism has undertaken to perform so that when we come to weigh its claims with its achievements we may judge it.

With militarism as a principle of government within the German Empire I have nothing to do. Though it may be a system for the enforcement of the will of the State against the will of the people, if the German people are satisfied with government resting on the principle of armed force, it is their own affair and concerns them alone. I will content myself with pointing out that that principle necessarily means autocracy based on armed force, and is utterly irreconcilable with and hostile to that other principle of government which rests upon the moral force of public opinion controlled and checked by constitutional guarantees to the individual of "natural" and "inherent" and "inalienable rights." And yet, if time permitted, the thesis would be an interesting one to defend that even within the German body politic militarism, like all other human forces acting upon human beings, is bound eventually to excite and bring into activity other forces antagonistic to itself and with which it sooner or later must come into conflict. And this has happened. The extraordinary growth of the German democracy, to say nothing of the numerous political parties that have sprung

up in opposition to the Government, must be looked upon as the necessary reaction of human wills to an autocratic will attempting to impose itself by force. However that may be, it is of the theory of militarism applied to international relations that the present war can alone be regarded as a test, and it is this aspect of the theory that I propose to consider.

We need not concern ourselves with the origin and historical evolution of German militarism. It is sufficient to accept it as it is found in its final form and as it has manifested itself during the last, say, twenty years—since 1896, the date of the Boer war.

The best exposition of German militarism (commonly called "Prussian") is to be found in concrete applications of its principles, and no more excellent example of applied militarism is to be found than in the attitude of Germany in the Serbian crisis in July, 1914. I trust I may be permitted to cite that incident in spite of the danger of introducing into this discussion controversial matters outside the main thesis.

Serbia had been charged with being guilty of offenses against Austria. Germany accordingly gave Austria assurances, secretly, that the latter should have a "free hand" in dealing with Serbia as she saw fit, regardless of the interests of Russia or the sovereign rights of Serbia, and that Germany would back her up with her army, if necessary. To all expostulation on the part both of

Serbia and the other powers Germany and Austria turned a deaf ear. A settlement of Austria's demands—all of which were yielded but two and Serbia offered to refer these to The Hague—by mediation, by conference of the powers, by conversations was refused. German militarism had the power, so it felt, to enforce its demands against Serbia, on the one hand, and against any outside interference by any power or combination of powers, on the other. Militarism desired, of course, to "localize" the conflict, for in that case its task would be easy; but if the conflict could not be localized, militarism had the power any way, so it believed, and was going to gain its ends by force and would accept no other methods, no matter what the consequences. Its ulterior object, it is generally conceded, was to extend German hegemony and trade as an appanage of empire through the Balkans to the Ægean Sea, Constantinople, and the Persian Gulf by force.

Militarism refused to take into consideration the rights of a sovereign nation, the "natural" and "inherent rights" of mankind, the political interests of other European powers, racial sympathies and prejudices, the traits, instincts, passions, and aspirations of other peoples, and, above all, mutual international moral obligations by which one nation should respect the rights and interests of every other. Its sole function was to gain the ends of its own nation by force, and, relying upon a supposed fear of its own armed power, it refused until

it was too late every other mode of settlement. That was the method of militarism. Necessarily militarism, to be efficient, requires a highly developed condition of preparedness for war. And this the German State has provided, first, in a scheme of offensive and defensive alliances; and, second, in a more efficiently organized military machine than the world has ever before seen and, for that matter, than the world ever dreamed of or thought possible. So that if militarism when tested shall be found not to have been a success, its failure cannot be laid to inefficiency of preparedness.

At this point the difference between the American idea of preparedness and the German idea becomes apparent. The American idea is preparedness for defense against attack.

The German idea includes this, but adds to it preparedness for defense of imperial intentions to extend German trade, German thought, and a system of government throughout the world by force —world empire or downfall, it has been called.

The underlying theory of militarism of course has been that, if all the resources of a nation are organized into a military system and that system is developed to its very highest efficiency in every one of its multiplicity of parts, it will be so powerful as to be irresistible against any combination of powers likely within human foresight to be brought against it; and that therefore no Power or likely combination of Powers will dare to attack it, on the one hand, and, on the other, it can enforce its

will on the world.

As opposed to this we have the rival theory that under modern conditions of civilization, whatever may have been the case in the ancient Roman world, no one or two or three States can dominate the whole world by force; that any State that disregards the natural and inherent rights of sovereign States and fails to show "a decent respect to the opinions of mankind" is bound to awaken into activity the latent moral and physical forces of the world; that aggressive actions threatening to obtain unjust advantage by force stimulate resistance, and that sooner or later, under the influence of public opinion, combinations of forces come into being which are too powerful to be overcome by any single power or possible alliance of powers.

A perfect analogy may be found in the great political conflict which of recent years agitated this country—the conflict between organized industries and organized capital on the one hand and public opinion on the other. Great aggregations of capital and industrial corporations, grown arrogant with power, undertook to extend their systems in disregard of the laws that protected the natural and inherent rights of individuals and lesser organizations, and to take what they wanted by the power which they wielded through their mighty militant organizations. In the pursuance of this policy there failed to be shown "a decent respect to the opinions of mankind." It was the principle of militarism adopted by industrialism and applied

by industrial force. Such overriding of the rights of others necessarily created an uprising of public opinion which gathered to itself the political powers of the nation and the States. These were more mighty than any that industrialism could mobilize. The result was such as might have been expected, and industrial militarism was overthrown.

As tested by the results of the conflict, industrial militarism proved itself a failure. Let us see how far German State militarism has proved successful as tested by this war. We are not concerned, of course, with the moral aspects of the question—with such questions as right and justice—but only with the pragmatic question of success or failure. If militarism can point to success, it can at least find one defense on the ground of necessity and expediency.

Has German Militarism been successful?

When one thinks of the great military successes achieved by the German armies thus far in this war, of the large regions of conquered territory in Belgium, France, Russia, and Serbia, one is prompted offhand to answer in the affirmative. But deeper consideration, I think, shows this view to be a superficial one. None of the armies of the great belligerents on either side has been destroyed. They all remain intact, and until the armies have been eliminated as effective forces, or their Governments rendered incapable by exhaustion of using them for further effective offense or resistance, it is idle to talk of victory for one side or the other. Against

the occupation of territory by the armies of the Central Empires may be set off:

1. The complete failure of their plan of campaign, designed years in advance, and to carry out which the German military organization had been perfected. So far from France being crushed and "bled white" by German preparedness, the German armies, after an early retreat, are held in their trenches, unable to move on the west, and on the east apparently are incapable of further advance.

2. The complete impotence of the German Navy, the bottling up of her merchant marine, the destruction of her commerce, and consequent impairment of her industries.

3. The loss of all Germany's colonies.

4. The encircling of Germany by an iron naval and military ring from which she cannot break out.

5. The indefinite isolation of Germany from commerce with over-sea nations and the continuous paralyzing of her industries by England's navy until England is satisfied with the terms of peace; thus probably enabling England to dictate terms.

6. The possible restriction, after the war, of Germany's commerce by preferential tariffs, mercantile port restrictions and other measures on the part of England and her colonies, France and Russia, against Germany and Austria.

These are offsets to the territories conquered by Germany and Austria. In view of them the final possession of the territories now held will be de-

termined by considerations governing the urgency or necessities for peace and not by the fact of temporary occupancy by force. But, however that may be, after giving the very maximum of weight to the initial territorial gains justly to be credited to militarism, including those in Serbia, let us look at the other side of the ledger and see what material and moral forces its very successes have called into being to threaten its supremacy.

By its own very example, the object lesson it has given, it has not only taught other nations the possibilities of military efficiency but, as a necessary reaction, has directly excited them to imitate the machine which German Militarism invented and to rival its standards. The results have been:

1. That France, at first half prepared, has in self-preservation developed and organized a military machine which, in proportion to its size, is the equal of Germany's. For this time was the sole requisite and this was gained when the German war machine was checked and held immobile after the first six weeks of war.

2. That the English nation, hitherto pursuing a policy opposed to the maintenance of large military land forces, has been stimulated to create for the purposes of this war a great military, industrial, and fighting machine which soon will be equal in efficiency to, and approximate in numbers of men, that of Germany. But, more important of all from the point of view of the validity of the theory of militarism, there have been evoked, as a reaction

to the threatening oppression of militarism, a solidified British public opinion and a national consciousness that not only accept military preparedness on land as a requisite for national security against force, but are inspired by a national will to destroy the militarism of German autocracy.

3. We are too far removed from Russia to judge the conditions there existing, but it is probably safe to assume that Russia, with her armies still intact, and taught by reverses, is reacting as England and France have done.

4. Even the United States has not remained quiescent. The thought of the nation has reacted to the object lesson of this war, and public opinion, as a counterforce, is fast being mobilized into a national will to oppose the threatening aggressions of militarism by a preparedness to meet the attacks of organized force with organized force.

5. But beyond these reactions, resulting in the mobilization of moral and physical forces against militarism, there have been other moral reactions of great portent. Without undertaking to pass judgment in a discussion of this kind on the rights and wrongs of the cause for which the belligerents of each side are contending, the lamentable fact still remains that the hatred and animosities that have been created in one people for another will prove to be both moral and industrial losses comparable to the loss of provinces.

There is another world condition which can be justly attributed to German Militarism and which

should be taken into consideration in the test of its success or failure as a policy of government. I refer to the world-wide hostility to and dislike of Germany and her system of government which now, it must be acknowledged, permeates almost all nations. Here, again, I wish to emphasize that I am not concerned with the rightness or wrongness, the justice or injustice, of this attitude of mind. I am dealing only with the psychological fact as determined by observation and of common acceptance.

Although this world attitude of mind has been brought to a culmination by the war and by contemporary studies of the German State forced into the focus of interest by the problems raised by the war, its origin can be traced to a succession of events, or better termed, perhaps, "crises," beginning at least twenty years ago. It has therefore been of gradual growth. Let me briefly sketch its history. We need not go further back than 1896, although it would be a serious omission to overlook the formation of the Dual Alliance in 1879, made into a Triple Alliance in 1883 by the union of Italy. For this alliance created a fear of Germany, and as a necessary reaction called forth the dual Franco-Russian alliance in 1891, to become the Triple Entente in 1904 and 1907 by "understandings" between England, France, and Russia. Potential force awakens distrust and creates preparations to use counterforce.

In 1896 the celebrated so-called Kruger tele-

gram of the Kaiser stirred the resentment of the English nation, even to the mobilization of her fleet, and set the people thinking. Suspicions of Germany's intentions became rife, and were kept alive during the next ten years by Germany's ambitions to wrest the supremacy of the seas from England; so that in 1908 the Emperor felt constrained to give out his famous London Telegraph interview in the hope to appease them. But the fear of German Militarism had taken deep root in the national consciousness of England and haunted her statesmen. Thus the germs of hostility to Germany were planted in the English mind.

In 1897 the act of German militarism that seized Kiao-Chau by force, in disregard of the sovereignty of China, shocked the public opinion of the world.

In 1898, in Manila Bay, the German Admiral Diederichs brought Germany to the brink of war with the United States, and the German Government attempted to form a European coalition against the United States for the purpose of intervening in our war with Spain. Though Dewey, supported by British ships under Captain Chichester, thwarted the scheme of the German Admiral, and the British Cabinet blocked the designs of the German Government, the seeds of a public opinion hostile to Germany were sown in the United States by these episodes, to germinate later in widespread suspicions of a German design to test the Monroe Doctrine.

In 1905 a diplomatic controversy with Germany over Morocco left France humiliated after the capture of Algeciras, with the resignation of Delcassé forced under the threat of war by Germany; Germany gained a point by militarism, but strengthened the entente of France with England against a common foe. Thus in France new seeds of hostility were sown by militarism.

In 1908 it was Russia's turn, when Germany, in disregard of both the Treaty of Berlin and the Treaty of London in 1871, compelled Russia by the threat of the sword to back down and assent to the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria. And Russia announced, "Never again!"

Then in 1911 came the crisis of Agadir, when Germany sent the *Panther* to that port and threatened to interfere for the second time by force with France in Morocco, and nearly brought on a European war. Though the German militarism backed down before the power of the combined fleets of France and England, it left increased feelings of hostility to Germany behind.

And so, whatever be the rights and the wrongs of the successive controversies in these crises, there has gradually been incubating for years in the world-consciousness an attitude of mind hostile to German militarism, and this has burst into full ripeness under the heat of resentment for wrongs committed against humanity and civilization during the present war. I have passed over, of course, a large number of co-operating happenings, such

as the German Emperor's appeal to Mohammedanism in 1898 and 1905, the militant naval program of 1897, the Venezuelan episode in which Roosevelt thwarted Germany's aggression against the Monroe Doctrine in 1902, the Casablanca affair in 1908, etc. I have selected only the more critical energizing causes of world hostility.

In view of these critical events, so far from Germany having kept the peace of Europe by the power of its army during the past twenty-five years, as has so often been proclaimed, she has, besides robbing China of a province in 1897, nearly precipitated war by the aggressive actions of her militarism on five different occasions: once in 1896 with England, twice with the United States (in 1898 and 1902), twice with France, in 1905 and in 1911, and once with Russia in 1908. And finally, by common consent, German Militarism incited the world cataclysm of 1914.

It is not given to any one to prophesy the final outcome of this war, but we can at least say this, that, whatever it may be, it is not conceivable that the successes of German militarism can be a recompense for its moral and material losses, and that it will not be left in a relatively far weaker condition for offense than before the war. Whatever may be the final result as determined by the terms of peace, German militarism at the end of the war will not only not have succeeded in gaining its long planned for ends of achieving its ambitions by force, but will have called into being a combination of op-

posing forces far more powerful than its own.

The Central Powers will find themselves surrounded by hostile powers not one of which will be more exhausted than Germany herself.

There will have been created in each of the greater allied nations—France, England, Russia * and Italy—a military organization, modeled after the German pattern, fully equipped and prepared and commanding all the mobilized industrial resources of the nation.

German Militarism will have awakened in every nation, including the United States, a complete understanding of the forces with which it will have to deal in the future—an understanding that was previously lacking—and will have created a preparedness by the great powers against attack which will guarantee that none can be taken unawares; will make another invasion impossible, and military threats impotent.

In other words, it will have created a world condition, probably with groups of offensive and defensive alliances, in view of which no nation, and no alliance of nations, can hope to aggressively enforce its policies against a great power by military force.

In other words, German Militarism, by its potential power and aggressive tactics, has called into being, as it was bound in time to do, forces more

* The sudden collapse of Russia from internal revolution could not, of course, be foreseen at this time (December, 1915) nor can we now (January, 1917) see what the final fate of Russia is to be.

powerful than itself.

By the test of this war, then, as I view the case, German Militarism has failed as a theory of empire. In this failure have we not the most powerful motive for an international court to enforce peace?

A WORLD CONSCIOUSNESS AND FUTURE PEACE

AN ADDRESS BEFORE THE "CONCORDIA ASSOCIATION" OF JAPAN, AT TOKYO, JUNE 13, 1916.

A WORLD CONSCIOUSNESS AND FUTURE PEACE

I

THE INDIVIDUAL CONSCIOUSNESS

THE newer Western psychology is giving us a deeper insight into the human mind than was possible by the older psychology. It is laying bare the hidden yearnings and aspirations and strivings of human beings whether as individuals, or collectively as families, civic communities or nations. And therefore it enables us to discover the real, the true motives which, underlying the superficial motives and apparent motives, determine human conduct, whether that conduct be an individual striving to accomplish his ambition, or a nation striving for World Empire.

This newer Western psychology is teaching us that the older psychology, the academic psychology of the universities is, as our great and lamented William James aptly expressed it, but the clanging of brass cymbals—much noise but without real meaning. The academic psychology is superficial in that it does not touch the profounder motives and mechanisms of human nature.

If we would understand the human mind we must

dive beneath the surface of consciousness, beneath the momentary ebullitions of thought. These, we are learning, are but the superficial, phenomenal and momentarily fragmentary manifestations of a larger and profounder consciousness. The teachings of modern investigations, and of our Western philosophical thought which those investigations have stimulated, is to regard our conscious thought as only a superficial consciousness and but a fragment of a larger mind which we term the subconscious or unconscious mind. As an English student, the late Frederick Myers, in his studies of "Human Personality" has expressed it, our thoughts and impulses at any given moment are but uprushes from this larger reservoir of consciousness. And, therefore, if we would discover the motives and springs to human action, the components and realities of human personality we must seek them by exploring not the superficial consciousness but below its threshold in the great, underlying consciousness and primitive inborn instincts of each individual. In this underlying subconsciousness, in this larger mind we find the solution of the riddle of personality and, more pragmatically important, the solution of the problems of what we may call the collective consciousness of communities.

By collective consciousness I mean, speaking generally, that unity of thought, those common ideals and that common will which take possession of the soul of a people—whether of small communities or of nations. Just as there is a personal

consciousness peculiar to the individual alone, so there is a larger family consciousness, a community consciousness, a civic consciousness and a national consciousness shared in common by the members of the group.

The larger subconscious mind can be reached by various devices: for instance, by putting ourselves in a state of deep revery or profound contemplation—that is, abstracted from all awareness of the immediate environment. Then there wells up a wealth of images and emotions and thoughts; and memories reaching, perhaps, far back into the past, and knowledge of the previously unknown. And of all this subconscious knowledge in our ordinary state of mind we were profoundly ignorant. But now we may see translucently, with almost a supernatural clearness and brightness of vision, what before was obscure or hidden. Thus to my way of thinking modern Western psychology and philosophy are reaching a point of approachment with Eastern philosophy, for it would seem to me, that it was this same subconscious mind that Buddha probably reached by profound contemplation. It is only a question of interpretation. Indeed, some Western thinkers, like Frederick Myers, would bring this great subconscious mind into close relation with a transcendental cosmic consciousness of which perhaps the individual consciousness is but one focus of intensity—a sort of vortex in a universal consciousness, or the energy of the Universe.

But we need not enter into that larger meta-

physical question which is far beyond my purpose. I want rather to treat of human personality and its ethical and pragmatic bearing upon individual and collective conduct. What then is the great subconscious mind that plays so large a part in personality?

It is impossible for me in such a brief address as this to treat this great subject with any fullness and you will not expect me, or indeed wish me, to do so. I should tire you if I did. It is indeed the great problem of the future. As M. Bergson, the French philosopher, has recently said: "To explore the most sacred depths of the unconscious, to labor in what I have just called the subsoil of consciousness, that will be the principal task of psychology in the century that is opening. I do not doubt that wonderful discoveries await it there, as important, perhaps, as have been in the preceding centuries the discoveries of the physical and natural sciences. That at least is the promise which I make for it, that is the wish that in closing I have for it."

I shall little more than touch upon it, sufficiently only to elucidate the main subject of my address.

Personality as Evolved by the Creative Force of the Experiences of Life

In this great underlying subsoil of consciousness are to be found the memories of a vast mass of experiences of life, extending, we may almost say,

from the cradle to the grave. Most of them are beyond voluntary recall as memory. By the term "experiences of life" you must understand all our conscious experiences of both our outer and inner life, our conscious experiences with the external world of men and things about us and our inner thoughts—our soul's thoughts. The subconscious thus includes the deposited experiences not only of our ephemeral everyday life, but of our whole acquired education, acquired from childhood to the grave—our pedagogical, our social, our religious, our ethical, our civic, our political and our patriotic education. It includes everything that has come to us by teaching from our ancestors and predecessors.

Within it, therefore, are to be found the formulated memories of codes of right conduct, codes of ethical precepts and of ideals. These when acquired in early life may have been repressed and lost sight of by the individual who, in later years, developed in an environment governed by antagonistic codes or allowed himself to be governed by instinctive impulses and interests of a conflicting character. But nevertheless they may still be subconsciously conserved ready to be called again into being by favoring influences.

A great mass of such experiences we conceive of as deposited as memories and dispositions to behavior, dispositions that may strive to find expression below the threshold of consciousness in the subconscious realm.

And then among the experiences of the inner life must be reckoned the strivings and conflicts of the soul—all that pertain to the innermost sanctuary of personality and character, the intimate communings with self, the doubts and fears and scruples pertaining to the moral, religious and other problems of life, and the struggles and trials and difficulties which beset its paths; the internal conflicts of the soul with the world, the flesh and the devil—conflicts which each individual may have undergone in efforts to adapt himself to the conflicting circumstances of his real life.

Memories of all these inner experiences, and of these and other unsolved problems of life are deposited in the subconscious mind. Sometimes it happens that, as in sudden religious conversion, they undergo subconscious incubation or reasoning and burst out into flower as a sudden realization of a religious truth.

By the creative force of all these life's experiences coöperating with the inborn primitive instincts —inborn in every individual—the subconscious mind is formed.

And out of the subconscious mind, as the acquired experiences of life, and these instincts are evolved and organized those tendencies, traits, ideals, and habits of mind and action which we term personality and character. I would, indeed, emphasize the primitive instincts because, besides all these acquired dispositions to behavior, there are, of course, inherited dispositions, by which we understand the

primitive instinctive impulses coming from all the inborn instincts of human nature. I mean the instincts of fear, and love, and anger, and aversion, and the sexual life, and their kind which motivate human nature.

The Subconscious as the Dynamic Source of Conduct

But a small fraction only of all these subconscious memories emerge as conscious processes of thought. The greater portion remain beneath the threshold and tend, unconsciously, to shape and determine our conscious processes—our judgments, ideals, beliefs, conventions, points of view, habits and the tendencies of our mental lives. Whence these come, how they were born, we often have long ceased to remember. For they have not only their roots but the springs which motivate them deep down in the subconscious past. Indeed there is reason to believe that in profound thought it is the subconscious that does the real work. Drawing upon the deposited experiences of the past for the conscious needs of the moment, it thrusts up into consciousness for consideration a selected series of germane ideas. From these our consciousness at such moments does little more than choose those judged adequate to meet the conditions of the problem.

As I said at the beginning, though we cannot by conscious effort attain to all our subconscious knowledge, yet, by special devices, like profound media-

tion, abstraction, revery, etc., we can bring a large amount to the full light of consciousness.

Thus it comes about that our reactions to the environment, our moral and social conduct, our sentiments and feelings, our points of view and attitudes of mind—all that we term character and personality—are predetermined by mental experiences of the past by which they are developed, organized and conserved in the subconscious mind. We react with hatred or with love, with loyalty or disloyalty, with sympathy or with aversion, to the traits, or character, or principles, or ideals, or behavior of some other being, or group of beings, or nation, because in the past there have been incorporated in our personalities and conserved in our subconscious minds sentiments, points of view, ethical principles, habits of mind, desires, tendencies, primitive instincts, etc., in harmony with or antagonistic to them. We are thus the offspring of our past and the past is the present. It may be that in certain cases such reactions are, as the newer psychology teaches, the outcome, the conscious expression of unrecognized conflicts with subconscious strivings or self-reproaches, if you like. But that is a detail of mechanisms with which we need not concern ourselves here as it does not affect the fundamental principle.

II

THE COLLECTIVE CONSCIOUSNESS

Thus far I have been concerned with the development of the consciousness peculiar to the individual—his personality.

But an individual is a unit in a community, and in the development of his personality he acquires systems of ideals and habits of mind and actions which are not peculiar to himself but are common to the community—*i. e.,* to a group of individuals united by common ties, and associations, and traditions and interests. These systems may be called a *collective consciousness,* because they are possessed in common by a collection of individuals. Hence it is that we have what is commonly spoken of as the *social consciousness.* It needs but a little thought to appreciate that this embodies established habits of thought and ideals and sentiments which underlie the customs, manners and etiquettes, the habits and modes of living peculiar to social groups, the social, philanthropic and other obligations of one individual to another and to the body of the community; the accepted principles of social morality. In recognition of such a collective consciousness and the social conduct regulated and determined by it, there has come into being a specialized field of study known as social psychology.

As there are many different kinds of social

groups, and as different groups become united into larger groups with common ties, so there are many different collective consciousnesses, or community consciousnesses.

Types of Collective Consciousness

There is the *family* consciousness in which are embodied, among much else, ideals of affection and loyalty of each member to each of the others and to the whole as a unit.

There used to be the *clan* consciousness of feudal times. There is the *caste* consciousness, such as was that of the *samurai* of Japan, of the Brahmins of India, the ancient noblesse of France, the knights of the days of King Arthur in England; and there is that of the military caste of Germany to-day, and the democracy of America; and so on.

More important for us to-day from a political point of view and of modern civilization is the civic community consciousness common to groups of individuals united for purposes of commercial, industrial and social interests and orderly government. Thus the citizens of Tokyo and every city have a civic consciousness. And still more important there is in every nation a state or national consciousness.

The Development of a Collective Consciousness

Now the first point that I would like to make is that the same principle underlying the devel-

opment of the consciousness peculiar to the individual and characteristic of his own personality brings about the organization of a collective consciousness. But here it is the creative force of *common* experiences. Through a common ethical and social education, and, in the case of political groups, political education, common *habits of thought,* common *sentiments* and *ideals,* common *aversions,* common *desires,* and common *habits of action* are established and firmly conserved in the consciousness of the members of the group. Similarly a common point of view and a common attitude of mind towards the circumstances of the social organization and of everyday life become developed. And, most important, as I shall presently point out, things and ideas of common experience become possessed of a *common meaning* for every individual.

Further, out of a collective consciousness by the force of common ideals and common desires, there necessarily develops a unity of thought, and common *will* which impel towards uniformity of behavior. But all is not explicitly conscious. The processes of the mind and conduct, in losing their plasticity and becoming fixed, necessarily become largely matters of habit and of second nature; which means that they have become organized below the threshold of consciousness and have their roots and sources of energy in subconsciously conserved experiences of the past. Each one of us would find it difficult or impossible to explain why

he has the same viewpoint as the rest of the community, why the same ideals, the same desires, the same will; why he regulates his conduct in the same way towards everyday life. He would give you undoubtedly an explanation, reasons that seem plausible to himself, but the real reason is that his social and ethical education have left dispositions to thought, dispositions to action—sort of phonographic records—in his subconsciousness, out of which have crystallized, as a sort of résumé, habit reactions. These govern him in spite of himself, even though he struggles hard against their impulses. And this is also in large part the case because through education the primitive instinctive impulses of human nature have been enlisted and harnessed to serve the habits of the social ideals, or brought under control and repressed in accordance with the aims of the community consciousness.

Furthermore we see the collective mind manifesting the same reactions to subconscious processes as does the individual mind. Thus we frequently see the consciousness of a community or nation reacting to the conduct of another community or nation with aversion or hatred, just as Germany does to-day towards England. The ostensible and given reason is because of some alleged immorality of conduct, like hypocrisy, that shocks the common ideal. But the real reason is because of a common baffled *subconscious* desire, or jealousy, or fear, dictated perhaps by self-interest and unacknowledged,

to which aversion or hatred is only the common conscious reaction.

A Common Meaning to Ideals Essential to a Collective Consciousness

The unity of the collective mind depends in no small degree upon ideas acquiring a *common meaning* for all the members of the community. This principle has far-reaching consequences. I do not refer to the dictionary meaning, or the etymological meaning, but rather to the meaning which ideas connote through their associations and implications. The meaning of the national flag of every nation is easily defined in a dictionary as a piece of cloth of a certain color and design, but it has, over and above this, an additional patriotic meaning for all the people of that nation which it has for the people of no other. And the meaning, when it is awakened, sends a thrill of emotional impulses throbbing through the veins which no dictionary meaning could do. And likewise patriotism, duty, morality, virtue, truth, honesty, valor, humanity, culture, and such ideas too often connote a different meaning to people of different communities and different nations, as we unfortunately see exemplified in the present war. And similarly ideas of relationship like wife, father, emperor, subject, citizen; conceptions such as God, religion, temple, connote different meanings to different people, individually or collectively; and so on. And thus it is that ac-

cording as ideas have a common meaning in this sense, they play a large part in determining the unity of the social consciousness, on the one hand, and variations in the customs, manners and habits of different communities.

Let us not forget that it is one's own personal experiences of life that give that special connoted meaning to ideas which is peculiar to each one of us, and therefore that shape your and my points of view and attitudes of mind towards the life about us. And according as these experiences are unique for each of us or are shared by the other members of the community, will the *meaning* of a given idea and the point of view and attitude of mind be purely personal or common to a group of individuals as part of a collective consciousness. Consider, for example, the difference in meaning of the word "son" for you and for me, according as the context shows it to mean *your* son or *my* son. Your son means something more and different to you than to me. Why? Because a large number of personal and intimate experiences have woven or systematized about the idea many sentiments and memories which give it a peculiarly personal meaning for you: and correspondingly in my case. And so our points of view and attitudes of mind towards your son and my son are different. But there is also a social meaning which we share in common. This is because, besides those experiences, intimate and personal, peculiar to ourselves, there are many experiences associated with this idea of filial relationship

which are common to most members of the community. These are derived from a common social education and environment. They may be ideas held in common of paternal and filial duty and obligations and affections and inheritance, etc. In this way there emerges a collective meaning which belongs to the collective consciousness. The experiences which provide this connoted meaning is called in psychological language the "setting" or "apperceptive mass." But there could be no "setting" or "apperceptive mass" and no persistent connoted meaning to ideas—no persistent point of view —unless life's experiences were conserved when out of mind as subconscious dispositions.

This is one of the principles according to which the points of view and attitudes of mind and ideals of different communities—the collective consciousness of communities—may differ or be identical regarding even the fundamentals of the social organization and conduct. According to differences in the settings appear differences in the ideals of the collective consciousness of different communities, whether of a circumscribed locality or a nation. Such differences underlie the variations in the codes, customs, manners and etiquette of the different classes of society and of nations.

I hardly need say that the formation of a collective consciousness regarding many matters begins in child-life in the home; regarding others, such as political ideals, later in life in the social world. In child-life moral and social ideals begin to be formed.

The formative influences here are the family, the school and social environment. The active forces are on the one hand repressive, and on the other creative. Either force may consciously or unconsciously be directed by the environment. Both, of course, are in principle educational. I suppose that in no country does repression play so dominant and large a part as in Japan. By repression the instinctive inborn impulses and tendencies in conflict with the ideals of the collective consciousness are inhibited and kept in check, and thus prevented from forming habits. On the other hand by the creative force of education ideas are instilled and systematized into a collective ideal that shall be a habit of thought. But from childhood and even infancy the individual begins to undergo repression and to accumulate the creative experiences that are to form the meaning of his ideas and establish his points of view. Many of these are the basis upon which manners, customs and etiquette rest. Indeed he is permitted, or directly required, to have these experiences because they are either the necessary resultant of the already existing habits of society or are demanded by society.

Is it any wonder then that nations have a difficulty in understanding, and therefore have a lack of sympathy with the customs and manners and ideals of one another? Ideas through differences in the apperceptive mass come to have a different meaning for different nations. Even those of father, mother, son, daughter, virtue, morality, *set* in a

mass of different associated ideas of duties, obligations, etc., have acquired social meanings that show marked variations for each nation corresponding with the social customs and codes of each, such as those of marriage and inheritance. That which is repressed by the social consciousness of one people may be entirely neglected or encouraged by that of another. In this particularly the Oriental and Occidental nations stand sharply contrasted. Note, as a simple example, nudity which is strongly repressed in everyday life by Occidentals, but is disregarded by Orientals so that it becomes a commonplace fact of daily life for the child as well as adult. The result is that while with the former nudity has a meaning that excites lively reactions from its apperceptive mass—the social root ideas which have been both its source and the repressing force—with the latter it arouses no more emotional reaction than would pots, kettles and pans. Likewise exposure of the face with Moslems has a meaning and causes reactions that belong to exposure of other parts of the body with people having other social codes. It is impossible, therefore, for one nation to completely understand the meaning of many social ideas of another nation, and therefore the corresponding points of view, without acquiring the same apperceptive mass—that is to say, without undergoing the same social education from childhood to adult life.

Through this same principle we find the difficulty of some nations—nations that are composed of poly-

glot people, racially and in stock heterogeneous,—acquiring a national consciousness rich in common ideals. Such common ideals as exist are, for the most part, instinctive and of the kind found in primitive tribes. They may be limited to defense of the national domain against encroachments of territory or defense against military aggressions upon national sovereignty and national interests. Such, for example, must be the case of the Austrian Empire with its polyglot people—Magyar, Germans, Bohemians, Roumanians, Slovenes, Slovaks, Serbs, Croats, and others. The same difficulty besets, even if in less degree, the United States, with its one hundred millions of people drawn from every race on the globe and now in the "melting pot." Out of that melting-pot will come some day a people with a national consciousness, common ideals, which will be the spiritual inspiring force of the nation. The same difficulty may arise even within homogeneous nations, wherein the disintegrating influences of modern economic, individual and political development have created heterogeneous class divisions based upon demoralizing social philosophy and selfish conflicting interest to the disregard of the interest of the national whole. Under such conditions the national consciousness becomes shorn of many of its most spiritual, amalgamating and inspiring ideals that give unity and force to a nation. Among these are ideals of personal self-sacrifice at the behest of national duty, the obligation of the individual to subordinate private rights

and selfish interests to the good of the State and the spiritual obligation of universal service in whatever field and wherever required by the State for its safety. In such a situation of disintegrated ideals England awoke at the outbreak of this war, and wondered with the whole world at her internal weakness. Nations, like individuals, must sometimes be tried in adversity to find themselves, to recover their ideals. And so England in the baptism of calamity has found herself, and in the finding has acquired ideals that have crystallized the soul of the nation into a spiritual force.

The Social Consciousness as the Regulator of Society

The second point I want to make is that the collective consciousness of the social organization—the social consciousness—plays a greater part in governing and regulating society than laws, or the military or police forces of even the most autocratic government. And this it does through the development of those habits of mind and action that underlie social customs and of an instinctive sense of social obligation which is the foundation of society. Lord Haldane, the former British Minister of War, dwelt upon this fact in a remarkable address just a year before the present war, and pointed out, as I shall also later argue, that it is not chimerical to hope that through the international extension of this type of collective conscious-

ness, it may become a common consciousness of nations—a *world consciousness.* If so, the duties and obligations of one nation to another may be regulated by it, and future wars prevented.

He laid stress upon the fact that the Germans have a word which he thought may be used to designate this particular field of the social consciousness. It is Sittlichkeit. The German philosopher Fichte has defined Sittlichkeit as "those principles of conduct which regulate people in their relations to each other and therefore have become matters of habit and second nature at the stage of culture reached, and of which, therefore, we are not explicitly conscious." But Sittlichkeit implies moral principles and it would seem preferable not to attempt to define too narrowly those principles, and therefore the kind of customs of society which perform this function. The fact requiring emphasis is that social customs become so much matters of habit that we are not explicitly conscious of the sense of social obligation and other principles which compel obedience to them.

This field of the social consciousness embraces a code of social ethics and of manners and customs to which the conduct of each member of the community must be conformed under penalty of the social *tabu.* And it embraces what we call the *social conscience* in which are crystallized the ideals, the soul of the community. It manifests itself through that great and powerful arbiter of private and community conduct, Public Opinion—the opinion

of the collective consciousness. The code of the social consciousness embodies or connotes duties and obligations which each citizen owes to society and the common welfare and each other. It embodies customs and manners which respect the rights and liberties and happiness which every citizen is entitled to enjoy without molestation by his fellows. It is thus a *system* of thought and customs based upon common points of view and attitudes of mind towards community life, grown into habit, and under which social customs have become established. As the social conscience it is the censor which punishes with the moral reprobation of public opinion infringement by the individual of those customs and of the social codes which the social conscience has established.

Out of this ethical and social system there develops a unity of thought and a common ideal and "common desire which can be made to penetrate the soul of the people and to take complete possession of it."* And necessarily there follows in consequence of psychological laws a "general will with which the will of the good citizen is in accord." This will of the community (inspired by the common ideal and desires) is common to all the individuals composing it. Herein lies the power of public opinion to which all governments bow and which all governments seek for their own support. Public opinion contains the potential common will which if not heeded will enforce the ideals of the

* Haldane.

social conscience.

To realize the truth of all this we have only to examine our own daily social habits and customs and behavior in relation to society. We then see, although we are not explicitly aware of it, that these are dictated by the social consciousness and not by our own personal desires. For if we imagine any radical departure from them we at once feel within us the deterring force of social criticism.

It is interesting to note that such a collective consciousness, in principle, is analogous to Bushido, which Professor Nitobe has so charmingly explained to English readers was "a code of moral principles which the knights were required to observe in the regulation of the ways of their daily life as well as in their vocation." Only Bushido was the collective consciousness of a *caste,* while "Sittlichkeit" is that of a whole community or state or nation.

Now it is a commonly accepted fact, as Lord Haldane pointed out, that the citizen is governed in his social conduct only to a relatively small extent by statutory laws and physical force, on the one hand, and by the dictates of his own individual conscience and his instinctive desires and impulses on the other. To a much larger extent he is governed by the more extensive system of the collective consciousness whether of the civic, state or national community. Even laws, in a democracy at least, must be the expression of the community consciousness, that is to say, of public opinion and the com-

mon will, or else they cannot be enforced, and it is really this collective consciousness that is the power behind the law. And still more is it true that the individual in his everyday life is regulated and governed not by law, but by habits of mind and customs and codes. From the moment we rise in the morning to the time we go to bed at night our social behavior is governed not by legal law but by customs and habits. Nearly everything we do, even the time of getting up and the time of going to bed, as well as the kind of bed we sleep in—whether we lie on the floor as in Japan or on a bedstead as in the western world; what shall we do and what we shall not do, and the way we shall do it; our manners and behavior towards one another; the way we shall live, our ceremonies and our etiquette; in short our daily conduct is regulated by customs established by the principles of the social codes. These become second nature, almost automatic and instinctive. They are, therefore, governed by systems of mental dispositions organized in the mind by the social education.

Indeed, from the very beginning of social life in the nursery, education consists in the repression of the barbaric instincts with which every child is born, bringing the savage impulses of his nature under control and adapting the child and the man to the customs and ideals of the civilization to which he belongs: in other words, to developing in him the community consciousness with its habits of mind and behavior.

Every child is born a savage; he only acquires culture and the common ideals and the common will of the social conscience.

The collective consciousness, then, is the foundation of the social organization; without it the organization would fall to pieces. If this be so, is it not because of the lack of an international collective consciousness, one of ethical codes and possessed in common by all the great peoples of the world—a world consciousness—that the world to-day has fallen to pieces in this holocaust of war?

A World Consciousness

What hope does psychology hold out to civilization? The common ideals of a collective consciousness respect and protect the rights of individuals and regulate their relations to one another *within* the nation. May it not be that, with time, fostered by systematic worldwide teaching, there may be developed an international consciousness, or world consciousness so far as concerns international relations? And may it not be that the principles of such a consciousness will regulate the nations in their relations to one another to the same extent that the social and national consciousness within a single nation regulate the relations of the people to one another, and, in the United States to-day, the relations of the sovereign states of the American Union to one another? In such a world consciousness there would grow up common habits of

mind that would become second nature—common points of view, common ideals of right and wrong in the dealings of one nation with another.

Likewise conceptions of humanity, of liberty and of the obligations of one people to another would have a common meaning, which is not the case to-day. In a consciousness of this kind, among the international habits of thought would be that of respecting the rights and interests of other nations whether large countries like China or small ones like Serbia, and the habit of repressing desires which have for an object the selfish aggrandizement of a nation at the expense of weaker ones. Such a world consciousness would mean desire, grown into habit and customs, to respect the rights of foreign peoples under international law, which, in turn, would be truly the expression of world ideals and desires, not of selfish interests as to-day, and the habit of looking to arbitration and conciliation to compose the conflicting interests of nations. The imponderable force of such a consciousness would offer the strongest support to international law—the power behind the law—and out of such ideals and such desires, when established, there would necessarily develop a general will to peace and a will to fulfil the obligations imposed by the ideals.

Theoretically the attainment of a world consciousness of this kind is psychologically possible, and if ever attained it would necessarily have the same binding force in regulating international conduct as has the social consciousness within a nation

to-day. To reach such an end the old world-habit of mind—the habit of thinking in war terms, of turning at first thought to war as a necessary means of settling international disputes, must be broken. A world conscience will be the censor which, like the social censor, will threaten with the *tabu* a breach of treaties of international customs, codes and habits of conduct. The ideals of the German autocracy and of the German military caste as taught, by their philosophers and publicists like Treitschke and Nietzsche and military writers like Bernhardi and their Kaiser, such ideals as "Might makes Right," "World Empire or Downfall," "It is the duty of great nations to make war on weak nations," "Little nations have no rights which powerful nations are bound to respect," and "Nothing shall happen in this world without Germany being consulted," in short "Kultur" and the worship of force, all such military ideals must give place to the ideals of that collective consciousness of the German people that govern them in their relations to each other within the Empire and to a newly created collective consciousness of the world. The war attitude of mind of the German autocracy and military caste, which, like a mental disease, has permeated and taken possession of the soul of the German people in its attitude towards other nations, must give place to a world consciousness.

If such a world consciousness should be developed, one nation will understand another because the ideals of the common consciousness will have

the same meaning. We shall think in the same language though we do not speak it. It is not through militarism, nor by piling up armaments, nor by a "league to enforce peace" that a world peace can be perpetually maintained. Such methods can be only temporary. Nor in the future when all nations shall be equally armed to the teeth and all the peoples of all the nations mobilized into armies, as will be the case after this war, can even just aspirations be attained and international disputes and conflicts of interest be settled by arms, because there must result a dead-lock of force. Some other mode must be found. May not these legitimate aims be reached without war when the great nations arrive at an international consciousness, with common ideals, a common understanding, and a common will.†

A world consciousness in international relations —that is the vision I see, the dream that psychology permits us to have. May that dream come true!

† The thesis of such a world consciousness which Lord Haldane ably presented from a legal standpoint and which I have endeavored to develop along psychological lines necessarily, of course, assumes the coöperation of an international police of some kind, just as the social consciousness is supplemented by a civic and national police. There are "Apache" or bandit nations as there are bandits within the social organization of every nation, and in the case of revolutions the rights of foreign nationals must be protected from mob violence.

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